DISSENT

VIETNAM & "THE GREAT SOCIETY"

A. Philip Randolph Proposes a "Freedom Budget"
Jack Rader Analyzes LBJ's War-Peace Priorities
Irving Howe Discusses New Phase in Vietnam War

LAURA CARPER, FRANK RIESSMAN

THE NEGRO FAMILY AND WHITE LIBERALS

CHRISTOPHER JENCKS

WHO SHOULD CONTROL EDUCATION?

PAUL FELDMAN

NEW WINDS ON THE CAMPUS

GERTRUDE EZORSKY

HANNAH ARENDT ANSWERED

LIONEL ABEL

SO WHO'S NOT MAD?

Marat/Sade & the Problem of Nihilism

MARCH-APRIL 1966 75c.

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AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Tom Kahn is Executive Director of the League for Industrial Democracy. . . . Jack Rader is a veteran contributor to DISSENT who, after a long absence, happily returns to our pages. . . . A. Philip Randolph is, of course, the distinguished Negro labor leader. . . . Murray Hausknecht teaches sociology at Hunter. . . . A new contributor, Laura Carper, works for the Michigan Civil Rights Commission. . . . Frank Riessman, also new to DISSENT, is professor of Educational Sociology at NYU. . . . Christopher Jencks, a contributing editor of *The New Republic,* is a Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington. . . . Lionel Abel is author of *Metatheatre.* . . . Gertrude Ezorsky, a second contributor, teaches philosophy at Brooklyn College. Her article "Hannah Arendt Against the Facts" appeared in Fall 1963 in *New Politics.* . . . Paul Feldman, still another new contributor, edits the Socialist Party paper *New America.* . . . Rita Hinden edits *Socialist Commentary* in London . . . Howard Meyer is a New York lawyer who has specialized in studies of American Negro history. . . . Gordon Haskell is on the staff of the American Civil Liberties Union. . . . Sheila Rush is a staff attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. . . . Robert Boyers edits *Salmagundi,* a new literary-political journal.

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THE VIETNAM CRISIS

speakers:

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editor, *Dissent*

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professor of history, Yale University

JOHN P. ROCHE
former chairman, ADA

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Henry Pachter, Michael Walzer and Arthur Waskow in a panel discussion on:

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DISSENT is a journal devoted to the ideas and values of democratic socialism. It seeks to serve as a forum for writers devoted to these ideas and values, while also welcoming a wide variety of other opinions. Each writer speaks for himself; there is no effort made to exact editorial consensus or uniformity.

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A BI-MONTHLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

Tom Kahn

A Report on the LID

The first year of the effort to reinvigorate the League for Industrial Democracy has been completed. It is time to take stock.

When Michael Harrington was named LID Chairman in September, 1964, and a young staff took over the office, we sought to avoid the grandiose predictions of progress that frequently characterize organizational motions on the American Left. We spoke, rather, of reestablishing the League as an educational and intellectual center among the movements for democratic social change. We saw opportunities to bring together intellectuals, civil rights activists, trade unionists and students—not into an all encompassing ersatz political party but into dialogue and association. There were signs of a revival of radical energy, and we wanted to make a contribution to its programmatic development.

In this context 1965 was a year of steady, encouraging gains and important new departures. The housekeeping statistics are good: LID membership has grown by well over 50%; the budget has doubled, and so has the staff (most of whom, incidentally, are under 30). Norman Thomas and Harry Laidler, stalwart voices for democratic socialism, have been joined on the Board of Directors by a host of new faces—Bayard Rustin, Irving Howe, Norman Hill, Frank Riessman, Patricia Sexton, Donald Slaiman, and others.

(*Continued on page* 217)

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COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

A Turn for the Worse in Vietnam

"We have been patient for five years with those who offered a military solution in Vietnam," said Senator McGovern. "Now let us be equally patient in the effort to find a peaceful solution." But the official "patience" of the U.S. went no further than 37 days. After that, the U.S. resumed bombing of North Vietnam—despite the acknowledged fact that such bombing has little military value; despite the certainty that it could only call into question the sincerity of LBJ's "peace offensive"; despite the likelihood that large sections of world opinion would again turn against the U.S.; and despite the revelation that the U.S. military build-up during those 37 days exceeded that of the other side, thereby undercutting the rationale that bombing was required by security needs. Whatever gain for peace there may be in submitting the Vietnam issue to the UN has largely been cancelled out by this brutal and disastrous decision to resume the bombing.

We shall return in detail to this matter in our next issue, but here are a few interim notes:

• Hanoi shares responsibility for the escalation of the war. Its defenders say the U.S. "peace offensive" was insincere. Why then—perhaps Staughton Lynd will tell us—did not Hanoi call Johnson's bluff and thereby expose him? Why did not Hanoi and the Viet Cong propose immediate negotiations at which all belligerents would be recognized? Like certain elements in Washington, the North Vietnamese seem still to look forward to a full military victory. This expectation, whether realistic or not, whether expressed by Gen. Taylor or Gen. Giap, should be condemned by everyone who wants peace in Vietnam.

• The only encouraging news has been the crystallization of a significant opposition in the U.S. Senate, led by Fulbright and Morse. This is a political fact of great importance. To sustain and strengthen this Senatorial opposition should now be a primary task for the peace movement, so that criticism of the war can be transformed into a mainstream issue of U.S. politics.

• A critically ambiguous issue remains the status of the NLF, the Vietcong political arm, in future negotiations. If one may trust Averill Harriman's statement of Feb. 6, the U.S. is gracelessly preparing to accept the right of the NLF to appear in its own name at the bargaining table. This, if true, should remove a barrier to negotiations, or what the Communists say is a barrier. We support such a move; but we do not support the Hanoi demand that the Viet Cong be recognized in advance as "the sole legitimate" spokesman for South Vietnam. To do that would leave little to negotiate.

• What has been lost politically can-

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not be recaptured militarily; what cannot be recaptured militarily is not to be snatched away in negotiations. Political realism suggests that negotiations will lead to a recognition of Viet Cong power in South Vietnam, with the hope that something like free elections under UN supervision may provide a check to that power. Little encouraging to democrats or socialists is likely to follow negotiations, but to escalate the war can only lead to something far worse, a magnification of disaster and death. I. H.

Jack Rader

Vietnam and Meat in the Sandwich

The President's rhetoric is fine; the implementation much less impressive. It will not, in fact, do at all.

It is useful that the President, in his State of the Union and subsequent messages, acknowledged that the war in Vietnam could not be used to submerge every social requirement. His assertion that "we will not permit" Vietnam to deflect from "prosecuting with vigor and determination our war on poverty" keeps Negro rights and the Great Society programs on the public agenda.

But we are less cheered by what is disclosed in a critical scrutiny of practical commitments. However valuable the Administration's assertion may be in principle, the gap between rhetoric and proposals is very wide.

> *For the President was no less ambiguous in declaring that Vietnam "must be the center of our concerns." The Great Society, the War on Poverty, and all the rest, will just have to get along on what is left. Since what is left in this super-abundant economy is considerable, there will be money to carry on with reforms already set in motion, and to add a few new ones. But the scale, the seriousness of the commitment—these are in doubt.*

The scale of appropriations projected by the Administration for social change has to be measured, after all, against a $725 billion economy that is growing at the rate of $47–50 billions a year. As the Economic Report notes, "production for Vietnam accounts for less than one and one half per cent of our GNP." Still, seven per cent of the Gross National Product is devoted to goods and services in the military budget. And military appropriations of $50 or more billion a year for more than a decade have certainly kept destructive capacity well above the overkill level.

Apart from the Republican nean-

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derthals, no one can seriously entertain the siphoning of the annual economic increment into the Vietnam War. This is not today a country tightening its belt; and it would be frightful to countenance that necessity for so dismal an object as the Vietnam war. The living is still mighty easy and high—for many, but not for all; and that is a little qualification that concerns bread, and if not bread then what to put on it, for *millions* of people. This is a country where corporate retained earnings rose by a fantastic 29 per cent in a single year—last year, and where every index and fact around us proclaims that we are in the midst of unimagined abundance.

The bulk of the so-called Great Society programs are not concerned with poverty. The War on Poverty is one phase, and in terms of funds, a small phase, of the many facets of national change inherited from the dormant Eisenhower years. The majority of the beneficiaries of the Great Society programs will not be the underclass of 35 million poor, but the middle and upper classes.

How then are we to evaluate the Administration's non-military proposals?

1. Their encyclopedic spread tends to diffuse the national purpose and resources. It's a grab bag and the danger in any grab bag is that those with the longest reach get away with the biggest prize. The economy, as it presently functions, works in that direction anyway. Innumerable studies demonstrate that while the poor may not be getting poorer in absolute terms, the discrepancy between their living standards and that enjoyed by the great majority is widening. Nothing in the Johnson program is geared to reverse this trend.

There is lots of movement, innovation, action in the program; indeed, LBJ seems ready to abscond with the JFK trademark—"vigor." But there is precious little focus, no clear scale of priorities. Politically this makes everything elusive for the President's critics; but it also obscures and minimizes the depth and quality of the social change required to root out institutionalized exclusions and deprivations, the complex social and economic network which bars the poor from the blessings of plenty. Nothing as yet proposed by the Administration even begins to come to grips with this problem.

2. More specifically, there is a disappointing omission of any reference to the forthcoming White House conference which will convene under presidential auspices to evolve proposals that go beyond the securing of legal rights and begin to tackle the basic social, economic and educational problems of the Negro. It is disappointing because it was Mr. Johnson's idea, presented dramatically at the Howard University commencement last June. For the first time a president had stepped beyond the legal bounds of government responsibility and proclaimed that the Administration would make it a matter of national policy to explore the means by which the Negro's accumulations of disabilities could finally be lifted.

It was a promising declaration. Unfortunately, it got bogged down in the Moynihan report even before it convened. But a preparatory meeting was held at the White House, out of which

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came not the Moynihan report, but an entirely new and revolutionary concept, the Freedom Budget. Nowhere does the President indicate any awareness of this radically exciting approach to the problem he defined.

> *A. Philip Randolph's remarks on the Freedom Budget idea appear elsewhere in this issue. It is instructive to compare the methodology and objectives of the Freedom Budget with the Administration's social program for the alleviation of poverty. The Freedom Budget takes a total approach. It makes a long range commitment to the elimination of the entire poverty syndrome. It not only estimates what it would cost but demonstrates where the money could come from. How different in scope and imagination from the piecemeal, fragmented, allocations of the Administration budget!*

The Johnson budget proposes to increase all the Great Society allocations by $2.7 billions in the next fiscal year, of which funds earmarked for the whole gamut of War on Poverty operations is to rise from $1.2 billions to $1.7 billions. This indication that Vietnam will not be allowed to interfere with the essential improvement of the life of America's neediest, comes to hardly more than the cost of a lunar probe and far less than the cost of developing the proposed mach 3 commercial airliner. The Freedom Budget tentatively projects outlays of the range of $40 billion.

Far-fetched, visionary, impractical beyond the means? At least two recent precedents come to mind. Early in the decade, when Kennedy set the target of landing a man on the moon by 1970, an expenditure of 20 billion dollars was projected and the ultimate cost, we may be sure, will exceed that. Whatever one's feelings about spending this much money for such a purpose, one cannot deny the boldness of the idea.

An even more spectacular example was the presentation to Congress of President Eisenhower's plan to construct a national Inter-State Highway System of 41,000 miles of roads at a cost of 100 billion dollars over a period of years which was subsequently adopted as a 41 billion dollar program. And, in fact $14,168,000,000 went for new roads in 1965—more than for the entire War on Poverty, Federal aid to education, and the entire foreign aid bill. Whatever one feels about the place of the automobile in American life, the point is that even during the political void of the Eisenhower era, a national problem was taken in hand and the money for it built into the Federal budget. Obviously poverty cannot be equated with a trip to the moon or road construction, but is it not time to approach the problem on a similar scale and with similar commitment? Should not this become the measuring rod by which we gauge the War on Poverty?

3. Another glaring omission in the Johnson program is the absence of any proposal to raise the minimum wage. It is difficult to see how poverty can be seriously attacked without an increase in the minimum wage to at least $2.00 an hour. The present $1.25 does not even assure the $3,000 national poverty income level! Indeed, the sections of

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presidential papers dealing with wages are concerned almost exclusively with holding the line at the 3.2 maximum allowable annual increase. This is not the place to discuss the formula itself which is arbitrary, inimical to collective bargaining, and not blended to specific needs. An increase of 3.2 per cent over $1.25 will also miss reaching the poverty line. Besides, the Administration has linked wages and prices in a tight equation, and proposes to hold the line on both. But meanwhile there is really no hold on profits. Mr. Johnson proclaims a 29 per cent increase in a single year as a credit to his economic policy. General Motors earned $2.1 billion in profits; and all the transit workers in New York collectively won a few million increase or a few bucks for each man, which was assailed as exceeding the 3.2 formula. The inequity is too obvious.

4. The whole matter of how poverty is defined is not viewed with a fresh eye. There is no indication in the Presidential pronouncements that the whole notion of a $3,000 boundary which supposedly separates those who are poor from those who are not is being seriously questioned inside government and out. One example: Herbert Bienstock, New York Regional Director for the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in a paper on "The Facts of Poverty in New York City," estimates that in 1959 it took $5,970 for a family of four to survive at "level of adequate living," which is defined as providing "according to prevailing standards, what is needed for health, efficiency, the nurture of children and for participation in social and community activities, as 'modest but adequate.' " Ironically, he notes that this budget has not been repriced since—that is, since the War on Poverty was proclaimed.

The $3000 poverty line has become too quickly institutionalized as the national barometer. But to bring people up to this level is hardly to remove them from the edge of the abyss. One of the features of the "line" is that large numbers of people hover about it; each year some moving over it and next year falling below again, for the simple reason that a $3000 income does not allow anyone to make a decisive break with his conditions.

> *Unfortunately, the poverty programs have yet to recognize the importance of job security, permanent employment, assurance of moving ahead both in income and function. These are as essential to breaking the poverty cycle as the amount of annual earnings. Mr. Johnson is delighted with the decrease of unemployment last year among Negroes and generally, but we do not know how much of this is due to the stepped-up draft, which is taking a disproportionate share of poor youth for the simple reason that they are not eligible for student deferments. More fundamentally what is lacking is the establishment of national responsibility to assure jobs for all.*

There is little comfort in the President's assurance that unemployment is down to 4 per cent. It remains twice that among Negroes generally, and three to four times that among Negro youth. They still have no place to go. Social dynamite continues to ac-

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cumulate in the ghettos. There are reported to be more jobless in Watts today than when it exploded. It is true that there are many more white poor than black, but make no mistake, the fortunes of the War on Poverty depends on what happens to the ghettos.

5. One of the most promising programs launched by President Johnson was the elevation to cabinet level of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Promising that is, in terms of the definition of its scope to rebuild entire core areas of our cities containing "in some cases as many as 100,000 people."

But "between the idea and the reality, between the motion and the act, falls the shadow." Between the clear call of the State of the Union message and the budget presented a week later, the total alloted for this purpose is $2.3 billions to be spread over six years, and for fiscal 1967—$5,000,000. *The New York Times* accurately calls it "one of the smallest items in the budget." Granted this is only a start. Surely it will grow. But how far can one get with a pittance toward the starting line of "rebuilding completely on a scale never before attempted, entire central and slum areas of our cities?"

When former Borough President of Manhattan, Constance Baker Motley, had prepared a plan to reconstruct the core of central Harlem, she carefully refrained from pricing it, but several of those involved have indicated informally that it would run into the hundreds of millions and possibly a billion dollars. This is for central Harlem, not all of it; and not for the half dozen other Harlems in the New York area, or the thousands of Harlems blighting the urban landscape.

6. Much of the poverty program to date is little more than a beefing up of previous services, but one of the few real and welcome innovations was Community Action. Never clearly defined, too quickly strapped into tight institutional molds, it is nevertheless an advance over previous approaches. Since the Elizabethan Poor Laws and before, such aid has been paternalistic on the implicit assumption that to be poor was also to be incompetent. Community Action for the first time recognized that among the many faces of poverty was helplessness, dependence, powerlessness, lack of access to authority, and that at least part of the remedy lay in involving the poor in their own salvation. This should not be overstated: the poor were hardly to be handed control of large sums or to have the power to determine what should be done for them. But they were to be counted in, and this sanction had a potential that could have been far-reaching. It reflected the reality of community action stimulated by the Civil Rights Movement.

But as everyone knows, Community Action, while it has not yet come a-cropper, is terribly sick. It is questionable whether it will survive at all. City Halls across the country, abetted sometimes innocently by what Saul Alinsky calls the social work industry, and sometimes by politicians and leaders of the Negro Establishment—these forces have combined to reduce what might have been a democratizing lever in the slums into another pork barrel. Militants have, on the whole, remained aloof, which has not helped either.

None of the messages, documents,

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and pronouncements emanating from the White House takes cognizance of this corruption of a program that presumably meant much to the Administration. Thus far its reactions have been positively supine with respect to the systematic subversion of Community Action.

•

How does it all add up? The fact that the Administration has recommitted itself to programs of social change means that the last word has not been said. New tactics, new strategies will have to be devised. The Freedom Budget could well become the new rallying cry, one that for the first time might bring the Civil Rights Movement into the ghettos.

Vietnam has already deflected many of the energies of the Movement and divided it. It has changed the political mood of the country, and practically monopolizes the mind of the national political leadership from the President on down. Yet none of this can make the reality of the ghetto vanish. Poverty at this stage of American history has become more expensive to maintain than to eliminate. The Negro Revolution has given it an explosive edge but the battle to end it has only begun.

A. Philip Randolph

Toward a Freedom Budget

The situation in Watts erupted in volcanic form because the people there knew or felt that their deep troubles were interlaced with manifest injustice. And this eruptive potential is seething just under the surface in portions of every large city within the United States, awaiting only some slight additional pressure or some unpredictable incitement to propel the explosion.

The very advances in general prosperity and employment, which may breed complacency in some quarters, are multiplying the fundamental pressures by the contrasts which they sharpen. Although unemployment as customarily measured is now said to be lower than at any time within eight years, the crucial fact is that at no time within these eight years has it been less than twice as high as it ought to be. When account is also taken of part-time unemployment and of concealed unemployment – concealed because hundreds of thousands or millions of young people and Negroes have been turned from the labor force to the pool rooms and to the dope and knife gangs because the jobs they

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need are not there—unemployment is really about twice as high as officially measured. And *where* it is most heavily concentrated is even more menacing than these figures indicate.

About thirty-four million Americans live in poverty, and about an equal number live above the poverty ceiling but far below the requirements for a minimum health and decency American standard of living. One-fifth of the nation still lives in slums, as our cities continue to deteriorate and become increasingly the homes of the poor. Perhaps 40 percent of our people still lack adequate medical care at costs within their means. Many of our American poor are among our senior citizens, who are poor because we have hardly commenced to bring our social security systems into line with changes in the price level since 1935 and the mandates of the increased *per capita* productivity and wealth of the population as a whole. Millions of people working full-time, are being paid abysmally substandard wages. Millions of broken families are not receiving the welfare payments which would represent the basic concept of some decent floor under incomes and living standards, a concept already embraced in some countries far less rich than we are. The concentration of poverty is extraordinarily high among our farm people.

Fundamentally the unemployment problem, the poverty problem, and the others which I have mentioned, are all *one* problem. They all mean simply that we are not bringing into use our full resources and directing them toward purposes responsive to those needs which bespeak the social and moral conscience of the nation.

II

We talk about a *total* war against poverty, and this concept is fraught with meaning if properly applied. When we were in a total war against external enemies, we made a budget of our total resources, a budget of our total needs, and then used policies and programs to bring the two together under a defined set of priorities, both civilian and military. The one additional ingredient which we added was the principle of equity. Because we did just this, during the World War II era, we maintained full employment, and in addition lifted living standards and reduced poverty more rapidly than ever before, even though we were burning up half of our productive resources in fighting our external enemies. If we now benefit by this lesson, what could we not accomplish in the few years ahead, when only about 7 percent of our current production is being devoted to national defense?

I believe that the time has come to make meaningful the concept of total war for humane purposes on the domestic front. I believe that the first step toward this end would be for the Federal Government through appropriate agencies: (1) to set forth specifically the magnitudes of full employment for the next ten years, which means less than three percent and preferably only two percent unemployment as usually measured, and to commit itself fully and explicitly to the attainment of full employment within a year's time and its maintenance thereafter; (2) to define what patterns of utilization of this fully employed labor force would produce the goods and services most responsive

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to the great priorities of our national needs, even while adding to the living standards of those already so affluent that their new wants relate to luxuries rather than to necessities; (3) guided by this ten-year projection of our productive resources and needs, which might be called goals, we should identify and set in motion those policies and programs, sufficient in quantity as well as in quality needed to translate what we *can* do into what we *must* do.

When we do this, I believe that much of the arid and futile debate as to whether unemployment is a demand problem or a structural problem, and as to whether poverty is due to something wrong within the individual or something wrong within the society, will disappear. Necessary problems of training and education will then have ten times the utility they now have, because we will know what to train and educate people for. We cannot afford to cling to the notion that training automatically creates a job, or that self-improvement automatically eradicates poverty. We need to encircle the problem, instead of touching it at a few points only.

I have been a life-long believer in community action and grass-roots participation, and, in both the role of private enterprise and public action. But the very nature of a *total* war against unemployment and poverty and all their manifestations calls for greatly increased emphasis upon adequate Federal programs and huge increases in Federal expenditures. Increases in private incomes alone, while necessary, cannot themselves at appreciable speed channel a large enough part of our resources into the clearance of slums, the rebuilding of our cities, the construction of schools and hospitals, the recruitment and adequate pay of teachers and nurses, and many other major elements now being articulated as the aspirations of the Great Society.

If our productive powers are marshalled as fully as they should be, our national product in 1975 will be considerably more than 400 billion dollars higher than it is now. This is an average increase of more than 40 billion dollars for each of the next 10 years, or an aggregate of more than 2.2 trillion dollars more during the next decade than if output were stabilized at current levels. I submit that, as a first step toward channeling these vast increases of productive output toward the purposes we need most, the Federal Budget as the most important single embodiment of national purpose and program should be lifted in 1975 to about 60 billion dollars higher than it is now, or lifted about 6 billion dollars a year. This would come to a lift of about 330 billion over the decade. Taking account of the transfer payments which enter into such programs as Social Security, but do not enter into the conventional Budget, and taking account also of feasible increases in state and local outlays, total public investment in 1975 should be at least 100 billion dollars higher than now—and perhaps much more than that. As this would represent an average increase of about 10 billion dollars a year, the total public investment over the decade ahead would aggregate about 550 billion dollars above what would result from stabilization at current levels.

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III

There are many ways of measuring the practical realism of this goal. If our total national production rises by an average of about 40 billion dollars a year over the next ten years, we will enjoy during the decade as a whole, as I have said, about 2.2 trillion dollars more of total national output than if it were to be stabilized at current levels. I think that the allocation of about 25 percent of this to our national needs which require increased public investment is entirely sound and essential.

Another measurement: we are told reliably that the increased tax revenues accruing each year to the Federal Government from economic growth at existing tax rates may lift Federal tax collections by about 10 billion a year on the average during the next ten years, or *additional* tax collections aggregating about 550 billion over the 10-year period. This would far more than cover the financial costs (330 billion, see above) of the proposed increases in federal outlays in the Federal Budget, and the balance could be devoted to help the States and localities which are much harder pressed in financial terms than the Federal Government.

Still another measurement: We have since 1962 undertaken tax reductions, by legislation and administrative action, having an annual value in the neighborhood of 20 billion dollars. Even without allowing for the increases in the size of the revenues foregone by this tax reduction which will result from economic growth, the aggregate tax reductions thus calculated will have a value of about 200 billion dollars over the next 10 years. Certainly we can and must afford during the next decade to put about $330 billion additional Federal outlays into those purposes which are so vitally important. We all know that a very substantial part of the top reduction is going to those who need help least and that it is a very imperfect weapon for those who need help most. In the slums are concentrated many of the causes and consequences of poverty. Vast programs of housing and urban renewal would not only make war on this poverty at its very roots, but would also make war against whole congeries of social evils, and would restructure employment opportunity so as to take care of perhaps half of the whole 25 million—*additional*—job problems facing us over the next decade. This is the central answer to the thrust of the new technology and automation, and would provide a uniquely high product mix of semi-skilled and relatively unskilled jobs, the achievement of which is the real hope for a preponderant portion of the unemployed.

By 1970, the annual level of nonfarm housing starts should be lifted to at least 2¼ million, compared with about 1.6 million in 1965, and maintained at this higher level at least through 1975. This would represent an average for the decade of more than 500,000 more starts per year than we are now achieving, and in the aggregate more than 5 million more starts over the decade than would result from stabilization at current levels. As I do not believe that we can maintain indefinitely the current level of starts for upper-middle income and high income groups, we ought to build 6 or 7 million new

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homes during the next decade for lower middle-income and low-income people, with a higher annual rate than 600—700,000 during the years immediately ahead.

The 10-year program of more than 5 million more housing starts than would result under current programs might involve an additional 10-year investment *above* current levels, considering costs in urban areas, of about 50 billion dollars, which might be lifted to the neighborhood of an additional 100 billion dollars above current levels by the community facilities and public improvements of all types which would be necessary to, and follow in the wake of the needed housing effort. Considering the high multiplier effect of housing investment upon almost every type of economic activity, especially private economic activity, the reason appears why I estimate that these levels of housing effort might take care of about one-half of the 25 million new jobs needed in the next ten years.

What is the role of the Federal Government and the Federal Budget in this enlarged housing and urban renewal effort? We all know that, despite the good housing legislation of 1965, Federal assistance to somewhere in the neighborhood of 35,000 units per year of housing for low income people is merely a token program. It therefore combines some laudible results with much frustration and hostility. The annual contributory system under the Federal program holds the annual costs remarkably low relative to the benefits to be achieved. Taking into account the profits made by the Federal Government on some of its housing programs, the Government is now spending almost nothing net on housing and urban renewal. I think that these Federal Budget outlays for housing and community development should be lifted to at least 4 billion dollars per year by 1975, as an essential part of lifting the total Federal Budget by about 60 billion dollars by 1975. In view of the urgency of this housing and urban renewal need, the most rapid acceleration should commence now, and I feel that Federal Budget outlays for housing and community development should be lifted to about 2 billion dollars in the Federal Budget to be submitted next January, and to considerably above 3 billion dollars by 1970.

From these efforts the American Negro will benefit more, in proportion to his numbers, than others. This is not because he is a Negro, but because he now suffers so much more than others, again relative to his numbers, from unemployment and poverty. But in absolute numbers, there are far fewer Negroes unemployed and living in poverty in the U.S. than those of lighter skins. In absolute numbers, those of lighter skins will benefit far more than the Negro. The Negro's greatest role in the attainment of the Great Society is not as a beneficiary, but as a galvanizing force. Out of his greater suffering and deprivation, he has helped awaken the American conscience with respect to civil rights and liberties. The debt which the whole nation owes to him will be increased many times, as he helps galvanize the American conscience with respect to unemployment and poverty.

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The Prosecution and Imprisonment of Mike Quill by the Transit Authority as Performed in New York Under the Direction of Mayor John V. Lindsay

Using the metaphor of the theater for political comment has its dangers. Style may easily be mistaken for substance and aesthetic for political judgments. Since there is a widespread adaptation of the techniques of entertainment to politics, there is the further danger of reinforcing the effects of those techniques. Yet for events like the New York transit strike, the metaphor can be useful.

In any case, once Mike Quill appeared on the scene, it is almost impossible to resist the language of the theater critic. His brogue and his rhetoric combined to give so theatrical an effect that "ham" became an instinctive response. But even as he reminded us of a bad performance in an impossible melodrama, he managed to capture a certain sympathy. Quill's eccentric style came as a welcome relief to a public aware of the techniques used to manipulate it. Eventually, however, he made us uneasy. The brogue began to grate; the mispronunciation of "Lindsley" for Lindsay became less funny; and when he publicly ripped up court injunctions and said that "the judge can drop dead in his black robes," we felt he had gone "too far." What began as engaging eccentricity ended as irrationality too close for comfort. Of course, he was not helped by the strike itself; it caused frustrations that made Quill a natural for the role of scapegoat. Yet some of the reaction to the strike was also a reaction to his "style," and this response may tell us something about political behavior in the United States today.

II

Quill's style was something more than an idiosyncracy. It articulated a denial of the official pieties of the society, its middle class morality. Even the brogue, seemingly untempered by a long absence from Ireland, played a role. It called attention to the immigrant, and its retention in a rich, verdant form proclaimed a conscious ethnic identification. In a city like New York, identification with an ethnic group is a political advantage; but it is one thing to proclaim an Irish identity in the Harvard accents of a Kennedy and another in the accents of a Quill. A Kennedy-like identification is reassurance that the "melting pot" is at work; but listening to Quill we became aware that the ethnic identification may mean something more than mere sentimentalism about the "auld sod." "Irish *and* Harvard graduate" reaffirms one's faith in the American Dream. Listening to Quill was to be reminded that there are many sons and daughters of immigrants who have not made it into the middle class and are not

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likely to. He symbolizes the presence of ethnic lower and working classes that may not share the middle-class ethos.

Quill's position before the strike was that the Mayor, the Transit Authority, and *The New York Times* were responsible for the crisis; those with authority and power would not behave reasonably until the transit workers were forced to reduce New York to "a shambles." A view of authority implacably ranged against one is a characteristic feeling of lower and working class groups, and no matter how shocked the middle class was by Quill's "disrespectful" treatment of court orders, one can be certain that his performance satisfied many other New Yorkers. With a new Administration coming into office at the very moment the strike was to get under way, and in view of the fact that a settlement depended on the size of the city's subsidy to the Transit Authority, it would seem that Quill had nothing to lose by postponing the strike for a while to give Lindsay a chance, as he put it, "to take hold on the situation." What seemed like reason and rationality to others was rejected by Quill. From the perspectives of the working classes, however, this action may not have seemed at all unreasonable.

To say that all of this can be accounted for in terms of internal union politics is of course true, but, by itself, misses the point. Quill reflected the attitudes and sentiments of a good part of his rank and file, and by magnifying these on the public stage forced them on our attention. We cannot escape awareness that underneath the surface harmony of the society there are groups who do not share "natural" and "normal" modes of behavior. The response to Quill, though in part caused by our anger at the loss of time, energy, and pay resulting from the strike, is also caused by the uneasiness he provoked by implicitly challenging "proper conduct."

III

Before the strike the Transit Authority secured an injunction against the leaders, and when the strike was called they were found guilty of civil contempt. Execution of such a court order for imprisonment depends wholly upon the other party; Quill would have remained free if the Authority had chosen not to have the order served. From any reasonable point of view the jailing of Quill was an error. Coercion of the leadership could only make the Transit Workers more intransigent; they had to beware of the charge of "selling out." Moreover, it brought other unions to the support of Quill which were actually unsympathetic to the idea of a transit strike. Putting Quill in jail makes sense only if we see it as having nothing to do with the immediate problems of the strike.

Lindsay had campaigned on a traditional reformer's platform decorated with some modern touches. Young, clean-cut and sincere, he was going to get New York moving toward the Great City. His opponents were boss-ridden, tired and bumbling mediocrities corrupted by traditional politics. His was to be an administration of clean, efficient government, untainted, by partisanship. Quill was not an issue during the campaign, but he could be made into an excellent symbol of

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what Lindsay had opposed. Every two years Quill would threaten a strike, and as the deadline neared, he and the Transit Commissioners would be called to City Hall. Hours later all reappeared with a settlement, and the next day the newspapers analyzed how "the deal" had been made. "The deal" is practical American politics on the day-to-day level, but it is also what Americans have in mind when they say "politics is a dirty business." The eternal yearning for a virginal politics was one source of Lindsay's electoral support. When faced with the strike, Lindsay was at the mercy of his own rhetoric and political stance. Even if it would help cut the strike short, he could not use any tactic that smacked of "the deal," while jailing Quill validated his claim to superior political and moral virtue. It was as cold-blooded a political move as any in our baroque municipal politics.

Nothing remotely resembling this picture appeared in the mass media. *The Times* continually congratulated Lindsay for not seeking a settlement that was "more political than economic," as in the bad old days of Mayor Wagner. The jailing of Quill was greeted as a victory over the forces of anarchy. The rhetoric of self-righteousness and moral indignation echoed across the city. It was the complement of the rhetoric of class alienation articulated by Quill. A political orientation based on suspicion, distrust, and hostility to authority evoked a response defending the values and sentiments being attacked. This kind of indignation supports the exercise of an immoral and irrational use of power.

IV

A clash between the rhetoric of alienation and the rhetoric of moral indignation can be found in other areas of politics. The Civil Rights Movement, the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, and the Vietnam Protest all involve elements of the drama played out in New York. SNCC, in its own way, exemplifies a style similar to Quill's. The overalls of a James Forman are the equivalent of Quill's brogue; both proclaim an ethnic and class identification by those who can easily become tweedy, pipe-smoking academics, or blue-suited, golf-playing labor statesmen. A SNCC leader, like Quill, is highly distrustful of authority ("the Establishment"); both are quick to identify the finks about them. The differences are obvious enough, yet the similarities of style are suggested in the similar responses they evoke.

SNCC disturbs the complacency of U.S. society more than the Civil Rights Movement as a whole has ever done. In a curious way the entire struggle for civil rights has made Americans more complacent than ever. Once prodded they were willing to acknowledge what they knew all along, that Negroes were deprived of their rights as citizens; they were even willing to condemn the recalcitrant Southerners. As a result, many white Americans enjoy a great deal of self-satisfaction from their response to Civil Rights. But SNCC won't let them off the hook that easily. It maintains that guaranteeing civil rights is the beginning, not the end. More important, by articulating the values of another class and by attempting to create a political ideology drawn from those values, it challenges the very basis of the

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belief that there is a consensus on middle class values. In doing this SNCC, SDS, and the Berkeley students proclaim that the economic and social underclass is morally superior to the middle class.

The implications are clear. If the war in Vietnam goes on and the protest grows, if the student ferment continues, if SNCC and SDS ideology can become the basis of political action by Negroes and the poor, we can expect a growth of irrational and morally impermissible repressive measures. And just as New Yorkers did not protest the jailing of Quill but felt that he got his just desserts, there will be other Americans, their moral sensibilities dulled by indignation, who will not protest similar measures.

MURRAY HAUSKNECHT

Slaughterhouse in Indonesia

Indonesia is passing through a period which could lead to its disintegration as a nation. The standing of its new military government and its leader Bung Karno has dropped to zero. The admitted slaughter of 87,000 Communists (according to Sukarno) by the Indonesian army and Moslem lynch mobs is a deed of appalling evil which demands universal condemnation. (Why has the American government been silent on this? Would it have remained silent if the slaughter had been done by the Communists?)

According to the little available information, squads of army officers and men, aided by Moslem gangs, went through the country rounding up all known Communist leaders, and executed them without hearing, trial or accusation. If Sukarno admits 87,000 dead, then the figure of 150,000 first reported is probably closer to the truth. Actually, we simply do not know what is going on in Indonesia since it passed under military control. With American backing, the United Nations ought to institute an investigation of the slaughter; the International League for Human Rights and the UN International Lawyer's Commission at Geneva ought to get on to this story.

Such an investigation would in no way need to condone the Indonesian Communist movement. If what appears to have been a premature Communist *coup* had succeeded, we have not the slightest doubt that the victorious Communists would have instituted their own bloody purge. Their slaughter of the six Indonesian army generals was a foretaste of what might have happened had they won power.

Shaken, crestfallen but unrepentant, Sukarno continues to "rule" his volcanic islands. What real power he possesses, what his perspectives are, remains largely unknown to the outside world. There is hardly a more repellant and odious figure in the world today than this half-clown, half-devil. The Government mint of Jakarta is

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reported operating on a double shift to run off thousands of rupiah notes daily, nothing more substantial behind them than the paper on which they are printed. The price of rice, the staple diet for 105 million Indonesians, was 300 rupiahs a quart in June, 1965; in January, 1966 it was 2,400 rupiahs.

Under these tragic circumstances not only does some kind of impartial investigation have to be conducted into the mass killings, but efforts should immediately be initiated to provide emergency aid to the people of Indonesia—not funds that the unspeakable Sukarno can use to start a war against Malaysia or to create useless luxury hotels and sports stadiums with which to glorify his rule, but food for the hungry and, if at all possible, aid toward a preliminary stabilization of the Indonesian economy.

S. P.

The Trial Ends

Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, who published fiction and essays in Western periodicals under the pennames of Abram Tertz and Nikolai Arzhak, have been sentenced to seven and five years in forced labor camps by the Russian Supreme Court. They were convicted—it is important to note—not because they allowed their manuscripts to be smuggled abroad, but because they wrote what could, in the words of the court, "be used profitably by enemies of Communism." And what is especially appalling is that the "evidence" accepted in the court consisted of literary works, fantasies and satires that were treated like political documents. The Russian state-party dictatorship thereby announces that, despite the softening of its rule these past years, it persists in thought control and will maintain its monopoly of political and intellectual expression.

It is a sickening thing—this brutal sentence of writers who have shown themselves to be gifted, courageous and devoted to human freedom. It comes at a time when another heretic in the Communist world, Milovan Djilas, begins his ninth year of imprisonment, locked in a freezing cell because he had dared to challenge the Titoist one-party dictatorship. Our hearts go out to Sinyavsky and Daniel, to their families, to their friends, to all Russian writers who struggle for the free word in their dungeon-society.

I. H.

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When discussed among the editors of DISSENT, *the following article aroused unusually strong reactions, pro and con. We print it because it focuses sharply on controversial matters. Several editors have declared their intention to dispute Mrs. Carper in a subsequent issue; and a copy of the article has been sent to Mr. Moynihan with an invitation to reply.*—ED.

Laura Carper

THE NEGRO FAMILY AND THE MOYNIHAN REPORT

MRS. BOYLE: We'll go. Come, Mary, an' we'll never come back here agen. Let your father furrage for himself now; I've done all I could an' it was all no use—he'll be hopeless till the end of his days. I've got a little room in me sisther's where we'll stop till your throuble is over, an' then we'll work together for the sake of the baby.

MARY: My poor little child that'll have no father!

MRS. BOYLE: It'll have what's far betther—it'll have two mothers.

(*Juno and the Paycock,* Act III, Sean O'Casey)

The culmination of intensive efforts to codify the life of the hapless is a document published by the Department of Labor entitled *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* and commonly referred to as "The Moynihan Report," after the reputed head of the investigation—the sociologist Daniel Moynihan. With the publication of this document a sociological theory which borders on an ideology has become a political weapon which we are all obliged to examine. In order to understand the theoretical framework within which this document was written, we must take a cursory look at sociological thought in the recent period.

In 1960, Dreger and Miller published in the *Psychological Bulletin* a critical evaluation of the "Comparative Psychological Studies of Negroes and Whites in the United States," which was an examination

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of the relevant contributions in the field between 1943 and 1958. They concluded that "in the areas of psychological functioning most closely related to the sociological, social class differences show up more clearly as a basis for differentiation between the two groups. Leadership, family life, child rearing practices, fertility and mate selection all seem to conform to social structure rather than to racial lines per se."

Dreger and Miller's conclusion reflected the intensive efforts of liberal sociological and psychological thought of the period. It was the culmination of a thoroughgoing examination of the corrosive effects of our peculiar social organization and value system on the Negro as compared to the white. They were unable to find a uniquely Negro personality or Negro psychology in any class. Their conclusion became a landmark in the field with which every investigator has been forced to contend.

In April 1964, however, *The Journal of Social Issues* published a collection of studies with an introduction by Thomas Pettigrew and Daniel C. Thompson and a lead article by Thomas Pettigrew which sought to delineate what Dreger and Miller were unable to locate—a Negro personality and a Negro psychology. Frankly admitting that in this effort social psychology was whistling in the dark since the Negro was notorious for his refusal to reveal his inner self to the social investigator and since it was virtually impossible to establish control groups of whites, Pettigrew nevertheless argued that past findings have "underestimated the corrosive effects on young children of impecunious ghetto living." This may indeed be true, but the theoretical basis of the issue is that due to the vicissitudes of his history and the brutality of white society, the Negro has developed a recognizable psychology and a recognizable personality which emerged under slavery, and that this psychology is self-sustaining and transmitted from generation to generation. The studies, together with the introduction, almost seem to argue for the existence of a racial unconscious.

The thinking here represents a powerful tendency in modern sociological thought; and it is this thinking, shorn of its somewhat hesitant and carefully hedged tone, which characterizes the ideological commitment of *The Report on the Negro Family* and the direction its authors feel national action should take.

The thesis of the Report is that the Negro poor "confront the nation with a new kind of problem. Measures that have worked in the past, or would work for most groups in the present will not work here. A national effort is required that will give unity and purpose

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to the many activities of the Federal government in this area, directed to a new kind of national goal: the establishment of a stable Negro family structure." The presumption is that the Negro poor are no longer merely the victims of white institutional corruption but also, to an undetermined extent, of their corrosive family life; that despite the enactment of the voting rights bill, the creation of the "Manpower Retraining Program, The Job Corps, and Community Action—et al," *fifty per cent* of the Negro population is incapable of profiting because of a psychological distemper.

The argument is supported with an array of statistics but without any effort to come to terms with the fact that variations in life style and social adjustment *within* the ghetto and between the Northern and Southern Negro poor are far more varied than between all of them and society at large. Fifty per cent of the Negro population is identified as reflecting the "social pathology" these statistics itemize, and the Negro family is recognized as its "source."

On page thirteen of the report there is a graph charting the non-white male unemployment rate and the number of AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) cases opened each year. This graph is the strongest argument the report offers to substantiate its thesis that the Negro poor have been so crippled by their situation and history that ordinary measures—which I suppose would be full employment, a radical revision of the ghetto school system, integrated education, decent housing, and a rigorously controlled police force—will no longer suffice; that what is now needed is a national effort not to alter our white social institutions but the way the Negro poor relate to each other on the primary personal level—the family.

The graph shows a direct correlation between the non-white male unemployment rate and AFDC cases opened each year between 1948 and 1961. As the unemployment rate drops, AFDC cases drop; as the unemployment rate rises, AFDC cases rise. But in 1962 a negative correlation begins to emerge; in 1963 the lines for each cross; in 1964 AFDC cases continue to rise as the unemployment rate continues to drop. Presumably, the negative correlation after 1962 shows or suggests that giving the Negro male a job will no longer insure or help insure family stability. The conclusion is that something more is needed.

I am not prepared to argue an economic determinist thesis. It is not my contention that the area of full employment is the only front on which we should fight. But I would like to attempt to explain the graph, particularly since the authors of the report direct the reader's attention to the negative correlation and argue that no government

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program should be instituted which aims at relieving the plight of the Negro poor until the reasons for the reversal are understood.

The first consideration in evaluating statistics is to understand their relevance. *New* AFDC cases must therefore be compared with the unemployment rate of young Negroes. A little investigation shows that the unemployment rate for non-white males as a whole is not reflected in the unemployment rate of non-white youth. Non-white youth, male and female, show a radically different set of statistics; and it is of course the young and not the mature Negro woman who would be a new AFDC case. The unemployment rate for eighteen and nineteen year old non-white men rose from 23.9% in 1961 to 27.4% in 1963, and for eighteen and nineteen year old women who would be obliged to assist in the support of their families from 28.2% to 31.9%. Taken as a whole, the unemployment rate of non-white men between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four during the years in question fluctuates but shows little over-all change. In 1963, the year the lines for AFDC cases and the unemployment rate converge, the rates were especially high. Where the over-all non-white male unemployment rate went down in 1963, the unemployment rate for youth went up and then went down a little in 1964. The picture for young non-white women is comparable. Their rate showed a general tendency to increase.

These figures, although they radically temper the implications of the graph, do not account for the extent of the reversal. A complete explanation must include the famous 1962 change in the social security law. There is a remarkable correlation between AFDC figures and the date of the new law, which authorized greater social and case work service to the poor. In the state of Michigan at least (I choose Michigan arbitrarily, only because I live there and was in a position to discuss the graph with the welfare department), the department has interpreted this law as a directive to alter its standards. Prior to 1962, if an applicant was a poor housekeeper, mentally disturbed, or evidence of a male friend could be found, her application for AFDC was denied; after 1962 she was accepted if she showed need, regardless of her housekeeping practices, her mental health or her social life. Whereas between July 1960 and June 1961 33.4% of the applications were denied, only 28% were denied between July 1963 and June 1964. The strange graph in the Moynihan Report is the result of graphing the wrong things. The negative correlation is due to an inconsistency between youth unemployment rate and the unemployment rate of the non-white male population as a whole and to an important change in policy

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on the part of the welfare authorities. As a staff member of the department informed me, "it is our policy to give everyone a chance now." The thinking behind the new policy is that by accepting the "undeserving" poor as well as the "deserving" poor, case-work service is made available to those who need it most. It is inevitable that as news of this policy change spreads among the Negro poor and as each of the states slowly alters its policy to conform to this new view, AFDC cases will continue to rise.

The Negro family is not the source of the "tangle of pathology" which the report attributes to the Negro community. It is the pathological relationship between white social institutions and the Negro community which has bred the statistics the report cites—from low scholastic averages to drug addiction to arrest records to illegitimacy to unemployment rates. This is the reason the Black Muslims have chosen to withdraw, and this is the reason the civil rights movement has chosen to confront us.

The statistics I have tried to examine are the supportive evidence the report offers in defense of a social psychological theory. In brief the argument is that American slavery stripped the Negro of his culture and his most minimal human rights; and that the Negro, under continued oppression, developed a matriarchal family organization within which the male played an inadequate role, if any. The argument continues that since American family life is patriarchal, the matriarchal family formation is pathological and is perpetuating a pathological Negro culture—as the statistics show. But I cannot help wonder with James Tobin, who published an interesting economic study in the Fall 1965 issue of *Daedalus*, why "personal attributes which doom(ed) a man to unemployment in 1932 or even 1954 or 1961 did not handicap him in 1944 or 1951 or 1956." Peter Townsend has pointed out that in 1930 many Englishmen estimated that as many as a million of their fellow-countrymen were unemployable because of their personal problems and only a decade later found that only 100,000 could be characterized in this way. There was a manpower shortage in 1940. What appears to be a social malformation in one period becomes the problem of isolated individuals in another.

The Negro poor are distinguished from the middle class primarily by the fact that they are poor. The father is haphazardly employed and at a very low wage. He is frequently absent from the family scene. He has either deserted or been thrown out by the mother. If he is present and works, he may squander his income. The children are raised by an extended family of adult women. This picture does not focus

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fifty per cent of the Negro families. But it does include a significant section of the Negro poor. Is it peculiar to them?

"Matriarchy" is a cultural formation common to many oppressed people throughout the history of western civilization—regardless of their own past history and regardless of the values they themselves held. A brilliant and moving characterization of how and why such a family constellation developed among the Irish poor can be found in Sean O'Casey's play *Juno and the Paycock,* from which I took the quotation which precedes this piece. The Irish matriarchal family formation is noteworthy because it existed in conflict with an Irish patriarchal ideal.

Both Patricia Sexton and Oscar Lewis have shown that the poor Puerto Rican family is beginning to move toward the same "pathology" as the Negro: illegitimacy and families with a woman at the helm.

The same can be said of Jewish family life in the *shtetl.* Although illegitimacy was not a problem (partly because divorce merely involved a witnessed statement placed in the hand of the wife; the father was frequently absent, either as a peddler on the road, as an immigrant in America, or as a permanent resident of the house of study who came home only to eat). Newly married couples usually moved into the home of the bride's parents. Among the Hassidic Jews (Hassidism was a movement initiated by the poor), it was common for the father to leave his wife and children without a kopek or a groshen in the house and depart for the Rebbe's court where he would dance and drink and spend all his money. As among the American poor, relations between husband and wife were cold and the roles of each clearly defined. The wife worked and assumed the main burden of supporting the family, and children became adults before they had ever had an opportunity to be children. The man either struggled desperately to make a living with little success or withdrew entirely into a private male society based on discourse or ecstacy and left the family to shift for itself. What the Jewish man succeeded in doing that the Negro man has failed to do is place a positive value on family desertion and personal withdrawal.

Since the Negro man does not rationalize his role as being a desirable religious achievement, it seems to me he would be easier to integrate into the surrounding culture than the Jew. After all, once integration became a viable possibility, even the *shtetl* Jew cast off what no longer served him. And the depth and extent to which oppression and poverty reduced the Jew can be measured by the disintegrative effects of the widespread Messianic movements, two of which emphasized

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orgiastic sexual practices as a means of insuring the coming of the Messiah.

I have chosen to detail the matriarchal organization of the Jewish family life not because it corresponds to the Negro family but because sociologists look upon Jewish family life as remarkably cohesive. Is the caricature I have drawn of the *shtetl* family accurate? Of course not. I have applied Mr. Moynihan's method of describing the Negro to a description of the Jew. I lumped a few hundred years of history together and failed to distinguish between people. Pathology is in the eye of the beholder. If one eliminates the positive social function of a cultural constellation, if one ignores the meaning personal relations have to the people involved, if one, in short, uses science to depersonalize, what emerges is always pathology. For health involves spontaneous human feelings of affection and tenderness which the Moynihan Report, like my deliberate caricature of Jewish family life, cannot encompass.

Let me also add that I am not trying to draw any direct analogies between the Irish poor, the Jewish poor, or even the Puerto Rican poor, and the Negro poor. I am seeking to show that "matriarchy" within the larger social context of what the report calls "patriarchy" is common to the way of life of poor people. And further, that people living under oppression always develop social formations which appear to the surrounding oppressive culture to be excessive or pathological. The form these so-called excesses take varies from culture to culture and person to person within the culture—but no matter how extreme the nature of the adjustment, once the social pressure which created it is removed, a new adjustment develops. A people is not destroyed by its history. What destroys a people is physical annihilation or assimilation, not its family life.

The question the report raises is the direction a government program would take to insure family stability. What is the quality of the solutions Mr. Moynihan has in mind? The report includes a detailed description of the therapeutic effects of military service. Mr. Moynihan argues that the armed forces are educational and that they "provide the largest single source of employment in the nation." He admits that "for those comparatively few who are killed or wounded in combat, or otherwise, the personal sacrifice is inestimable. But on balance, service in the Armed Forces over the past quarter-century has worked greatly to the advantage of those involved. . . . Service in the United States Armed Forces is the *only* [author's italics] experience open to the Negro-American in which he is truly treated as an equal: not as a Negro equal to any white, but as one man equal to any man in a world where the

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category 'Negro' and 'white' do not exist." Mr. Moynihan further states that for the Negro "the armed forces are a dramatic and desperately needed change: a world away from women, a world run by strong men of unquestioned authority, where discipline, if harsh, is nonetheless orderly and predictable and where rewards, if limited, are granted on the basis of performance." This view of the desirability of army life is patently absurd. Underlying the Report's understanding of the problems of the Negro family is its author's concept of masculinity. According to the Report "the essence of the male animal, from the bantam rooster to the four-star general, is to strut."

I cannot here counterpose my taste in men or my concept of the good life against Mr. Moynihan's—but it seems clear to me that it is for the Negro male himself to determine his sexual and social style—whether strutting or not.

The challenge to the Negro community is political. It remains to be seen whether we can make room for the poor to acquire social and economic power. This is our social problem—and not the existence of a matriarchal family organization. What is more, Frank Riessman has found that involving emotionally disturbed people among the Negro poor in the civil rights movement can resolve their personal problems. What is destructive to the Negro man and woman is social impotence here and now, and what rehabilitates them is social power and the struggle for it. It is not new for a ruling elite to characterize its poor as incontinent and shiftless. It is the characteristic way in which those on top describe those on the bottom, even when sincerely trying to uplift them. My Negro landlady encountered a helpful woman who tried to tell her that Negro culture was rooted in the life style of slavery and fixed by history. In telling me about the conversation my landlady said, "That woman thinks that if she handed me a bail of cotton, I'd know how to make a dress out of it!" The Negro is not grappling with the social system under which he lived over a hundred years ago, or even with the social system under which he lived ten years ago. He is grappling with the social system under which he lives today.

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Frank Riessman

IN DEFENSE OF THE NEGRO FAMILY

I am convinced that Daniel Moynihan is sincerely opposed to discrimination and his report is intended to document its negative consequences for the Negro. From my point of view, however, the report represents a highly inappropriate approach to the development of programs and policy to fulfill the rights of the Negro.—F.R.

The Moynihan Report employs supposed inadequacies of the Negro family as an explanatory tool for understanding why the Negro has not taken his place fully in the economic structure of our society. Presumed family pathology, particularly illegitimacy, is said to be an important cause for the under-employment and inadequate education of the Negro.

The questions raised by Moynihan and many others at the White House Conference on Civil Rights are crucial ones: Would the removal of all forms of discrimination enable the Negro to take his place economically in American society? Has the Negro been so damaged by discrimination that even if these barriers were removed, he could not be adequately employed and educated? Perhaps full employment and the removal of discrimination would bring the Negro into the mainstream far more rapidly than is assumed. But one thing seems clear: if Negroes are offered more of the same in the way of education, training and employment, they will be less than responsive. They are not terribly interested in training which does not lead to jobs or which leads at best to dead end menial jobs. They are not attracted to the summer programs of the busy work, anti-riot type. And they have not been receptive to "compensatory education" which constantly stresses their deficits.

The basic defect in the Moynihan thesis is a *one-sided presentation of the consequences of segregation and discrimination.* That damage has been done to the Negro as a result of discrimination cannot and should not be denied. But the Negro has responded to his oppressive conditions by many powerful coping endeavors. He has developed many

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ways of fighting the system, protecting himself, providing self-help and even joy. One of the most significant forms of his adaptation has been the extended, female-based family.

To overlook this adaptation and instead to emphasize one-sidedly the limiting aspects and presumed pathology of this family, is to do the Negro a deep injustice. And it is most inappropriate to attempt to involve people in change by emphasizing some alleged weakness in their make-up. People are much more readily moved through an emphasis on their strengths, their positives, their coping abilities. Thus Dr. John Spiegel, in providing psychotherapy for low-income populations, is most concerned to work with the extended family rather than ignore it or stress its difficulties.

Conceptualizations developed in psychiatry have important bearing on this issue of strength and weakness. For example, it has come to be recognized that *mental health and mental illness can co-exist in the same individual—that a person may have considerable pathology and at the same time have considerable strength;* one is not the inverse of the other. In other words, it is not accurate to assume that because an individual has more pathology, he has less strength or health. Health and pathology are two continuums, albeit overlapping ones. This concept has enormous implications for social action because it draws attention to the need for concentrating on the health-producing aspects of an organism or group.

Moynihan's stress on pathology and deficit is not unique. The Haryou Report similarly stresses various indices of pathology in Harlem and fails to accent the strengths, the cohesion, etc. It is thus no accident that the Haryou Report misinterprets the low rate of suicide among the Negro population. If it followed the classic Durkheim theory, it would note that a low rate of suicide is generally an index of the *cohesion* of a group.

The Limitations of "Compensatory Education"

In the field of education there is a widely heralded, although essentially unsuccessful approach, which, like Moynihan's, one-sidedly attempts to develop a theory of action based on deficits. This is the "compensatory education" thesis. It does not build on the action style, the cooperative (team) learning potential, or the hip language of the poor. Instead, "compensatory education" stresses deficits and attempts to build an entire program on overcoming these deficits.* Like the Moynihan

*, One should be very careful to specify what the presumed deficits are. It is not correct to talk about language deficiency as a general defect among low-income

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family approach, it is one-sided in principle and doomed to failure in practice.

As long ago as 1955 I reported that Negro families in large numbers stated that education was what *they had missed most in life and what they would like their children to have.* These matriarchal Negro families are very pro-education, although they have long criticized I.Q. tests, all-white readers, condescending PTA's, and together with their children have indicated a strong desire for a livelier, more vital school. Their surprisingly tough, masculine youngsters would like a more male-oriented school. This can be achieved by hiring large numbers of males as nonprofessional teacher aides, recreation aides, parent education coordinators. Since much of the learning in the family comes less from the parents and more from the brothers and sisters and friends on the street, this method of peer learning might be well adapted in the school itself. (Lippitt has demonstrated how disadvantaged 6th grade youngsters helped 4th grade youngsters for a short time during the week and both groups dramatically improved in their performance!)

If one wants to improve the educability of the Negro, it would seem much more relevant to stress changes in school practice and to develop this practice so that it is more attuned to the style and strengths of the population in question, rather than to emphasize the reorganization of the family. The latter emphasis seems much more indirect and less likely to produce the desired result. Similarly in the employment area, it would appear more appropriate to develop meaningful jobs for large numbers of low-income Negroes—e.g., non-professional jobs, where the job is provided first and the training built-in, rather than being concerned about the family. In the Howard University Community Apprentice Experiment, it was demonstrated that highly delinquent, functionally illiterate Negro youngsters were able to function in non-professional jobs when the training was built into the job. Their life patterns and work patterns were markedly changed as a result of this new non-professional job experience even though there were no changes in their family pattern.

The emphasis on the deficits and damages of the Negro people

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populations. It is more accurate to speak about deficiency in syntax and formal language. But in other aspects of language, such as the use of metaphor, rich adjectives, hip language, the connection between verbal and non-verbal communication, there is positive strength. A much more significant deficit of low-income populations is lack of school know-how and lack of system know-how. Similarly, in relation to the family, it is very important to specify what the supposed weaknesses are, and how these supposed weaknesses are translated into preventing the individual from functioning in the employment and education structures. The mechanism of this connection is often vague.

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kept sociologists from predicting the powerful Negro upheaval that developed into the Civil Rights Movement. This behavior could not be accounted for by an emphasis on the weaknesses, deficiencies and supposed lack of bootstraps. The uprising evolved from the Negro's *strength*, his protest, his anger, and when the conditions were ripe, these traits produced a powerful movement.

In response to the deficiencies of the system the Negro has developed his own informal system and traditions in order to cope and survive. Storefront churches, the extended family, the use of the street as a playground, the block party, the mutual help of siblings, the informal know-how and self-help of the neighborhood, the use of peer learning, hip language, the rent strike and other forms of direct social action are just a few illustrations.

The community action phase of the anti-poverty program is attempting to build on these positive traditions; thus the use of neighborhood service-center storefronts and nonprofessional neighborhood helpers are strategic features of the new community action pogram.

Only by calling upon these traditions can the Negro move into the mainstream of our society and, not incidentally, can our society benefit enormously from incorporation of some of these traditions. It is the Negro who is basically challenging our educational system and producing the demand for changes in educational technology and organization that will be of benefit to everyone.

There is increasing evidence that the integrated education drive is actually powering educational benefits for *all* children, not only Negro children. For example, the great hue and cry that arose regarding the "segregated," white face, white theme "Dick and Jane" readers, has led to the development of a variety of new "urban" readers that appear not only to improve the reading ability of the Negro children but also the white children's reading. Even more dramatic, the *Wall Street Journal* (Jan. 20, 1965) reports that in approximately 10% of *Southern* schools where some desegregation has taken place, not only do the Negro pupils improve rapidly, but the white youngsters appear to advance also.

It is only through full recognition of strengths that the condescension of welfarism can be avoided. Because if the have-nots have nothing—no culture, no strength, no anger, no organization, no cooperativeness, no inventiveness, no vitality—if they are only depressed, apathetic, fatalistic and pathological, then where is the force for their liberation to come from?

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Christopher Jencks

WHO SHOULD CONTROL EDUCATION?

I

American liberals have traditionally believed that many of the country's problems were susceptible to gradual and comparatively painless solution by combining education and technological innovation. In part, this assumption is correct. But most of America's problems are rooted not in technological or intellectual ineptitude but in genuine conflicts of interest. These problems cannot be solved merely by learning more; they can be solved only by taking the right to make certain decisions away from some people and giving power to others. Whether the problem is the arms race or America's enthusiasm for minding other nations' business, racism or poverty, illness or crime, the solution is not to be found in the classroom. If it were, there would be no need for radicalism in modern America.

The inability of schools to cure America's social disorders comes as a continuing disappointment to almost everyone (with the possible exception of teachers). Americans have always tended to assume that good schools could offset all the numerous defects of American homes, churches, and employers. Our dependence on schools and colleges to socialize the young has increased steadily during recent years. The reason for this is not the megalomania of educators. Nor is it the instinctive faith of laymen in educators; on the contrary, such faith has been conspicuously lacking. The reason is that parents, clergymen, and employers have found it harder and harder to meet their traditional responsibilities.

The inability of the typical American home to prepare its young for adult life needs little documentation. The world is changing too fast for parents to feel confident about imposing the values of their own youth on their children. They look outside the home for guidance: to their neighbors, to the mass media, to Dr. Spock and Margaret Mead, and to the schools. If elementary schools suggest that it is more important for children to get along with one another than to acquire adult virtues, most parents will acquiesce. If high schools sanction cars and cigarettes as normal to adolescent life, most parents will do the same. If colleges

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take sex and liquor for granted among undergraduates, most parents will protest only feebly.

The parent who would resist this pattern, soon discovers that his powers are extremely limited. The days are long gone when parents could or would spend most of their time with the young, either in household or farm work. By the time most students reach adolescence they have become expert in outwardly seeming to conform to parental demands while actually adapting to the less easily evaded expectations of their classmates. They have found, too, that their schools are in fact ersatz families, competing with parents for control over the young. The modern "schoolchild" is in many respects just that: the child of an institution. For him the school provides the mirror in which to discover himself. In large part, moreover, this mirror is the creation of his classmates, not his teachers. If the child is successful by his classmates' standards he becomes confident in a way that he never does if he succeeds only in pleasing his elders. Yet he can seldom be healthy or satisfied unless he also has the skill to make some kind of peace, however fragile or fraudulent, with adult expectations.

The decline of the family as a shaper of the young has been matched by the decline of the churches, and for similar reasons. The geographic mobility which has made it easier for children to anticipate that they will sooner or later be freed from the parental shadow has also made it possible for every one to change churches more easily, creating a buyer's market in religion. The growing complexity of the economy has created a variety of occupations which rival or surpass the clergy in erudition and breadth of experience, thereby reducing the authority of the pulpit as the arbiter of community morals. As a result, education has become a kind of secular religion, and teachers a sort of lay clergy.

Industry is also eager to transfer responsibility for the socialization and training of prospective employees to the schools. Employers have wanted to put vocational and professional training under public auspices to save themselves money and effort. Labor unions, professional associations and the like wanted their training programs in schools and colleges to give their callings status. Both have agreed that such a transfer of responsibility would provide more equality of opportunity and more assurance that the young would get high quality training. The roots of this change go back to the nineteenth century, when schools of medicine, law, and theology were established in the better American universities. In this same era land-grant colleges were set up to provide scientific training for farmers and engineers. Later, with the help of federal grants-

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in-aid, vocational training won a place in the secondary schools. In recent decades even business and public administration, the last prestigious holdouts against professionalization and academic preparation, have begun to fall into line. Today there is little real debate about the necessity of providing occupational training in school as well as (and in some measure instead of) on the job. The only serious debate is whether particular kinds of training need be extensive or brief, and at which educational level they should be provided.

It is clear, then, that schools and colleges are being asked to assume a large measure of responsibility for the personalities, attitudes and competence of the next generation. It is also clear that they are not set up to meet this responsibility. In the first place, America has assigned a comparatively small share of her resources to the task. Expenditures on education are usually reckoned at between five and six per cent of the Gross National Product. Less than three per cent of the adult population is employed in teaching, and except at the graduate level and in a few colleges this three per cent includes only a few of America's most talented men and women. Even our commitment of time may well be inadequate for the tasks we expect to accomplish in the classroom. The average American goes to school only 12 years out of almost 70, and during those years he is in school only about 180 days out of 365, and usually only about 6 hours each day. He devotes only about two per cent of his lifetime to formal education. Academically talented or socially fortunate children are, of course, likely to give more of their lives to educational institutions: often as much as four, and sometimes even six per cent. In some of these cases the impact of what happens in school is so strong that it helps shape the rest of the student's life. But this is the exception. Often enough, life outside the school is so much more compelling than life inside that a student is psychologically absent even during the hours he spends in class.

The basic reason why schools and colleges cannot cure our major social disorders is not, however, their lack of resources; it is that they are part of the system which produces the disorders. The resulting limitations are illustrated by looking closely at one of the many problems education is normally expected to solve: poverty.

American society is organized on the assumption that if you want to live comfortably you have to perform some kind of work which society values. Those who cannot perform such work are, with certain exceptions, condemned to live at or below the subsistence level. It is therefore usually assumed that the cure for poverty is an educational system which

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gives everyone the skills for doing some kind of valuable work. In other words, if everyone were literate, ambitious, and socially poised, everyone could earn a comfortable middle-class living.

Unfortunately, however, skills are not absolute but relative—and hence competitive. If the least adept students are given slightly better instruction, while instruction of the most adept gets substantially better, the competitive position of the least adept will deteriorate rather than improve. If that happens, poverty will grow more widespread. If the schools want to end poverty, they must not only improve the position of the poor pupils; *they must improve it faster than they improve the position of the rest of the pupils.* Parents of the better pupils (middle-class parents by and large) inevitably resist such efforts. They do not, of course, defend giving the inept students an inept teacher or poorly equipped classroom. But they do not want talented teachers diverted from work with gifted children to "remedial" or "vocational" work, nor do they want improvement of slum schools given higher priority than the improvement of their own schools. The middle classes realize quite well that American life is competitive, and that if their children are to prosper they must get "the best" education. Both "the best" and "the worst" are defined by comparison with the rest. If "the worst" gets better, then middle-class parents will want "the best" improved even more. Given today's political realities, educators can seldom resist such middle-class demands. Nor do most educators have an impulse to resist, even if they could. They typically argue that "the best way to improve the education system is to start at the top." This is probably true. But improving the system in this way will do nothing to eliminate poverty, and may even intensify it. If we want to end poverty we must concentrate not on increasing the absolute educational level of the population but on narrowing the gap between the best educated and the worst educated.

As this example suggests, the social role of education is at bottom a political rather than a technical question. Schools and colleges can only play a major role in solving America's social problems if control over them passes to new individuals and interests which expect to benefit from solving these problems. If the poor, for example, want to narrow the gap between what their children learn in school and what the children of the middle classes learn, they will have to fight for a larger voice in the allocation of personnel and money among competing schools and competing programs within schools.

A radical analysis of American education must, then, begin by

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focusing on the question of who controls our schools and colleges. At first glance this appears to be a fairly simple question, which can be answered by studying the legislators, philanthropists, and parents who put up most of the money for education, and the boards of education and trustees which nominally control most schools and colleges. This kind of analysis shows quite clearly that education is a virtual monopoly of the middle classes, and that the great conflicts are in large part intra-class conflicts. The battle over church-state relations, for example, is largely a struggle between middle-class Catholics who want "the best" education for their child and don't want to pay for it twice, and the middle-class non-Catholics who think religious separatism a national menace. The battle over racial segregation, too, is largely a struggle between lower-middle-class Negroes who want to escape the ghetto mentality and lower-middle-class whites whose status and self-assurance are too fragile to accept Negroes as equals. (This is not to say that poor Negroes accept segregation willingly. But for the most part they are not ready to organize and they are more interested in new buildings and good teachers than in integration *per se.)*

Most conflicts over education are not, however, conflicts among lay interests but between one or another lay group and the professionals. Formally, of course, these battles are fought in the lay arena. Typically there is a "liberal" group which takes its cues from the professionals and supports their demands, and a "conservative" group which opposes the dominant professional opinion on the subject. The classic example of this pattern is, of course, the perennial struggle over educational finances, in which the educators ask for more money, the "liberals" support the demand, and the "conservatives" oppose it. Another recurrent example is the struggle for "academic freedom," a term which can mean almost anything but is generally used in debates about the political, theological or moral content of a teacher's classes or reading lists. Again, the pattern is one in which the "liberals" support professional autonomy while the "conservatives" argue for the layman's right to decide what goes on in a school or college. With the major exceptions of racial and religious questions, this pattern characterizes almost the full range of educational politics. Sooner or later (mostly later) victory in such struggles usually goes to the liberals. The result is that the educators have more and more control both over their own affairs and over their students'. The reasons for this trend deserve careful attention, for until they are understood it is impossible to map a realistic program of educational reform, radical or otherwise.

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II

Ours is an academic age. All of the major professions have come to depend on universities, not just to train their recruits but to provide old-timers with new techniques and ideas. Business and government are in many respects as dependent on the universities as the professions are. The universities generate many of the ideas which give politicians and civil servants a sense of purpose; they invent many of the scientific and managerial techniques which make it possible for both governmental and corporate bureaucracies to achieve their purposes; and they train men to do the more complicated jobs in business and government. Even such a symbolically pre-academic man as the yeoman farmer has come to depend on the university extension service.

The vital link between formal education and workaday world is usually the graduate professional school. These schools, concentrated in a few dozen universities, train almost all the important educators, doctors, lawyers, engineers, economists, and literary critics, as well as many of the leading businessmen, government officials, and even military officers. They put an imprimatur on the young which tells outsiders that a particular man is an insider. They also shape the state of mind which this imprimatur symbolizes: acceptance of the needs of your employer-client, be he the Pentagon or a neurotic four year old, as legitimate and inevitable; keeping personal feelings and emotional impulses to yourself; knowing more about the problems you tackle than anyone else; not getting hung up on questions that are too big or too fundamental to be "manageable." Over any considerable period of time the men who teach in America's leading graduate schools determine for the rest of us not only what is true and what is false but in large measure what is "done" and "not done." Since the graduate schools are usually a generation ahead of whatever segment of the society they lead, their influence at any particular moment always looks modest. Over the years, however, they are perhaps the single most important source of innovation in society.

There are, of course, differences among graduate schools. The world of medicine is not the same as the world of physics, economic advice is not offered in quite the same way as legal advice, literary criticism requires a different temperament from library management. And all these differences are mirrored in the graduate schools. Nevertheless, the similarities between graduate programs are generally more striking than the differences. I shall therefore lump all of these programs under the general rubric "graduate schools," and will assume that all graduate schools are professional schools, even when the "profession" for which they prepare is archaeology or musicology.

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Standing as they do at the crossroads between education and employment, the graduate schools have enormous potential influence on the rest of education. Nor have they been slow to exercise this influence. The customs and concerns of the graduate schools increasingly mold undergraduate education. This applies not only to undergraduate education in the universities but to the supposedly independent liberal arts colleges, and even colleges nominally dedicated to saving souls, training teachers and preparing young ladies to become Southern matrons.

The reasons for this hegemony are several. First, the graduate schools are the principal source of college teachers. These teachers tend to regard their years in graduate school as a model of what all education should be like. They seek to re-create this model in the college, both by adding graduate programs and by reorganizing undergraduate programs in the image of graduate ones. A second reason for the hegemony of the graduate schools is that the proportion of undergraduates who plan to go on to graduate school appears to be steadily increasing. As a result, the faculty has more leverage in its struggle to impose graduate school standards on undergraduates. The student who a generation ago would not have cared whether he got an "A" or a "C" in European History now does care. This means that his professors can make him act like an apprentice historian while he is enrolled in the course. And now that he sees himself as a prospective graduate student he is often *eager* to play the amateur Ranke. There are, of course, still plenty of colleges where the majority of students reject all this and intend to go to work in what they see as an anti-intellectual business community. But such colleges and such students have less status than their more academically rigorous competitors and are increasingly on the defensive. Everyone concerned agrees that the graduate schools are the wave of the future.

If outside laymen still controlled colleges as tightly as they once did, the recruitment and expectations of faculty and students might make little difference. But the fact is that college trustees and administrators are more and more responsive to the collective views of the academic profession, less and less to other pressures. As a result, college faculties have increasing power to shape their institutions. One reason for this is the rising importance of federal and foundation support, compared to such traditional sources as state legislatures and alumni. Both the foundations and the federal government are inclined to consult professional rather than lay opinion in deciding how to spend their money. They also often deal with faculty members rather than going through administrators and trustees. Thus the faculty have more independent

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initiative, and the trustees and administrators are more dependent on the faculty to bring in money. With so much money available for research, even institutions which have done little to push back the intellectual frontiers are anxious to do more—or at least to *seem* to do more. This anxiety has produced an unprecedented concern about that elusive attribute "quality," as well as about its more measurable (if largely meaningless) counterpart, "credentials." Faced with a shortage of distinguished or even competent scholars, boards of trustees and administrators have nevertheless shown unprecedented eagerness to maintain standards, and in many cases have even struggled to raise them. As a result, colleges compete to improve salaries and working conditions. More and more faculty can "write their own ticket."

The rising bargaining power of the academic profession and its rising prestige in the eyes of laymen have reduced the control of the special interest groups which founded most colleges: the Catholics and Baptists, the Negroes and Irish, the teachers and farmers, the feminists and aristocrats, the home town boosters and regional patriots. Academicians are subject to less direct pressure from these groups, either with regard to their own affairs or in their dealings with the young. Indeed, academicians are more and more looked to by these interests to mediate between their traditional claims and the newer, more cosmopolitan and "national" vision of society which many members of these groups see emerging. This does not, of course, mean that academic and professional freedom is universal or irreversible; but any look at the past suggests that the trend is toward more and more autonomy for the professors, less and less authority for the laymen.

Nor is this trend confined to the colleges. It is also apparent, if to a lesser extent, in the elementary and secondary schools. Indeed, the relationship between graduate and undergraduate instruction is in many respects paralleled by that between undergraduate and secondary education. Most of the secondary school teachers have been trained in the colleges (some have also had some graduate work), and their definitions of what is worth knowing and how it should be taught are at least partially acquired in college. These colleges, moreover, are increasingly cosmopolitan. The old teachers college in which the student never met a creative scholar or scientist is slowly on the way out.

At the same time, the proportion of high school students who graduate and go on to college is rising steadily, and this means that more and more high school students care about good grades and can be forced to do whatever academic tasks their teachers set for them.

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These changes have many by-products. The "curriculum reform" movement, for example, is primarily an effort to remake the secondary (and to a lesser extent, the elementary) curriculum in the image of the college and the graduate school curricula—only better. Professors from the leading universities have been involved in preparing curriculum materials and in training teachers to use them. "Advanced placement" courses are another sign of the times. High school teachers of these courses give instruction which is avowedly and deliberately similar to what has traditionally been given to college freshmen, and many colleges now give credit for such work if students do sufficiently well on a national exam devised for the purpose. The growing emphasis on academic preparation for secondary teachers, and the feeling that the skills and training required for a college teacher are essentially the same as those required for a high school teacher, are a natural consequence of such trends.

In the elementary and secondary schools as in the colleges, the power of lay boards of control appears to be diminishing. Partly this is a financial change. The local school board depends more and more upon state and federal assistance to balance its budget and is therefore subject to the decisions of state and federal legislators about how money should be spent. For a variety of reasons best known to politicians, the professional educators seem to have substantially more influence over decisions made at the state and federal level than over decisions made locally. One reason may be that state and federal legislators are typically better educated than the local school board members, and may therefore be more deferential toward the claims of educators. Then too, neither state nor federal legislators can easily punish educators who mobilize public opinion against them or try to push them in directions they don't want to go. The teacher who criticizes a local school board, on the other hand, may find himself unemployed. Yet even at the local level teachers have in recent years shown unprecedented readiness to organize, lobby for better schools, and withdraw their services if they don't get what they want. While much of the controversy over teachers' unions, strikes, and "professional sanctions" has focused on salaries, the teachers' right to a direct voice in shaping school policy has also been a vital issue.

What do these developments portend for the future? So far as educators are concerned, the picture seems clear. They are building a unified educational system, running from pre-school to graduate school, all of whose parts will be increasingly articulated with one another. The wellsprings of authority in this system will be the graduate schools,

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which have direct contact with the dominant institutions in the larger society and which therefore embody and symbolize the demands of the "real" world. The leading universities will have far more influence on the rest of the educational system than the system has on them. This will be clear to teachers at all levels, and the result will be an increasingly widespread desire to work in a major university where most research will be done, where most graduate students will be trained, and where the rest of the educational system will be increasingly shaped. The teachers will, moreover, find it easier than in the past to satisfy their perennial impulse to work in or near the centers of power and influence. Graduate programs will undergo enormous expansion, creating more jobs for men with good scholarly credentials. This will not only decimate undergraduate classrooms but lure many talented teachers away from the elementary and secondary schools.

The hegemony of the universities will almost certainly accelerate the nationalization of the whole educational system. Already the academic profession has an essentially national outlook, and tends to be impatient with the parochial interests of local boards who assume that the educational system under their control should have a special mission or standards. Academicians use whatever leverage they have to enforce their more universalistic viewpoint, and they find that the federal civil service and to a lesser extent the President and the Congress are their natural allies in such struggles. Thus there will be more and more pressure for federal "leadership" and federal "standards" at all levels, and the result will be more federal "control."

For the students, a system dominated by the academic profession and the top universities will mean several changes. First, and perhaps most important, such a system will be increasingly organized and run on the assumption that students at each level are going on to the next level. The high schools will be run for the benefit of those who plan to attend college, the colleges will be run for those who plan to attend graduate school. At any particular level, this assumption will be correct for more and more students, even though in the forseeable future the great majority will continue to drop out *somewhere* along the path to a graduate degree. The dropouts, however, will be more and more on the defensive in the nonacademic world. Adults will assume that a "normal" youngster should go on to get a graduate degree, and that those who fail to follow this course are stupid, rebellious, inflexible, or in some other way socially tainted. As a result, there will be a growing consensus among educators and laymen that "improving" education at

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each level consists not of preparing students better for the non-academic world, but preparing them better for the next higher level.

These trends will affect students in several ways. For one thing, the present emphasis on admission to the "right" college will probably be more and more overshadowed and supplanted by emphasis on admission to the "right" graduate school. Students will tend to view college as they now view secondary school: mainly as a way-station from which one progresses to the next level. Many such students will, I think, be willing to attend "comprehensive" public commuter colleges during their undergraduate years, just as they now attend comprehensive public high schools. In that event the undergraduate colleges attached to major universities may go the same way as the academic high schools of an earlier era: surviving and even prospering, but still appealing only to a small, cosmopolitan and highly motivated minority. Similarly, the private residential liberal arts college may, like the boarding school of an earlier era, price itself out of reach of most families. (Costs have in recent years risen much faster than personal incomes.) Some such colleges may fold, while the rest will come to serve the same mixture of education-conscious upper-middle class families and carefully selected scholarship students now found in the better private schools.

The present influence of the elite undergraduate college may be further eroded if, as seems likely, it becomes increasingly difficult for *any* undergraduate program to attract big-name teachers. Without distinguished faculties, the difference between an elite residential college and a "comprehensive" commuter college will be more and more a matter of "tradition," and "atmosphere." How many parents will be willing to spend a large fraction of their income on such "intangibles" if there is a cheap and respectable public college just around the corner, and if this college seems to ensure its more gifted BA's entry into the nation's top graduate schools? Parental reluctance to invest large sums in undergraduate education may be particularly marked if federal support for graduate students lags behind costs, so that the parents expect to be asked for substantial contributions to their children's graduate education. Only the most prosperous parents, who can afford to support their children at *both* levels, seem likely to opt for expensive undergraduate education. In this respect, as in others, the undergraduate pattern of tomorrow is likely to mirror the secondary school pattern of today.

Students in this system will find themselves under pressure to grow up faster than they have in the past. Educators generally, and university

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scholars particularly, tend to gear the educational program to precocious and talented youngsters such as they themselves usually were. Today this tendency is somewhat restrained by the power of laymen. Parents, speaking through the board of education, complain if their children are worked too hard or "can't keep up." Students both in school and college conspire tacitly or explicitly to restrict output. For reasons already suggested, however, these limitations on academic power and pressure are diminishing, and the pace of learning is accelerating. Today's students study languages in elementary school which were once saved for secondary school, they read books in high school that were once read only in college, and they write papers and perform experiments in college which would once have been reserved to graduate students. Conversely, students whose failure to learn was once accepted as normal and predictable are now defined as "problems," and are segregated into "remedial" programs of one kind or another.

III

What is an appropriate radical response to these developments—assuming I have predicted them accurately? First, it seems to me the radical must ask how such a system of education is going to affect the character of the larger society. Will changes of the kind I have predicted cure any of the present diseases of American society? Will they stimulate any new ones? Second, a radical must ask whether the emerging system of education will be good in its own right, i.e., will those who teach and learn and live within the system find it more satisfying than they find the present system?

The impact of the emerging system of education on American society is far from clear, but at least in some respects trouble appears likely. We seem to be headed for a world in which everyone will spend more time in the classroom and related activities, in which performance in these activities will be more important for success elsewhere, and in which the larger society will increasingly mirror the values and organization of the classroom. This may not be such a bad thing; certainly it is better than a society which demands and values physical brawn or the right ancestors. But educational institutions also have important limitations. At least as presently and prospectively organized, they keep students largely passive and dependent. The student, at whatever level, is not encouraged to discover and define reality for himself. Rather, he is encouraged to accept the definitions and demands of others, and is rewarded according to his ability and willingness to adapt to these demands. Such schools and colleges provide appropriate socialization for

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the corporate or governmental civil service and for many professions. But a society cannot be wholly run by organization men. Somewhere it must have men who initiate new activities, who take the lead in responding to new problems and to a changing environment.

If everyone is to spend a substantial part of the years between five and twenty-five in educational institutions, the definition of such institutions must somehow become more flexible. Already this is happening in some measure: from elementary school to graduate school, the definition of institutional responsibilities and possibilities has been enormously expanded since 1900, and further expansion seems likely. As academics become more involved in the affairs of society, their assumptions about what young apprentices should be doing also seem to become somewhat broader. Scholars who commute to Washington as consultants, for example, often listen sympathetically to those who propose that graduate or undergraduate students should gain political experience as part of their education. At the other end of the spectrum, elementary school teachers who are also mothers want to expose their pupils to the full range of activities that they offer their own children, from trips to the zoo to individual reading or tinkering projects. The result of all this is that while it becomes harder for the young to escape the embrace of educational institutions, the range of activities possible within this embrace is much wider than it was a generation or two ago. This applies not only to the diversification of "credit" courses, but to the growing flexibility of the role of the "student." A generation ago young people almost never mixed marriage with study. Comparatively few responsible employed adults were also students. Today both mixtures are becoming more common, and the role of the "student" is far more open-ended and potentially satisfying to a variety of dissimilar temperaments.

The present trend will probably continue. But it is by no means certain that the role of the student will be diversified as fast as it should be when you consider the increasing proportion of the population which is being forced into this role for ever longer periods of time. Even more important, although the role of the student is fairly flexible when viewed in a national context, it is often extremely rigid in the particular school or college he is forced to attend.

There are, of course, exceptions to this pattern of uniformity. A big state university, for example, is likely to have a variety of student sub-cultures, and a student is likely to have considerable freedom to join whichever he finds congenial. This is true to a lesser extent of some big comprehensive high schools. Nevertheless, there are very few schools or

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colleges which include the full range of possible responses to such youthful realities as ignorance and curiosity, loneliness and sexuality, powerlessness and irresponsibility. In the great majority of institutions there is one dominant style, and all other possibilities are looked down on. If a student is not comfortable with the style which dominates his institution, if he does not find that the attitudes and talents of its leading crowd complement his own, he must either go underground or elsewhere. In most cases he can go underground only at great cost to himself, and elsewhere only at great cost to his parents. As a result, many young people spend years in institutions they hate, learn very little, and drop out too soon to have much chance of realizing their potential as adults.

What can be done to remedy this situation? One possibility is to try to make schools and colleges more pluralistic, encouraging faculty to teach in more ways and students to create more sub-cultures within each institution. Once educators have got done denying that the problem doesn't exist, they usually make suggestions of this kind. As a practical matter, however, pluralism within institutions has both limitations and drawbacks.

The limitations derive from the fact of central administration and from the desire of most teachers to work with colleagues who differ from themselves along only a few dimensions. The consequences of central administration vary, of course, according to the administrative system and the philosophy on which it operates. University administrators are usually readier than school administrators to allow a variety of distinctive or even conflicting enterprises within their bailiwick. But it is almost impossible to find administrators at any level who can take responsibility for actively promoting a wide variety of contradictory programs. The most one can hope for is an administrator who will hire subordinates of quite different outlooks and then let them ride off in all directions. Even this is rare.

The power of a single organization to move in diverse directions is usually limited not only by the top man but by the staff. Especially in colleges and universities, where the faculty expect to play a major role in choosing their colleagues, there is normally great resistance to establishing new programs which will bring radically different sorts of instructors into the club. Indeed, there is often strong resistance even to allowing faculty who are already in the club to undertake radically new programs which seem to constitute an indictment of the status quo. A college professor has a great deal of freedom to teach *what* he pleases,

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and a school teacher has some, but neither is free to decide *how* to teach—whether in large groups or small, in departmentalized courses or others, one day a week or five. The limits are as often imposed by colleagues anxious to preserve standards and "continuity" as by administrators. There is nowhere near as much freedom to organize one's own teaching projects in an idiosyncratic way as there is with research projects.

Even if these problems could be solved, the drive for pluralism would entail major sacrifices. The most important problem is size. If an institution wants to be all things to all people, it must be large. At the college level, a small, manageable student body will not usually have enough students interested in politics to sustain a group of left or right-wing activists. If it does, there will not be enough journalists to put out a good newspaper or enough squares to sustain the fraternities. Similarly, a small junior high school will not have enough bookish students to sustain an intellectual sub-culture, nor will it have enough potential junkies to support a narcotics saleman.

Bigness has many advantages, especially for the student with unusual talent, energy or interests who can master a complex environment. But for many students bigness is an invitation to passivity and anomie. One reason is that while increased enrollment brings an increase in the number and variety of student activities, the latter never increase in proportion to the former. No matter how big the place gets, there is only one student paper, one band, one football team, one valedictorian and so forth. Competition for these slots therefore grows more intense as size increases. The quality of performance in each activity is better, but fewer students participate actively. Many students must gain whatever satisfaction they can from watching classmates they hardly know perform with skill they cannot equal. In a large student body, no matter how carefully selected, many individuals find they have no special contribution to make, no well-defined role to give them a sense of being valued, and every reason to assume that they are regarded as expendable.

Size tends to affect not only the relationship among students but that between students and adults. As student sub-cultures grow more diverse and encompass more of the students' lives, their dependence on adults seems in some respects to diminish. This may be fine from the students' viewpoint, but it frees them for foolish as well as wise experiments. The anonymity of a large institution can lead to tragedy as well as emancipation. Indeed, it is perhaps the possibility of the former which encourages the latter. For the many youngsters who are born tragedy-prone, such an educational setting is a mistake.

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For all of these reasons, an educational system which aspires to offer the young both a manageable environment and a wide range of choice should not try to make each of its enterprises all things to all people. Instead, a system with such aims must try to establish a wide variety of somewhat specialized and distinctive institutions, each following its unique path, each doing only what its staff can do well, each attracting its own constituency and serving that constituency in its own way. Some of these institutions should be large, others small, but in each case the aim should be to determine size according to the needs of the teachers and students rather than on the basis of administrative convenience or logistic pressure.

The first step toward the establishment of such an educational system would be to abandon the tradition that education should be rooted in geography. According to this venerable notion, the best educational system is one in which everyone who lives in a particular area attends school or college with everyone else living in that area. This assumption is now firmly established in the elementary schools, largely dominant in the secondary schools, and for reasons already indicated is spreading to the colleges. Its justification is twofold. First, it is cheap and convenient. Transportation costs are cut to a minimum for the young, and even college students are spared the expense of living away from home. Second, certain communities have a wide spread of incomes and personalities. This means that schools and colleges rooted in these communities seem very "democratic." We are, however, more and more an urban people, whose rich live in suburbs and whose poor live in slums. There are fewer and fewer communities in which a "local" school or college is heterogeneous and more in which it is economically and/or ethnically homogeneous. This pattern is extremely obvious in elementary education, increasingly so in junior and senior highs, and has begun to appear even in higher education. As the cost of living away from home rises, and as youthful unemployment makes it harder for poor students to earn enough to meet this cost, the children of the slums who want to go to college will be under growing pressure to attend the local commuter college. Efforts to provide government scholarships which would give such students a wider range of choice have come to little.

What is the alternative? First, every effort must be made to ensure that students and parents have complete freedom to choose among all the various schools and colleges in the nation. This means that a child living in one part of town must be allowed to apply for a school in another part on precisely the same basis as a child who lives around the

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corner from the school in question. It means that a student who wants to attend a university which is 200 (or 2000) miles from his home should be given as much assistance as he needs to pay his room and board bills rather than being forced by poverty to attend a junior college to which he can commute. Perhaps most important, it means that a student who wants to attend a private school or college should get the same subsidy from the state as a student who wants to attend a public school or college, so long as the private institution meets minimal criteria established by the state.

The essential principle of such an educational system would be that the needs of individual students have primacy over the needs of institutions, public or private, and that subsidies will be spent on the kinds of education parents and students want, not on the kind politicians want and control. This principle could be realized either by making all subsidies take the form of tuition grants or by paying public funds to schools and colleges according to the number, level and perhaps the incapacity to pay of their students. The essential point in either case would be to use the market mechanism to ensure that the allocation of resources among competing schools and colleges was in the hands of students and parents.

The value of such a system depends, of course, on the amount of real diversity it creates. Little will be gained by providing more choice if this turns out to be between hundreds of virtually identical institutions. To avoid this we must make a real effort to promote experimentation and to create specialized schools catering to various minority tastes. In part, of course, the proposed reorganization of the academic marketplace will do this, for if a special-purpose school, either public or private, can draw from all income groups and all geographic areas its chances of finding and retaining a stable constituency will be much greater than today. If we want to go very far in this direction, however, the administration of the public sector of the educational economy must be reorganized. If students have a choice about whether they attend a particular school or not, it should become politically possible to free the principal and staff of the school from many of the restrictions which now hem them in. If a principal wants to recruit a staff and set up a Montessori school, and if he can find parents who want to send their children to such a school, he should be free to follow his mission. If another principal wants to use McGuffey's reader, and if enough teachers and parents support this quaint notion, they should be free to do that too. If a school wants to recruit teachers without regard to the number of education courses they have taken, and if parents find the resulting

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program suits their children, this should be possible. If a public university wants to hire fewer professors and pay higher salaries than its competitors, it should be free to take that approach so long as it can live within a standard allocation of money for each student. Public institutions, in other words, should wherever possible have the same kinds of autonomy that private institutions now have. At every level an effort should be made to reduce the distinction between the public and private sectors, encouraging them to compete on equal terms for students and allocating funds among them according to the number of students they attract.

In its pure form, the system I am advocating would give the professional educators absolute freedom to establish any kinds of schools and colleges they see fit, while giving parents and students absolute freedom to choose among these schools and colleges as they see fit. As a practical matter, however, this purity would have to be diluted in certain respects.

First, the public must be protected against fraud. This means that any school which receives public funds should be open to public inspection, and that the results of such inspection should be publicly available. An educational "consumers union" would also be useful in this context, and if millions of parents were suddenly free to choose among a variety of schools and colleges, such a union would probably spring up.

A second limitation emerges from the fact that in many parts of the country there is only one school within bussing distance of most families. If such families don't like the nearest school their only alternative is a boarding school. While this solution ought to be more widely available than it is, particularly to Negroes in the Deep South, it is not an appealing alternative to many families. In sparsely settled areas and in smaller towns geography will have to remain one of the organizing principles of education. In such settings the professional educators' freedom to experiment must continue to be limited by what the local board of education judges acceptable to the community.

A third limitation is that there are some parents whose educational preferences do not deserve to be indulged, even if educators can be found to indulge them. Parents who want their children to attend all-white schools should not be allowed to use public funds to pursue this preference. Other restrictions would inevitably be imposed by the courts and by legislators. The courts would presumably hold, for example, that public funds could not go to a school or college which discriminated in favor of Catholics. They might also hold that public funds could not

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go to a school or college which held religious services on its premises—though this latter seems unlikely. Politicians in some areas might well feel that public funds should not be used to support and promote academic elitism, at least among the young. In that case they might require that a school receiving public support be open to all comers, regardless of IQ or academic record. This should not, in my view, prevent a school from setting up a strictly academic program geared to hard working and talented children; but there is much to be said for leaving the decision about whether to enter such a school to parents and students rather than to testers and teachers. (Teachers will no doubt disagree.)

With the safeguards outlined, a system of free choice could have an enormously beneficial effect on the American educational scene. The market mechanism is not, of course, foolproof; in areas where mass production or national advertising is vitally important, a "free" market tends to produce oligopoly or monopoly, and the customer is often left with no real choice among products. But education does not appear to be an industry with such a propensity to concentration. Rather, it is an industry in which the small entrepreneur can often do his job as well as, or better than, the big time operator. Competition can and does flourish when the government does not rig the market. In such a market the consumer has a reasonable hope of getting what he wants—*if* the government gives him enough money to pay for it. A free market would, of course, reduce enrollment in publicly-controlled schools and increase enrollment in privately-controlled schools. But that is not in itself an argument against change. There is no inherent virtue in public administration of the schools any more than in public administration of universities, post offices or the telephone system. One must judge by results, and today's largely public system of administration has produced neither an equitable nor an efficient and imaginative deployment of educational resources.

I have suggested that the major change now taking place in the educational system is the growing power of the professional educators, and I have argued that this will do little to solve the problems of most students. If we want a radical change in the present system, a mechanism must be found for offsetting the power of the profession. Sporadic reassertions of political control are not likely to turn the trick; indeed, many of the more common sorts of intervention by boards of laymen are likely to make matters worse. The only alternative that I can see is to establish a freer market and thus give more direct power to parents and students.

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Lionel Abel

SO WHO'S NOT MAD?

On Marat/Sade and Nihilism*

It was Susan Sontag, I think, who first pointed up the extreme theatricality of *Marat/Sade*. Susan Sontag was right, *Marat/Sade* is theatrical. Is the play dramatic, though? About this there seems to be some question in even Miss Sontag's mind. When she discussed the work in her *Partisan Review* article (Spring 1965), the word "dramatic," scarcely used in her text, came up in this sentence: ". . . *Marat/Sade* is far from being the supreme masterpiece of contemporary dramatic literature, but it is scarcely a second-rate play." From which I infer that Miss Sontag herself has doubts as to the value of *Marat/Sade* as drama. My own opinion—which has the virtue at least of being settled—is that the play is indeed a "director's play," and owes most of its values of excitement and bravura to the staging and direction of Mr. Peter Brook. Whatever life *Marat/Sade* has on the stage comes, in my finding, from the devices of its director, not its author.

One could not say this were the play truly compelling. For certainly a play not soundly dramatic can do little more than hold its audience; the devices of a director can merely make a play bearable. To me, *Marat/Sade* was certainly bearable, but little more than that, except for a few moments. The first part was often tedious, and the second part a repetition of what is boring in the first. But what concerns me here is a general point, the difference between the theatrical and the dramatic.

When we find Marat on the Martin Beck stage, half of his body is enclosed in a metal bathtub, and the naked flesh of him that we do see is covered with large red spots. There he is, immobile, frail and blotched in his bath, stained by his disease. Now the effect is electric. But this effect lasts only for a moment, for Marat is going to speak. We want to hear what he says. And as we listen, we tend not to look

* *The Persecution and Assassination of Marat as Performed by the Inmates of the Asylum at Charenton under the Direction of the Marquis de Sade.* By Peter Weiss. Directed by Peter Brook. Martin Beck Theater, New York.

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at his red spots; but what he says is less interesting than the red spots, much less interesting humanly, much less interesting dramatically. His voice, which often rises to an orator's shout, somehow erases the strong effect the sight of his body first gave us. His is a theatrical presence, not a dramatic one.

To point up the contrast between the theatrical and the dramatic, one has only to think for a moment of Danton in Buechner's play, *Danton's Death*. The real Danton, the Danton of history, was pockmarked, but Buechner in the directions for his work never insisted on representing him as such. For what interests us in the Danton of Buechner are the things Danton says, and were he presented with a pockmarked visage, the force of his lines would limit, make one forget, or even quite destroy, I think, any theatrical value his appearance with a pitted skin might have, just as the feebleness and platitudinousness of Marat's lines in *Marat/Sade* tend, as that play goes on, to destroy the theatrical effect our first sight of Marat, spotted and in his bathtub, gave. I suggest that the theatrical is something very different from the dramatic, and that it is finally dependent on the dramatic. A play in which the first is substituted for the second will tend to lose whatever value, as it goes on, it had at the start. This is what happens in *Marat/Sade*. Highly theatrical at the outset, never becoming dramatic, as it progresses it loses its theatricality. And not because the theatrical is contrary to the dramatic or in some sense its opposite. The theatrical sums itself up in one moment of time whereas the dramatic links into a culminating action many moments of time. When we speak of a *coup de théâtre* we have in mind an event which combines the theatrical with the dramatic, but the *coup de théâtre* simply cannot take place if some dramatic development has not prepared it. Now there is no *coup de théâtre* in the utterly theatrical play of Peter Weiss. In fact, the most theatrical thing about this play is its full title, which takes up about a minute's reading time. Read it: *The Persecution and Assassination of Marat as Performed by the Inmates of the Asylum at Charenton under the Direction of the Marquis de Sade.*

The idea that Sade might put on a play to be performed by the inmates of a lunatic asylum, and that in this play he and Marat might be the leading characters, is certainly a fascinating one suggesting a real drama. But no drama takes place in Peter Weiss's play. Sade tries to convert Marat, who does not listen to him. Why would he listen to the platitudes of sadism? Marat, totally unresponsive, declaims, in his turn, the political platitudes to which he remains committed. There is no yielding of one to the other, consequently there is no dramatic

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play between them. The author has said that the center of his play is an argument. Now I heard none. For in any true argument there is always a moment of wavering on the part of the one or the other. But in *Marat/Sade,* the Marquis is scarcely beguiling, and Marat never gives any indication of being beguiled.

Some, including Miss Sontag, have found a great theatrical interest in the fact that almost everyone on the stage is mad. I am inclined to think that this reveals in those who take such a view an ideological interest in the mad rather than an aesthetic or even psychologically normal response to madness. Anyone who has ever had a discussion with another person and noted or suspected at some point that the other was mad, must recall that with that thought or suspicion there was an immediate tendency to break off discussion. For one cannot know what a lunatic is thinking or feeling and the normal impulse is to detach oneself from any consideration of what may go on in his mind. And so it follows, however surprising this may be to some people, that madmen, though theatrical, are fundamentally undramatic and do not properly belong on the stage. A moment of madness, yes, particularly as expressed by someone whom we have seen as sane before, can have dramatic interest, and of course a sane man pretending madness is interesting. But real madmen, or persons presented as really mad, do not belong in any theater attended by people with a taste for drama.

Yet I must admit that the audience at the Martin Beck Theater does not reason as I do, and does not feel as I do. During the last moments of *Marat/Sade,* when the inmates of Charenton threw off all restraints and went berserk, there was an unmistakable feeling of solidarity with them on the part of the audience, so that for some moments I half expected whole groups to get up on stage and add their own versions to the outrageous "twist" Peter Brook designed. Why this fellow feeling for the mad? In answering this question, one can perhaps find some reason for the very great success of Peter Weiss's play.

Now the play is quite devoid of any intellectual meaning. Is Weiss trying to say that the content of history is sadism? This judgment might indeed make a play, and a challenging play, though I think the judgment false. In any case, Weiss has denied that this is his judgment. He asserts, "Everything irrational and absurd is foreign to me." He claims, also, to side with the platitudinous opinions uttered by Marat. Of course, none of Weiss's statements about his play need be taken seriously. In public interviews he has on the one hand described himself as a socialist, and on the other hand said that he considers socialism a failure. Such indecisiveness of judgment is hardly

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the sign of a superior sensitiveness to what, after judging, may remain ambiguous. Very probably, we can only learn about what is unresolvably ambiguous in politics and morals from someone whose moral and political position is clear. Certainly it would be unfair to confront Weiss's play with masterpieces like Dostoevsky's. Nevertheless, the art of the Russian novelist did settle one question (there are some questions that have been settled) now being called upon by the partisans of *Marat/Sade,* notably its director, Mr. Peter Brook. What Dostoevsky's work proved, to those, of course, who know how to read him, is that one can choose finally—Dostoevsky chose Christ as against science and socialism—and yet acknowledge with full awareness all that is valid in what one rejects. No reader can be in doubt of Dostoevsky's judgment; he denies no reader a taste of the ambiguous. Bad or inconclusive thinking is hardly the best, or even a good way, to apprehend ambiguities.

But why the enthusiasm for *Marat/Sade?* Here, I think, we have to turn aside from the aesthetics of drama and look to the ideological motives of the play.

Let me go back to the frenetic response of certain members of the audience to the final scene of *Marat/Sade.* In that response there was a clearly articulated sympathy for madness. What sustains so peculiar, and to my mind unnatural, a sympathy?

Do people tend to think now that history is a madhouse? Or, to cite again Joyce's much-quoted phrase, a nightmare? In that case, why would they not want to wake up from it? I must also point out, that, when any strikingly leftist remark was made on the stage, the very same members of the audience who solidarized themselves with the stage's madmen again came to life with clapping and cheers. So there was a feeling in the theater for leftism plus madness, and I think this feeling is expressed in the play itself, whose two chief protagonists have the names Marat and Sade.

I suggest that the play appeals generally to those who have violent leftist notions and yet, like the author, think socialism a failure. In madness, one can combine such ideas.

However, the interest in madness presently expressed, and by a good many talented and intelligent people, may go far beyond the need to conciliate political leftism with despair of socialism. The frantic, the frenetic, the wild and outrageous are continually being stated as positive values nowadays, in literature, in the films, and on the stage. I recently saw an extremely clever French film in which the goal of the hero—he achieves it—is schizophrenia. The film is light, intelligent,

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ironical, and in that way pays tribute to French rationality, but it is an ironic tribute, for the real appeal of the film is in the figure of its protagonist finally at home in the white walls of an asylum. And if one correlates with a film of this kind, the various expressions of hysteria, irrational violence, homosexual hatred, and sheer nuttiness regularly expressed by our youngest writers, one has to look more deeply into what may have caused or promoted what now amounts to a powerful trend.

I have in mind *The White Negro,* that wacky though powerful essay by Norman Mailer, in which our genial friend and Marxist gone haywire singled out psychopaths as the bearers of future values. In this piece, he also defended the courage of some tough young kids who beat up a weak old man. Now there was a time when courage was understood very differently. Not a few French knights in feudal times thought it unmanly to engage in combat when not outnumbered. I also have in mind Mailer's recent novel, *The American Dream,* in which the protagonist, Rojack, kills his wife and then immediately afterwards buggers their maid. I must note here that the deed is a variant of one in Jean Genet's *Querelle de Brest.* In that novel the young sailor Querelle, having killed a man, feels that he ought to pay for his crime, and has himself buggered by the local pimp. Thus buggered, Querelle becomes a marked man, an *enculé,* and for all eternity. So Querelle does not entirely escape the mark of Cain. Except that the mark Cain had to bear on his forehead is kept hidden by Genet's hero in his ass. Now Mailer's American hero, who kills as if Cain had never existed, appears, after his crime, like an innocent abroad; he has no feeling of guilt, no need for expiation. And how was Mailer's novel understood? When Philip Rahv attacked the book insofar as its hero is without any kind of conscience, his objection was met with derision, as if it were absurd to judge a fictional character morally! As if the best of our critics had not done just that, and ever since the novel came into being.

Or take Leslie Fiedler's article, *The Mutants,* published in the Fall 1965 *Partisan Review.* I heard Mr. Fiedler give that essay as a lecture at a conference at Rutger's University and so I can supply some additional data which may throw light on Mr. Fiedler's purposes; these, from his essay as published, may be unclear. In his essay, and also in his lecture, Mr. Fiedler quoted a contemporary kid as having said to him: "Freud is a fink." Now what interested Mr. Fiedler was not whether this judgment was true or false. What interested him was that a kid should say this, and I submit that if you look at Mr. Fiedler's article you will see that he is inclined to accept the kid's judgment. Why? At Rutgers Mr. Fiedler said in so many words, though I quote

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from memory—but there is a transcript of the discussion which may be checked—: "I myself have become as tired of the rationalism of Freud as of Marx." Is Freud then really a fink? And why did the young man Fiedler cited say so? The answer to this is not hard to find. Norman Brown, who has had a very great impact on many of our very young men, says in his now famous book that the insistence of many conventional American males on satisfying women sexually is a form of repression stemming from Freud, and something to be rejected in the name of freedom. So even fucking, in other words, is to Mr. Brown and to the young enlightened by him a bit too classical, just too upstanding!

I want to say something further about Mr. Fiedler's essay. According to him, the taking of drugs by the young is their expression, and main expression, of dissatisfaction with a boring and spiritually flat society. I will not go so far as to say that Mr. Fiedler recommends that the young take drugs, but I suggest that no one whose children are engaged in taking drugs should call on Mr. Fiedler to dissuade them from doing so. To take drugs, according to him, is to be an adventurer, and in a society in which little adventure is possible. It is to travel inwards, something very up-to-date, like the up-to-dateness of the cosmonauts who go towards outer space. Once again, I do not want to charge Mr. Fiedler with recommending the taking of drugs, but I think his whole essay is a confession that he cannot call upon one value in whose name he could oppose it. Why?

When there is a real trend, and I think I am talking about a real trend here, one has to look for something deeper to explain it than the views of those who represent it verbally, even with cleverness. It is not enough to call names as Philip Rahv did in his review of Norman Mailer's *The American Dream*. Nor is it enough to argue politically with the youth, as Irving Howe did in his article on the "new left." Call Mailer foolish or a bad novelist—the last he is not—and the young will still listen to him. Call the "new left" ahistorical, as Irving Howe did in his essay, and the youny will reply—they already have replied—with violence. Philip Rahv and Irving Howe are perfectly right, of course, but I can't help remembering Hegel's remark about Rome in its decadence. The philosophers were right, Hegel said, but the people were right not to listen to them.

Once again, what can be understood to lie behind the not always clear inclination of the contemporary youth for all forms of the irrational?

More than fifteen years ago, in Alexandre Kojève's extraordinary book, *An Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, a work which has in-

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fluenced all French thought, including Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's, I read the following remarkable passage, the full meaning of which I confess not to have understood at the time and which I am here translating rather freely:

> Philosophy has no sense or reason for being unless it can lead to Wisdom, or at least to the Sage, that is to say, to the Man of Wisdom. On the other hand, to believe that the Sage or Man of Wisdom is possible is to necessarily accept philosophy, understood as a means of attaining Wisdom, of realizing the Sage . . .
>
> Now on the question of the Sage the only fundamental disagreement is between Plato and Hegel . . . Let us see what their disagreement amounts to. One can of course, with Plato, deny that Wisdom can be realized. Then we have an either/or. Either the ideal of the Sage is never and nowhere realized, and the Philosopher is simply a madman who pretends to be what he *knows* it is impossible to be. Or he is not a madman; and then his ideal of Wisdom is or will be realized, and his definition of the Sage or Man of Wisdom is or will be a truth.

But to deny the existence of wisdom realized, either in God, as with Plato, or in man, as with Hegel, means, according to Kojève, to say that the philosopher is a madman—in other words, that there is no difference between the madman and the philosopher. (One might add, between the philosopher and the criminal, and between the philosopher and the dope addict.) The point of view expressed here, and which is so pertinent, in my opinion, to our contemporary problems, may be summed up as follows: either God exists and perfection on earth is not required, or God does not exist and human life can be perfected. That is, philosophy is a reasonable pursuit. But if God does not exist (contrary to Plato), and if wisdom cannot be realized (contrary to Hegel), then the madmen, the criminals and dope addicts are as reasonable as the philosophers, and even more reasonable insofar as they do not attempt to philosophize.

Now, the final deliverance of this epoch is that God does not exist and that human life cannot ever be perfected and hence that the madman, the criminal, and the dope addict are not inferior to the philosopher. That is why it is so difficult to argue with a young student against taking drugs, not to speak of dissuading him from doing so. Can one say to him that God exists? No. Can one say to him that society can be perfected? No. (It will not do, according to Kojève, to say that society can be somewhat improved.) Then can one say that the philosopher is better than the drug addict? No. Or better than the criminal or the madman? Again no. It is the vague recognition, I will

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not call it knowledge, that no one to be respected can answer these questions affirmatively which emboldens our contemporary youth and makes them so rash and so sad.

Obviously our dilemma was not new in the Russia of the 1860's. What is new, though, is the impact on a mass society of the issue of belief which Dostoevsky raised. Do we today believe in God or in man? And by "we" I mean the masses, I mean the many, the millions. For there are many Raskolnikovs among us and many more Rojacks. In fact, to appreciate fully the effect on the masses of our spiritual dilemma and the receptivity of present-day society to any and all answers, no matter how drastic, one has only to think of a contemporary Dr. Raskolnikov giving a seminar on the Double Meaning of Killing Two Pawnbrokers, or of a Dr. Rojack lecturing at an honored university on Why It Is Not Wrong to Kill One's Wife. Say that Norman Mailer is no Dostoevsky, who's going to say he is? But to say that he is not is to discriminate, and the whole question now is whether discrimination is valid. As for Mailer, his excesses in thinking were prophesied, I believe, in James Joyce's *Ulysses*. When Bloom, about to fall asleep, plays with variations on the name Sindbad, calling up Ninbad the Nailer, Tinbad the Tailor, and Binbad the Bailer, he suddenly becomes less lethargic, somewhat more caustic, and gets to the name we know and he didn't: our contemporary to him is Mindbad the Mailer.

But never mind Mindbad. The question is not whether Mailer is intelligent, but whether intelligence counts any more. The argument for intelligence, that is for philosophy—and by philosophy I mean the taking up of any topic, art, morals or politics, with a sincere intent to be reasonable—was, I once thought, stated forever by Aristotle. He said: if you want to philosophize, then let us philosophize; and if you don't want to philosophize, you still have to philosophize. But who in philosophy feels he has to philosophize nowadays?

In fact, our young philosophers are dulled, I believe, by their aim, which is only to be bright, that is brighter than other philosophers. And the brightest and most intolerable of all philosophers in recent times was Ludwig Wittgenstein, who said against philosophy what no philosopher ever said before him: Philosophy is Hell. For why undertake the great labor of reasoning if reason is futile, if wisdom is unrealizable, and if the philosopher is no better than the madman, the criminal, or the addict? Why? Genet is a problem to Sartre, the philosopher, who devoted a book of over 600 pages to explaining him. Sartre, as all the young know now, is no problem to Genet.

But to get back to Weiss's play. It is my assumption that the depth

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of the contemporary situation is there and present whenever the least conscious members of the audience at *Marat/Sade* respond to that work as they do and empathize with its moments of madness. I know I could argue with them about the aesthetics of drama, dispute and even refute their notions of taste, but how am I going to refute their spontaneous identification with the mad figures tumbling convulsively at the play's end across the stage?

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Gertrude Ezorsky

HANNAH ARENDT ANSWERED

Never, to my knowledge, in the history of intellectual controversy has any book met such devastating refutation as Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem* in Jacob Robinson's critique, *And the Crooked Shall Be Made Straight.**

After Robinson's argument not a single one of Miss Arendt's main contentions can be credited; and a great many of her minor contentions—including those irrelevant to her main theses—have also to be tossed out. She was wrong about Eichmann, she was wrong about international law, she was wrong about the Jewish leaders, she was wrong about Jewish resistance, she was wrong about Jewish "cooperation" with the Nazis, she was wrong about the alleged Jewish origins of Heydrich and Hans Frank, she was wrong about the activities of the Jewish *SonderKommandos*. She was wrong, wrong, wrong.

Exposed in so many errors, Miss Arendt yet insists that Mr. Robinson does not have the proper credentials. (*New York Review of Books*, January 20, 1966.) To my mind this is somewhat comical. Works of refutation, and Robinson's is frankly a work of refutation, do not have to be backed up by a history of achievements. Socrates, in refuting his opponents, emphasized that he had no credentials—even as he refuted them. But, to set the record straight, Robinson does have credentials. He is an international lawyer, with a mastery of East European as well as West European languages—hence (unlike Miss Arendt), able to read material emanating from Jewish sources, written in a variety of languages; an expert on the treatment of minorities and the author of several volumes on that question; assistant on Jewish affairs to Justice Jackson at the Nuremberg trials; assistant to Hausner at the Eichmann trial; Coordinator of Research on the Jewish Catastrophe in four institutes in New York, London, Paris, and Jerusalem; and director of a bibliographical series on the Catastrophe. He would seem, to this observer, the man best qualified to assess the truth of Miss Arendt's book.

* And the Crooked Shall Be Made Straight. By Jacob Robinson. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 406 pp. $6.95.

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Robinson takes up every important feature of Miss Arendt' Eichmann portrait. She had sketched Eichmann as an "average" man of "rather modest mental gifts" and "terribly and terrifyingly normal," who was "obviously . . . no case of . . . fanatical anti-Semitism or indoctrination of any kind," but had "extraordinary loyalty to Hitler and the Führer's order." Robinson shows that this image has no foundation in the known facts about Eichmann. Take, for example, Miss Arendt's notion that Eichmann was not a fanatical anti-Semite but acted out of "extraordinary loyalty" to Hitler. Robinson produces massive evidence to prove that her view is contradicted by Eichmann's deeds, his own statements and reports by those who knew him. Here is some of that evidence:

In his 1957 interview with Sassen, a Dutch journalist in Argentina, Eichmann said he was sorry only that he had not succeeded in exterminating all eleven million European Jews (Robinson, p. 52). Rudolph Höss, camp commandant of Auschwitz, said "Eichmann was . . . convinced that this extermination action was necessary in order to preserve the German people in the future from the destructive intentions of the Jews . . . He was completely obsessed with the idea of destroying every single Jew that he could lay his hands on." (Robinson, p. 46.) Moreover, Eichmann reported that he had become disenchanted with Hitler: "I said that the real war agitators were the infernal high finance (*die infernalische Hochfinanz*) circles of the Western Hemisphere . . . whose pawns in this game of theirs, are Hitler, Mussolini, Daladier, and Chamberlain." (Robinson, p. 44.) So Eichmann, who Miss Arendt claims was motivated by loyalty to Hitler and was free of fanatical hatred of Jews, concluded that Hitler himself was a pawn of "infernal high-finance circles," that is international Jewry. Even Hitler's anti-Semitism didn't satisfy Eichmann!

During the deportation of the Hungarian Jews (whom Eichmann referred to as *"Jüdischen Dreck,"* [Robinson, p. 4]), Eichmann thought Hitler was too weak on the question of murdering Jews. This same incident also displays just how much "loyalty" Eichmann had to Hitler. Hitler had agreed to spare the lives of 8,700 Jewish families and allow them to emigrate, if Horthy would agree to the deportation of the Hungarian Jewish community. Eichmann stated his opposition to Hitler's decision sparing these Jewish families because, Eichmann claimed, the Jews involved were "without exception, biologically valuable material" and he threatened to "seek a new decision from the *Führer.*"

Moreover, Eichmann planned to frustrate Hitler's decision by having these Jews, whom Hitler was willing to spare, deported to death

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camps before emigration formalities had been completed. Finally, if the Jews involved did succeed in emigrating, Eichmann wanted to stop them outside of Hungary (Robinson, pp. 30–32).[1] Eichmann, it appears, showed "extraordinary loyalty" to Hitler, as long as Hitler ordered the murder of Jews. So much for Miss Arendt's notion that Eichmann was motivated not by fanatical anti-Semitism but "extraordinary loyalty" to Hitler.

In her lengthy *New York Review of Books* article, where Miss Arendt devotes a good deal of space to attacking Robinson, she fails to take him up on a single major point concerning her view of Eichmann. Here is an illustration of the way Miss Arendt does defend herself on the subject of Eichmann. She claims that Robinson is "psychologically color-blind . . ."

> Hence [she writes] when I . . . point out that on the basis of the evidence he [Eichmann] was not an inveterate liar and yet lied occasionally, and then proceed to give instances where he actually lied, Mr. Robinson is firmly convinced that there are "contradictions," "hopping back and forth. . . ."

Robinson does not say that an inveterate liar is incapable of an occasional lie. He cites *thirteen* separate occasions during the trial concerning which Miss Arendt herself finds Eichmann guilty of untruthfullness (Robinson, p. 5–6). Surely this casts doubt on her claim that Eichmann was not an inveterate liar. Moreover, Robinson wonders why–since Miss Arendt admits Eichmann's untruthfulness on so many occasions–she complains because neither the prosecutor, the defense nor the judges took his word concerning his attitude toward the Jews. (Robinson, p. 5.) "Alas, nobody believed him." (Arendt, p. 23.)

One of the most devastating sections in Robinson's book is his appraisal of Miss Arendt's charge that the cooperation of Jewish administrators was essential to the Final Solution. Miss Arendt wrote:

> Without Jewish help in administrative and police work [in the deportations] . . . there would have been either complete chaos or an impossibly severe drain on German manpower. (Arendt, p. 104.)

Robinson shows that Miss Arendt's own reports on different areas belie her conclusion that Jewish assistance in administrative and police work was essential to the Nazi extermination drive. Robinson 166–168.) According to Raul Hilberg, on whom Miss Arendt relies heavily,

1. Eichmann's attitude toward Hitler's decision concerning the Hungarian Jews is described in a telegram from Veesenmayer, Reich plenipotentiary in Hungary, which is available at the YIVO office in New York.

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5,100,000 Jews were killed by the Nazis. In the revised paperback edition of *Eichmann in Jerusalem* Miss Arendt concedes that in Eastern Europe "The Jewish bureaucracy . . . played no part in the seizure and the concentration of the Jews." (Arendt, rev. ed, p. 218.) This means that the Jewish bureaucracy played no role in the murder of the 3,900,000 Jews in the occupied territories of the U.S.S.R. and in Poland. To this figure one must add the 797,000 Jews killed in other areas where Miss Arendt does not claim that Jewish help in administrative and police work was an essential factor. Hence, Miss Arendt's own reports show that Jewish assistance could not have played a significant role in the annihilation of ninety per cent of the Jews killed by the Nazis. So, Miss Arendt's generalization that Jewish administrative and police help was crucial for implementing the Final Solution makes no sense whatsoever.

Miss Arendt's generalization that the members of Jewish Councils were "as a rule the locally recognized Jewish leaders" (Arendt, p. 104) — for which she offers no proof—also fails to withstand Robinson's examination. He shows that the degree of continuity between the Councils and the pre-war Jewish leadership varied greatly in different areas. Moreover, even where there was a measure of continuity the Nazis, using the principle of "negative selection," repeatedly purged the Councils' members by replacing them with unknowns. But—leaders or not—any judgment of the Jewish Councils, even from hindsight, requires an understanding of the situation in which they were trapped. Miss Arendt claims that the "cooperation" between the Jewish Councils and the Nazis is "To a Jew . . the darkest chapter of the whole dark story" (Arendt p. 104). To my mind, the most moving section of Robinson's book is his account of the desperation which beset Jewish officials when the extermination drive was launched. For example: An anti-Nazi German writer who visited the Lodz ghetto twice quoted from the Jewish police chief this statement of the moral problem involved in selecting victims for deportation:

> And I must select the people for it [deportation for gassing]. If I refuse I'll be shot. This would be the simplest solution for me. But what happens then? The SS has already said it: then they'll make the selections. This would mean that those with unbroken spirits, the pregnant, the rabbis, the torah scholars, the professors, the poets would go into the oven first. But if I stay, I can take the volunteers. Often they urge to be taken. And sometimes I have as many as I have to report. Sometimes though there are less. Then I can take the dying . . . and if there are not enough of them, the mortally ill. But if there are still not enough, what then? Then I can take the criminals; but, God protect us, who does not become criminal here ?. . . I know mothers who denounce their neighbors for a

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> slice of bread, so their children won't starve to death. Who wants to sit in judgment here? . . . I have asked the leaders of the community, the rabbis, the torah scholars; they have all told me "You are doing the right thing; stay and make the selections the way you have thought it out." I have asked the congregations . . . the old people, the condemned, the mortally ill; they have all agreed with me, Mr. Hielscher . . . I implore you . . . if you know a better way than the one I have found, show it to me. . . . And if you don't know a better one, tell me: shall I stay or shall I have myself shot? (Robinson pp. 181–182.)

Had this Jewish police chief been able to consult Miss Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* he would have found that in 1951 she considered his moral dilemma to be insoluble. She wrote then

> The alternative [under totalitarianism] is no longer between good and evil, but between murder and murder. Who could solve the moral dilemma of the Greek mother who was allowed by the Nazis to choose which of her three children should be killed? (p. 452, Meridian reprint, 1957.)

But when Miss Arendt came to write *Eichmann in Jerusalem* she castigated the Jewish Councils who chose "between murder and murder" for their "moral collapse" (p. 111 Arendt). Let us assume however, that after 1951 she discovered a solution to the "moral dilemma" she at that time declared insoluble. What is it? Miss Arendt's moral prescription appears not in *Eichmann in Jerusalem* but in an exchange between herself and Gershom Scholem published in *Encounter,* January 1964. She writes:

> In other words, until 1939 and even until 1941 whatever Jewish functionaries did or did not do is understandable and excusable. Only later does it become highly problematical. I said that there was no possibility of resistance but there existed the possibility of *doing nothing.* And in order to do nothing, one did not need to be a saint, one need only to say: I am just a simple Jew and I have no desire to play any other role . . . we should not forget that we are dealing here with conditions which were terrible and desperate enough, but which were not the conditions of concentration camps. These decisions were made in an atmosphere of terror but not under the immediate pressure and impact of terror. . . . *These people had still a certain limited freedom of decision and of action. Just as the S.S. murderers also possessed, as we now know, a limited choice of alternatives. They could say: "I wish to be relieved of my murderous duties," and nothing happened to them.* [Italics added]

Notice the fact with which Miss Arendt supports her view that the Jewish officials had the possibility of doing nothing. When S.S. murderers asked to be relieved of their murderous duties, nothing

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happened to them! Does Miss Arendt really want her readers to think that any Jew under the Nazis enjoyed privileges similar to those of an S.S. murderer?

What would have happened to Jewish Council members after 1941, when the extermination drive began, if they had decided to do nothing? Would nothing have happened to them? Did they have that much "freedom of decision and of action"? Let us imagine the situation of a Jewish Council member who contemplates doing nothing when ordered by the Nazis to participate in the process of deporting Jews. To do nothing in the face of an order is disobedience to that order. Hence, the question becomes: would nothing have happened to a Council member who disobeyed Nazi orders? But one does not have to speculate in this matter. There *were* cases of Jewish officials who refused to obey Nazi orders. These are documented in Robinson's book (p. 170–171) when he describes the savagery and repression suffered by many *Judenrat* officials at the hands of the Nazis.

Owsiej Izikson, chairman of the Baranowicze *Judenrat* and his secretary were shot for refusing to deliver children, the sick, and the aged. He told the Nazis, "I gave you everything you asked from me, but I am not going to give you Jews. I am no master (*balabos*) over human life." Or he might just as well have said what Miss Arendt claims he was free to say, "I am just a simple Jew and I have no desire to play any other role." Dr. Majblum, chairman of the Zloczów Council was shot for refusing to sign a paper acknowledging that the reason for the deportation of Jews was a typhus outbreak in the ghetto. Not only was a Jewish Council member not free to disobey Nazi orders, he faced deportation if he failed to carry out Nazi orders to the hilt. For example, Dr. Artur Rosenzweig, chairman for a period of the Cracow *Judenrat* was charged with *laxity* in oganizing the May 31, 1942 resettlement. Consequently, he and his family were deported. A straight statement of the moral choice that faced *Judenrat* officials was given by Tadeusz Pankiewicz a Polish pharmacist in the Cracow ghetto who witnessed its life throughout its existence: "To resign [from the Jewish Council] was equivalent to signing one's own death sentence" (Robinson p. 182).

One must therefore ask: Is this what Miss Arendt means when she says Jewish officials had "the possibility of *doing nothing*," and in taking that course did not have "to be a saint?" Or is this what she means in claiming they could say, like the rebellious SS men, "I wish to be relieved of my murderous duties" and "nothing happened to them?" *Nothing?*

Miss Arendt in the *New York Review* article complains that Walter

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Laqueur criticized her for "having been unaware of the 'particular vulnerability' of the Jewish communities in the face of organized persecution . . ." Miss Arendt retorts that she herself enumerated just these vulnerabilities in *Eichmann in Jerusalem.* But her castigation of the Jewish Councils for not acting as if they possessed the freedom from punishment enjoyed by the S.S., shows just how unaware she actually is of the "particular vulnerability" of the Jewish communities under the Nazis.

In her *New York Review* article, Miss Arendt castigates Robinson for criticizing her picture of the reaction of the Jewish victims to the Final Solution. Here is what Robinson said:

> Miss Arendt writes of "the submissive meekness with which Jews went to their deaths—arriving on time at the transportation points, walking on their own feet to the places of execution, digging their own graves, undressing and making neat piles of their clothing, and lying down side by side to be shot" (Arendt, p. 9) . . . *This picture contrasts radically with reality.* (Robinson p. 187) [Italics added]

Miss Arendt complains that she took this description of Jewish behavior word for word from Attorney General Hausner himself and " 'that this picture contrasts radically with reality' . . ., of course, was my whole point to begin with."

Did Miss Arendt really claim in her book that this picture of "submissive meekness" on the part of the Jewish victims "contrasts radically with reality?" Was this really her "whole point to begin with?" Here is what she wrote:

> The contrast between Israeli heroism and the *submissive meekness* with which Jews went to their death—arriving on time at the transportation points, walking on their own feet to the places of execution, digging their own graves, undressing and making neat piles of their clothing, and lying down side by side to be shot—seemed a fine point, and the prosecutor asking witness after witness, "Why did you not protest?" . . . was elaborating it for all it was worth. But the sad truth of the matter is that the point was ill taken, *for no non-Jewish group or people had behaved differently.* (Arendt, p. 9.) [Italics added]

Not only did Miss Arendt in her book accept this picture of the "submissive meekness" of the Jewish victims, she added that "no non-Jewish group or people had behaved differently." So, according to Miss Arendt, the picture of "submissive meekness" fits not only the facts about Jewish behavior, it is even a bigger and truer picture than the Attorney General imagined. Both Jews and non-Jews alike reacted to Nazism with "submissive meekness." Now, after being challenged, Miss

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Arendt would have her *New York Review* readers believe her "whole point to begin with" was that this picture of "submissive meekness" "contrasts radically with reality."

Miss Arendt in a passage where she begins by denouncing Robinson for his "moral obtuseness" goes on to make a charge against the rabbis of Europe, who lived under Hitlerism.

> At this point, not knowing what he is doing, Mr. Robinson raises one of the most disturbing "problems" of the whole issue, a problem I had been careful not to raise because it was not raised at the trial and therefore was not my business: the conduct of the European rabbinate during the catastrophe. It *seems* there was not one Rabbi who did what Dompropst Bernhard Lichtenberg, a Catholic priest, or Propst Heinrich Grüber, a Protestant minister, had tried to do—to volunteer for deportation. [Italics added]

Notice Miss Arendt says it only *"seems"* that not one Rabbi volunteered for deportation. Wasn't it her business to make sure? Moreover, what is the point of her comparison of rabbis under the Nazis with a Catholic priest and Protestant clergyman? How could rabbis whom the Nazis wanted to murder perform an act of protest by volunteering to be murdered? Rabbis along with Jewish intellectuals, professionals and political leaders were among the first taken by the Nazis to serve as hostages or for deportation. Most of Europe's rabbis were incarcerated in ghettos which were themselves concentration points for deportation. A ghetto Jew who volunteered for deportation was surely not making a protest against deportation. The Nazis wanted Jews to volunteer and offered bribes of food to the starving ghetto inhabitants in order to get them to do so. For Miss Arendt now to attack the rabbis of Europe for not doing just what the Nazis in fact wanted them to do reveals her insensitivity to the situation of the Jewish victims.

But since Miss Arendt has now made it her business to raise the question of "the conduct of the European rabbinate during the catastrophe," let her be informed of the following pertinent data:

> • Rabbi Michal David Shtufel of Miretz, having been told that he could save his community by surrendering himself as a hostage, gave himself up to the Nazis, knowing that he would be killed. He appeared in his burial clothing and died under torture. The parts of his dismembered body were assembled for burial.
>
> • Rabbi Isaiah Englard of Sosnowitz had an opportunity to get out of a death train but chose to remain when he found out that another Jew would have to take his place. He and his family were killed in Auschwitz.
>
> • Rabbi Mordecai Ruttenberg of Antwerp would not allow the French

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Maquis to rescue him from the transitional assembly camp of Vital unless everyone in his group could be saved. He died in Auschwitz.

• Rabbi Karlback of Hamburg refused to escape, saying he would not abandon his oppressed brothers as long as they needed him. In 1938 during the *Kristallnacht*, when thousands of German Jews were imprisoned, Rabbi Karlback asked to be arrested so that he could be with the imprisoned Jews.

• Rabbi Lau of Piotrokov had himself accepted as a substitute for fifty Jews whom the Nazis had taken as hostages. When the deportations began, Rabbi Lau tried to organize a mass rescue, but his effort failed. He then declined an offer of escape for himself and his family saying that he wished to remain with his communty.

• Rabbi Ezekiel Levin, chief rabbi of Lvow, was offered safety by the Metropolitan Szepticki during the Nazi organized pogrom in 1941 when Jews were being killed and tortured in the streets by Ukrainians. Rabbi Levin went into the streets to ask the Metropolitan to intercede with the Ukrainians. He told the Metropolitan "I shall return to my community where I belong." On his way home he was killed.

A few hours' reading of a partial list of the biographies of leaders of religious Jewry in Europe reveals the names of a number of rabbis, such as Rabbi Chaim Toib of Zavlin, Rabbi Elijah Lifshitz of Griza, Rabbi David Blacher of Mezericz, and Rabbi Isaac Maharshon of The Hague who had opportunities to escape and chose to stay with their communities although they knew that only a miracle could save them.[2] The most well-known case is that of the last three rabbis of Warsaw, Rabbis Zemba, Stockhammer, and Szapiro who would not desert their congregations for the safety guaranteed them by the Court of Bishops in Warsaw. Miss Arendt must be familiar with this last case. An account of it appears in Robinson's book as well as in other works. She must also know that Rabbi Leo Baeck of Berlin could have escaped Nazi persecution but refused to abandon the German Jews.

The rabbis I have cited—no doubt there were many others equally heroic, whose names may never be entered into the archives of history—showed, Miss Arendt must concede, a certain degree of courage under conditions of Nazi terror. Now Miss Arendt is here, safe in the United States. Will she have the courage, now that she has opened the question of the European Rabbinate's conduct, to close it, by admitting that she was wrong?

2. Information about all the rabbis mentioned above can be found in *These Will I Remember*, edited by Dr. Isaac Levin (in Hebrew), Research Institute of Religious Jewry, 1961, New York. Translation of passages relevant to this paper was made by Ephraim Friend.

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For Robinson the issue raised by Miss Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem* is the falsity of her thesis. Is there in fact any other issue raised by her book? Is some philosophical view at stake in *Eichmann in Jerusalem?* I think not. Miss Arendt's notion of "the banality of evil," is, as I see it, so vague as to be barely intelligible. But two things are clear. First, Miss Arendt grounded her theory of the banality of evil on her portrait of Eichmann, and second her portrait of Eichmann has not stood up under Robinson's logical and factual criticism.

Daniel Bell, who grants that Miss Arendt's account of the Jewish leadership is not the whole truth, claims nevertheless that she is concerned with justice. I should like to know how anyone concerned with justice can ignore the whole truth. Walter Laqueur asserts that many people did not object to what Miss Arendt said but to the manner in which she said it. In my opinion, the issue is not Miss Arendt's tone —objectionable as that may be—but the truth or falsity of her theses. The merit of Robinson's contribution to the controversy is that he showed the utter falsity of what she said. Robinson uncovered, as one observer has put it, an Arendt of errors.

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Paul Feldman

NEW WINDS ON THE CAMPUS

A Report on the SDS National Conference

"A change is gonna come" is the battle hymn of the New Left. But after a year of marching around the "Establishment" walls, which not only didn't fall down but hardly shook at all, Students for a Democratic Society is trying to work out a new battle plan.

The SDS call for an educational conference during Christmas sounded a new note: "The December Conference will . . . be the beginning of an analysis and self-criticism which has been lacking in SDS for the last year . . . We have slogans which take the place of thought: 'There's a change gonna come' is our substitute for social theory; 'Let the people decide' has been an escape from our own indecision; we scream 'no leaders', 'no structures' and seem to come up with implicit structures which are far less democratic than the most explicit elitism . . . What sociology, what psychology, what history do we need to know the answers? How seriously have we treated those not from the 'New Left'?" A few months ago, when the New Left seemed to be riding high, such admissions would have been considered treasonous by many inside SDS ranks.

What has happened since the Vietnam March on Washington in April 1965, when SDS mobilized the largest student demonstration in over a decade? In brief, the section of the "Anti-War" movement SDS had been working with, had collapsed as a result of the hostility it encountered not only from the right but from within the liberal community, which became leery of the New Left's vague position on Communism. Peaceful co-existence within this "Anti-War" movement could not be maintained among pacifists, Vietcong supporters, warring pro-Russian and pro-Chinese youth groups, and other students who had no ideological bias but felt a justified moral outrage at U.S. actions in Vietnam. ". . . We are worried because we see the movement without any clear sense of direction, in political isolation, and trapped in the undergrowth of single issue politics that has so long weakened us," wrote two of the more experienced SDS leaders, Paul Booth and Lee Webb, in a working paper for the conference.

To add to SDS problems, its Northern community organizing projects are also in trouble. These were begun when the Northern ghettos seemed to be coming alive in solidarity with the Southern Negro struggle. But once the drama of the South subsided without sparking a similar movement in

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the North, the young people who had gone to work in the ghetto were faced with the enormous problem of organizing wholly around the problems of the Northern poor. In this situation SNCC-style militancy was simply not enough.

The commitment of the SDS activists was admirable, but as the Introduction to its Conference Working Papers pointed out, such slogans as "do as the spirit says" were a "substitute for thought." This was also aggravated by a simplistic analysis of how ghetto organizers could combine a "militant" domestic protest movement of the poor with the anti-war movement. One SDS activist reported how unnerved she had been when she was thrown out of Negro homes after trying to explain that their plight had much in common with that of the Vietcong.

II

As a result of such experiences, some in SDS concluded that it was time for rethinking. Although SDS still had important differences with its former parent group, the League for Industrial Democracy, it invited LID to send working papers and speakers to the conference. I attended the conference with the LID contingent which included its Executive Director, Tom Kahn, and other younger members. More than 300 young people came from all over the country to the conference at the University of Illinois.

If nothing else, the SDS now shared with the democratic left a common frustration at trying to build a radical movement. Some in SDS wanted an "opening to the right" to break out of isolation. As Lee Webb, former SDS National Secretary, pointed out, "In Italy an opening to the left by the Christian Democrats is significant because there are 15,000,000 people on the left. For us the situation is a bit different; we have 5,000 on our left, and 190,000,000 on our right. . . . As we feel it is essential to point out our differences with Michael Harrington, Norman Thomas and Bayard Rustin, why do we forget the Vietcong, or Progressive Labor or the Dubois Clubs?"

Most other SDSers would not have gone as far as Webb, though the majority really wanted serious discussion. But there was also another group —a minority, I think—that wanted no part of this dialogue. Some of them had a vested interest in the SDS programs that were not working out. Others were supporters of groups like the Dubois Clubs who didn't want their ideology critically examined. And a few felt there was nothing wrong that a good demonstration couldn't cure.

But the problems were too glaring to be ignored. Because of LID participation and growing uneasiness within SDS, the issues of "coalition" and "Communism" were discussed more seriously than they had been for some time.

The first discussion I attended was on "imperialism." During the meeting I presented the traditional democratic socalist view criticizing both sides in the Cold War for attempting to impose their will on other nations by force of arms or economic and political pressure. I sat down quickly and waited for smashing attacks. They did not come. Instead a number of SDSers agreed, with varying emphasis on

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which side was most guilty of imperialistic practices. I glanced around at the 75 or more young people in the room, wondering if by accident I had stumbled into a friendly group of left-wing democratic socialists, but there were only two faces I recognized. To be sure, there were echoes from the past. The chairman of the session presented that old evasion, "We are Americans and should only criticize our own government." But it didn't go over as well as it used to.

The next session was on Communism, and the discussion leader was a socialist, Saul Mendelson. Very few of the young people present were totally uncritical of Communist movements and governments. Typical of the newer SDS members was a student who declared he couldn't support the Vietcong and Communists generally, but admired Castro's close relationship with the people. From his experience in an IBM society where he was only a number on a card he said he could appreciate "Fidel's spontaneity" and was sure Cubans were freer than Americans. Another participant countered that the previous speaker believed this because he had lived under IBM but never under Castro. The USSR, of all the Communist governments, came under the sharpest attack. Part of the reason for this was the belief held by many that there is a Soviet establishment which limits freedom for its own reasons.

The problem of Communism and other authoritarian movements in the Third World was more difficult. Here the moral and political questions were thorny not only for the New Left but, to be honest, for democratic socialists as well. Some SDSers argued that the creation of democratic institutions was largely impossible in underdeveloped economies. They saw a conflict between industrial development and democracy, and they gave higher priority to the former. A few argued for support of movements like the Vietcong as "a lesser evil." But even here we made some headway with the argument that apologists for the authoritarian regimes in Saigon made similar kinds of rationalizations for not helping to create democratic alternatives to Diem and Ky. Further we said that the appeal of the radical movement was undermined if we restricted our demand for "one man, one vote" to Mississippi and Saigon and became strangely quiet when someone asked us, "What about Hanoi or Peiping?" Many were willing to give some serious thought to this dilemma, but remained unconvinced that the democratic left had any real solution to the problems of the Third World. And in every session where the nature of Communism was discussed, there was also a small minority that used the traditional arguments of the totalitarian left.

SDS President Carl Oglesby seemed to have the attitude toward Communism that most reflected the thinking of the members. In his speech at the recent March on Washington, Oglesby was critical of the lack of freedom in Eastern Europe, but expressed a romantic feeling toward Communist revolutions in the Third World. But as SDS moves away from ideological abstractions and moral generalities, it will be more and more called upon to make some rigorous judgments about Communist movements and systems all over the world.

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III

This seems likely because most SDSers lack the rigid dogmatism that prevailed in the radical groups that had one or another kind of illusion about the progressive nature of the Communist world. Another reason, I think, besides the genuine openness of most SDS members, is the state of the adult radical movement. Just as there is no strong democratic left to provide an ideological attraction, so there is no longer a monolithic Communist movement. The split between Moscow and Peiping cuts down the ability of pro-Communist adult tendencies to influence the student movement.

Many new members of SDS had never before heard a full presentation of the democratic socialist view on united fronts and had accepted preposterous second-hand accounts that we were advocating exclusion of individuals from picket lines or were motivated by fears that the SDS would be taken over by Communists in joint activities. They seemed genuinely surprised when we said what we were advocating was that the left not blur its political position to swell demonstrations or compromise its commitment to democracy at home or abroad in the name of a specious unity. Quite a number also recognized that in their anti-war activities they should have been critical of the Communist as well as the American role in Vietnam and the cold war. And as a result of SDS's experiences with elements of the "anti-war" movement, many were willing to reconsider the question of SDS's "opening to the Left." Lee Webb noted that "this united front of ours may turn into a civil libertarian funeral for the movement."

Particularly traumatic for some SDSers was the recent Convention of the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam. There a bitter power struggle took place for control of the "anti-war" movement that was reminiscent of the faction fights of the '30's. National Guardianites, CPers, the Dubois Clubs, some would-be mentors of the New Left, including *Liberation* editors Staughton Lynd and David Dellinger, *Studies on the Left* editor Stanley Aronowitz, and even the Progressive Labor Party people made a united front against what they described as "Trotskyist wreckers." The "wreckers" by their definition included the Socialist Workers Party and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance and Youth Against War and Fascism. Both sides masked their political differences behind structural questions and attempted to use younger New Leftists as pawns. Ironically Lynd was, by his own definition, in "a coalition with the Marines," as his side opposed SWP efforts to make the demand of the movement, "Bring the boys home now." One disillusioned young participant compared the proceeding to life in Animal Farm. Most of the SDS leadership walked out in disgust.

The SDS national council has voted down a resolution to affiliate to the NCC and participate in two of its Vietnam protest demonstrations. In fact Staughton Lynd-style "wave after wave" proposals which used to be endorsed with enthusiasm now were greeted with hilarity. It is still not clear, however, whether this amounts to somewhat of a break with the politics of the NCC which is only critical of the West in the Cold War or is a

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reaction to the sectarian faction fights within it.

In any event, SDS is now "de-emphasizing" foreign policy questions and "re-emphasizing" a perspective for building a movement for domestic social change which it hopes will eventually be able to gain enough strength to challenge the existing foreign policy consensus. This, to be sure, is a more realistic approach to the problem of building a radical movement. But instead of confronting the deeper question of why their politics isolated them on the Vietnam issue, they are comforting themselves with a notion I heard over and over again at the conference that "it is impossible to change American foreign policy through direct pressure on the government." This will certainly be news to the far right which has been doing pretty well as a pressure group, and it is certainly a dangerous assumption when the threat of a wider war looms so great.

Many in SDS now recognize that the organization's rebounding from issue to issue is a symptom of a deeper malaise. Anyone who has been active in radical politics could not help being sympathetic to the description in the SDS National Secretary's report on how the SDS draft and conscientious objector program got out of control and took its own course.

IV

The New Leftists at the conference had some justified criticisms to make of the democratic left. They also raised some incisive questions about whether the democratic left could build a radical movement when most of its energies were going into "coalition politics." SDSers scored some telling points about the failure of the liberal community to stand up to McCarthyism. The educational experience of the conference was not a one-way process.

Recognizing the correctness of the criticisms on this score was not a signal for the LIDers to beat their breasts. For one thing, we ourselves had not been guilty of such compromises, and as we pointd out, democratic socialist leaders like Norman Thomas, Michael Harrington and Irving Howe had spoken out in defense of the rights of Communists when so many others were silent. But no matter what the record of the democratic left on this and other questions—and no doubt it could have been better—it would not have been enough to bridge the gap between the two radical generations. It is basically a by-product of a larger generational conflict. At best this is expressed in legitimate disgust with social hypocry in the U.S. and anger at a government that calls upon them to fight for "democracy" in a war in support of a dictator in Saigon. This theme ran through the conference. Paul Booth noted in his report that "the phenomenal growth of SDS Chapters" was in part the result of "the student response to the war and the deeper social trend of the development of a culture of dissatisfaction based on a deeply felt understanding of the compromises of our middle-class parents. . . ."

Political differences are not enough to explain this phenomenon. SDS members have a strong sense of belonging to a generation apart and of being at war with their predecessors, no matter what their politics.

This generational solidarity is not limited to the New Left. At Berkeley Bettina Aptheker, a leader of the Free Speech Movement who an-

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nounced she was a Communist, was elected to the student government with a high vote. HUAC notwithstanding, there are not that many pro-Communists on the campus. As one liberal student expressed it, "She may be a Communist, but she is our Communist." Many students saw her election as a way of defying the "establishment" as well as making a protest for civil liberties.

But the senior Aptheker would not be accepted in the same way. It is not because he defended Russian tanks against the Hungarian workers and students. Most of these younger radicals know little about the history of the Communist Party or the radical movement in general. They would reject Aptheker because he is from the "Old Left," that "outmoded generation that failed." These young radicals do not discriminate among Maoists, Moscovites, Social Democrats or even liberals. Age is the criterion, not politics.

The tensions generated on the New Left as a result of this self-imposed isolation from other groups and institutions in American society create a corresponding desire for relatedness and community. This partially explains their enthusiasm for setting up, mostly on paper, sometimes in reality, counter communities and institutions —their own "Continental Congresses," "free universities," "community unions," etc. They counterpose their conception of "Communitas" and meaningful social relationships to the middle-class life and values they are rejecting. There is something admirable about this desire to create new institutions; in part it stems from a profound moral insight into the deficiencies of American society, where so many Negroes, the poor, the aged and the sick are outcasts. But embattled social groupings like the New Left—which makes up a very small segment of society—also develop their own forms of exclusiveness. They have their own pressures to conformity, particularly in the face of outside hostility. They attempt to maintain an inner cohesion by blurring principled political differences within their ranks. Consensus becomes the watchword, hard and controversal decisions necessary to maintain a radical movement are avoided, and internal democracy is muted.

This confusion of the need for a beloved community with building a radical political movement leads to the substitution of symbolic actions for meaningful political work. Symptomatic is the tendency of some children of the comfortable middle class, who predominantly make up the New Left, to identify the cause of the "underclass" with their own, while refusing to recognize that the needs of the economically exploited are not identical with the needs of the socially alienated from other classes. A radical posture alone does not bridge the gap between these two strata in our society. And the tendency of some in the New Left who have expressed, perhaps unwittingly, a kind of proprietary interest in the poor raises some real doubts about their values. Significant here is the priority they give to bringing the poor into their "movement" while expressing indifference or outright hostility to broader efforts for new social welfare legislation, as proposed by the trade unions.

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Of course this has been true of other generations of middle-class radicals who have mistaken their vision of a new society for that of the masses they are supposed to serve. And all of us, who make claims to being radicals, should be wary of this tendency in ourselves.

V

Some of the SDSers active in community organizing whom we talked to informally said they were against the poverty program because it would "co-opt the poor" (from poverty or from them, one wonders). We were a bit taken aback when one SDS member opposed social security because it was bureaucratic and alienating like any dole ("the check came on an IBM card"). The editor of a conservative Southern newspaper after an interview with one SDS leader concluded that the attitude of many in SDS toward the welfare state was similar to those held by economic conservatives. I am not arguing here that the prevailing tendency in SDS is towards incipient Goldwaterism or bureaucratic collectivism. My point is that many of them are just as alienated from the masses of working-class people as they are from the conformist middle class; they have very little knowledge of, or feeling for, the millions of American workers organized into trade unions.

Paul Booth and Lee Webb submitted a working paper that stated: "We are not satisfied with a facile anti-establishment position . . . which equates the Peace Corps with the Air Force. . . . We want [liberals] as allies on the issues we raise. . . ." At the national council meeting immediately following the conference, a resolution was passed that even foreign policy activities would be undertaken with an eye for winning over parts of the trade union movement. A year ago it is likely that this thought would have been ridiculed. When Webb spoke for this resolution he was asked, "You mean the workers?" He replied, "No, I mean the unions." This is among the healthier developments in SDS.

SDS is certainly an organization in transition. Where to, no one can be certain. It has elitist tendencies but also profoundly democratic impulses, and sometimes they coexist in a single individual. The fate of SDS is important, not only because it contains many young people who can make an important contribution to building a democratic radical movement, but also because it reflects many of the conflicts within the intellectual middle class today. This new middle-class generation has two political options: It can try to help build a democratic left coalition to move this country beyond the welfare state; or it can become part of the new academic-managerial elite. These are the real political alternatives in the U.S. Only in the phantasy world of the extreme Right or extreme Left can Tom Hayden take power and become the Nkrumah of the West. The real danger is that the disaffected children of the middle class will become tired of marching up dead-end streets, as so many in past radical generations have, and return to the path society has marked out for them. Hopefully, the best in SDS will not make their peace with injustice, but will find a road to democratic social change.

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NOTEBOOK

Rita Hinden

British Labor: A Year of Achievement

In our fall 1965 issue we printed a highly critical report by Michael Rustin on the record of the British Labor government. Below there appears another view, considerably more favorable. DISSENT *remains open on this, as on other questions, to a wide range of opinion.*—EDITORS

Britain has had a Labor government for more than a year, and only now does its position seem secure. Even to say that evokes an air of unreality, because the parliamentary majority is balanced on a knife-edge of three votes; the Government has only to lose one or two by-elections for the majority to disappear altogether. Yet in *feeling* the Government is riding high. The latest opinion polls show it fluctuating between eleven and eighteen per cent ahead of the Conservatives; Harold Wilson seems to increase in impressiveness almost daily; a massive program of legislation has been prepared for the next session of Parliament, and the public impression is that the economic position is at last under control.

This sense of confidence is all the more remarkable when one thinks back to a year ago. Then the story was one of an £800,000,000 deficit in the balance of payments which was revealed as soon as Labor took office. Then followed the subsequent flight from the pound, the desperate action to raise a loan from foreign bankers in order to save the pound, and the restrictive budgetary measures which became essential. It was an unhappy beginning for a government pledged to expansion, modernization and imaginative social reform. Its public esteem slumped disastrously, until that grey winter day when it lost the Leyton by-election, after having held the seat for Labor for over twenty years. The Leyton affair unfortunately got tied up with the colored immigration problem; feeling about the influx of immigrants was rising and Labor, which had opposed restrictions, was being sharply criticized.

In the difficult months that followed, the Government was confronted with a series of dilemmas, and no doubt its decisions were not always the wisest. It shocked its own supporters when it postponed the increases in old-age pensions (the increases have since been implemented) while allowing sharp rises in MP's salaries—whatever the objective justifi-

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cation for this act, a bad psychological mistake. The Government infuriated our foreign trade allies by imposing a surcharge on imports without consulting them adequately. It has deeply upset many friends by its arbitrary restriction of immigration. It has come in for severe criticism for supporting U.S. policy in Vietnam. It has aroused suspicions among the left wing of the Labor party for having put steel nationalization back in the queue.

There have in fact been a whole range of individual acts for which the Government can be criticized, and many people who are by nature opposition-minded have been saying they are "disenchanted." Perhaps nothing has been so disenchanting as the handling of the immigrant issue, because it appeared to be a blatant surrender to color prejudice. Yet the more one tries to analyze this problem hard-headedly, and to define seriously what should have been done, the more difficult it becomes. No one who has thought about it is suggesting that there should have been no restriction at all; the serious criticism is directed against the way the restricted figure was arbitrarily arrived at, the inadequacy of the proposed measures for integrating the colored immigration, the harsh conditions for deportation.

Most people can see that failure to restrict immigration might well have cost this government its life, as the bitter electoral experiences at Smethwick and Leyton indicate. To overthrow Labor would certainly not have helped the immigrants, any more than if no action had been taken and passions allowed to mount to the point of racial violence. Yet the mere idea of restricting colored immigrants has provoked great bitterness. No one is clear as to precisely what should have been done; but everyone is agreed that the Government hasn't handled the whole matter happily. This is perhaps its greatest failure so far.

But for anyone who has eyes to see, the mistakes and failures which can be chalked up against this Labor government are only one side, one small side, of the picture. The other is one of quite remarkable achievement. Rarely has Parliament been so busy or have Members of Parliament worked so hard. "By the end of the second session" (that is, next summer) claimed Harold Wilson, "the Government would have carried into law almost all its specific election pledges. As the economic deficit moves slowly but surely into economic surplus, and as we put into effect measure after measure in fulfillment of the mandate for which we asked in our election manifesto, so will this discredited Tory Party be reduced to a querulous and impotent irrelevance." In this same speech, which was delivered by Wilson to the accompaniment of immense enthusiasm at the Party Conference in October, he said:

> In a little over eight months we have succeeded in carrying through the Houses of Parliament 65 bills, two more than the Tories managed in the previous session with a majority of 100, 14 more than the average for the 13 (Tory) years 1951 to 1964.
> The Government had carried out their pledges to introduce free or concessionary bus fares for pensioners, raised pensions, abolished the earnings rule for widows and increased the pension of the "ten-shilling widow," it had abolished the prescription charge and given

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> families security of tenure in their own homes; a bill to provide new machinery for fixing fair rents was through the Commons and through the Redundancy Payments Bill. They had kept their pledge to give help to those who lost their jobs because of industrial changes. They had honoured their pledge about the Trades Disputes Bill, and introduced a new Monopolies Bill to curb the abuses of monopoly power. The Law Commission was now due to present to Parliament a detailed and imaginative programme of law reform. . . .

This list is chiefly concerned with correcting social injustices—some of them most gross injustices. Yet none of these is the Government's really outstanding contribution. What justifies my phrase "remarkable achievement" is its handling of the economic situation—that most central of all of Britain's problems today. I do not refer only to what it has done in dramatically improving the balance of payments position (though that alone might have been achievement enough) but even more far-reaching, to its introduction of the National Plan—the first comprehensive economic plan ever put before the British people—and the launching of the Prices and Incomes policy, with the aim of keeping rises in wages and other incomes, and in prices, within the bounds of an agreed norm.

The Plan has a fourfold purpose—to put right the balance of payments; to speed the rate of economic growth (the target is a 25 per cent increase in output by 1970); to get a better regional balance to development; and to ensure that the fruits of future growth are used in accordance with a civilized and just standard. The unusual feature of this Plan is that it is to be achieved *by consent,* not by compulsion or direction. Of course, a whole range of purposive Government actions have also to be taken; for example, to help exports, refunds have been made to exporters worth over £80 million a year; easier and cheaper credit has been made available for exports, and Government money has been provided for market research and trade missions. Or, to take a few other examples, changes in company taxation have been introduced so that firms have been encouraged to use a much higher proportion of their profits for investment, and so that investment in British industry will become more attractive compared with investment overseas; Industrial Training Boards are being set up to meet the shortage of skilled workers; machinery for economic planning in the regions has been established; advance factories are being built for sale or lease to private firms in the Development Districts; the powers of the National Research Development Corporation has been expanded.

But the vital work of expansion, and expansion in the right directions in accordance with the Plan, has to be carried out by industry, both sides of industry. The managers on the one hand and the unions on the other have been drawn into committees covering all the main industries of the country. These committees are composed of management, unions, and Government, together with independent members under an independent chairman. They work on measures to increase exports and replace imports, to encourage greater standardi-

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zation and longer production runs, and to building up larger units which can compete more effectively in world markets.

In the same way the Prices and Incomes Board is trying to implement its policy with the help of the *voluntary* agreement of unions and management. Any significant wage claim or price increase can be referred to the Board for scrutiny. The Board then investigates all the circumstances and presents a report on it. So far, it has relied on the pressures of public opinion to keep the claims in check, though action to give the Board legal powers to enforce its decisions is now likely to be taken. So far, in about nine months of working, the Board has had some successes and some failures; it is undoubtedly a remarkable experiment. What it is trying to do is immensely difficult—to create a climate of opinion in which even hard-bitten trade unionists and traders will agree to moderate their own claims for the sake of the public advantage.

The preparation and operation of the National Plan is the work of a new government department, the Department of Economic Affairs, which sprang into being on the morrow of the Labor government's coming into office. It recruited a high-powered staff, many of them new to government service and drawn from industry or the universities. The new members of this staff shared one quality—they were dedicated to the idea of working out a comprehensive strategy for economic growth, based not on compulsion but on persuasion.

One thing this government understands really well—indeed, any socialist government worth the name could hardly fail to do so—is that if people are to co-operate in an economic plan, they must receive fair treatment; the drive towards planning must be accompanied by a drive towards equality. One of the main legislative acts of the year has been the Finance Act of 1965, and one of its features was the Capital Gains Tax. The Act has been described by one of the MP's who took a leading part in the debates, as "a great Act of Parliament which musters all the potentialities of taxation policy in the interests of social equity and economic development." The debate on the Bill lasted for over two hundred hours; it often went on all night. Division after division was forced through with the knife-edge majority of three against bitter Conservative opposition. The result was the most radical reform of the taxation system of this country which has taken place for half a century. Yet an act of this kind is little understood by the broader public; it is never as much as mentioned by the critics of the Government.

The drive towards equality is also to be seen in education. People often think of inequality in the British educational system as arising mainly out of the existence of a privileged sector of exclusive schools, known ineptly as "public schools." But far greater inequalities are due to the terrible shortage of teachers, which means oversized classes, and to the utterly inadequate school buildings in which so many children are today being taught. Bad inequalities arise, too, through the division of state secondary education into three streams—grammar, modern, and technical—into

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which children are divided at the age of eleven-plus. Labor has long set its face against this division of children into categories at so young an age; its answer has been the "comprehensive school," in which all types of children are educated together, provision being made within the school for different aptitudes.

Since Labor came into office, it has carried out a most energetic program for rapidly increasing the size of the teacher force—the aim is to *double the numbers* in training within the next eight years. A most imaginative 14-point action program has been set in train. Similarly, the Government has stated categorically that it is its intention to abolish segregation and the 11-plus examination and to reorganize secondary education along comprehensive lines. But it must be understood that the government itself cannot act, as education falls within the domain of the counties. The Minister therefore "requests local education authorities to prepare and submit to him plans for reorganizing secondary education in their areas on comprehensive lines." There are now, already, 250 comprehensive schools; nearly all the major towns are "going comprehensive." Approximately three-quarters of our secondary school children live in areas where the movement towards comprehensive schooling has already begun. This does not, yet, deal with the difficult question of the independent "public schools." A commission is now being set up charged with the task of recommending how these special schools should be integrated into the state system. Let no one underestimate this task.

There have been many other exciting developments—the proposals for setting up a Land Commission to acquire development land and to impose on it a development levy of 40 per cent; the plans to build half a million houses a year, partly through using new techniques of production; the law protecting tenants against eviction, and the establishment of a system of fair rents under a new Rent Act. There has even been—at last—the abolition of the death penalty, and the setting up of a Law Commission to overhaul Britain's archaic system of law. A completely new departure for this country has been the appointment of a special minister with responsibility for the development of arts and amenities, and another minister for the development of facilities for sports. The net result of all this activity is the feeling, now widespread, that at last we have a Government with a real grip on the situation, and a Prime Minister who knows what he is doing. The critics, who began with nothing good to say for Wilson and his team, are talking differently now. Whether people like the man or not, the consensus of opinion in this country is that, as a Prime Minister, Harold Wilson is a success.

I have deliberately avoided the two most controversial issues of international policy of the last year—Vietnam and Rhodesia. Of course there are many people who are bitterly dissatisfied with the Labor government's support of U.S. policy in Vietnam; it would be fruitless to repeat all the arguments pro and con here. But whether the British government is right or wrong in this, I am convinced that they are acting with the utmost sincerity and after most careful

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thought; they are not just following America's lead out of feebleness or sycophancy. Similarly, although there is some criticism that troops were not sent in to crush the Smith regime in Rhodesia at once, and that to rely on economic sanctions is a sign of hypocrisy and faint-heartedness, most people in Britain are convinced that no good will come from setting in train a new war in central Africa, for that may well be the result of any form of military intervention there. It is, anyway, doubtful whether this Government could survive an attempt to use force in Rhodesia; so little is public opinion behind it for such a purpose, that any step in this direction would probably bring down the Government, with its tiny majority, almost overnight.

Turning back to the domestic scene, what does all the feverish activity of the first year boil down to? It is an attempt to take a country, which was falling sadly behind in almost every aspect of economic and social life, and to infuse into it a new dynamism. The method is not compulsion, but patient persuasion, not reliance on private initiative and incentives but on public planning and guidance, not favoring private enterprise but public enterprise in all its variety of forms, always trying to improve the lot of the poorest and weakest, and to introduce the spirit of equality into the very fabric of social life. In other words, the method is the classic method of democratic socialism. I venture to predict that history will mark down this Labor government as one of Britain's greatest. Mistakes, yes; failures, no doubt; but the record of progress is already immensely impressive.

Howard N. Meyer

History As It Is Rewritten

A public relations coup has inundated the U.S. with 350,000 copies of Admiral Morison's "legacy to his countrymen."* Included among the testimonials for this product are: "a delight to read" (from Bruce Catton, himself a strong brand name); "I whooped with sheer joy at its style, wit, raciness, structure, narrative power. . ." (Max Lerner); and "unquestionably the best general history of the United States ever written" (Johns Hopkins' distinguished David Donald).

I propose to examine the Admiral's standing as a historian by comparing his book with the two-volume, five-edition *The Growth of the American Republic,* which he wrote in collaboration with Henry Steele Commager. And I propose to use one simple touchstone: what is his grasp of Negro history in the United States?

Arnold Rose recently wrote, in a brilliant essay on "Distortion in the

* *The Oxford History of the American People,* by Samuel Eliot Morrison. New York: Oxford University Press, 1150 pp. $12.50.

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History of American Race Relations," that white "historians allowed bigots to invent the history of race relations in the United States" and that such bigotry must be fought, not as a mere matter of abstract or academic justice but as an integral part of the Freedom movement, because "*contemporary* interpersonal and intergroup relations" are dominated by "what people *believe* to have occurred in the past" (Rose's italics). Two glimpses into the 1950 (4th ed.) Morison and Commager are illustrative of the point Rose makes:

> As for Sambo, whose wrongs moved the abolitionists to wrath and tears, there is some reason to believe that he suffered less than any other class in the South from its "peculiar institution." [Vol. I p. 537]
>
> Yet the heritage of black reconstruction was an unfortunate one. Southerners drew from this experience certain conclusions which were more obvious than exact. They concluded that any Negro participation in politics was dangerous. . . . And finally the readiness with which the colored people lent themselves to exploitation by unprincipled white men forfeited for the Negroes the respect of many Northerners and persuaded them that Negro participation in politics was a mistake. [Vol. II p. 48]

Somehow, without excavating any new manuscripts, Morison in 1965 has found new viewpoints which he offers without a blush:

> Abolition was an irresistible power in a world awakening to new concepts of humanity. [p. 523]
>
> This Reconstruction stereotype, already generally accepted in 1890, was promoted by David W. Griffith's film *The Birth of a Nation* (1915) . . . . it seems hopeless for a mere historian to deflate it. [p. 709]

Reformed sinners are always welcome, but not with the unrepentant flourish of transferring their sins to the motion picture industry. Morison-1965 asserts that "Southern Negroes as a whole cannot be described by sweeping generalizations"; this is not enough to erase the effect of the Morison/Commager-1950 reference to the "average childlike, improvident, humorous, prevaricating, and superstitious Negro." It is an essential part of our history that most white historians wrote that way, as well as that they condemned the abolitionists for having "closed every avenue to emanicipation save civil war"—replaced in Morison-1965 by "it is perfectly clear that slavery was too firmly rooted in Southern society to die otherwise than by violence."

The erasures and the retouchings of the anti-Negro myths that came into being as rationalizations for the overthrow of the first Reconstruction are not accompanied by a really *new* point of view. The role of the Negro as both leader and follower in the abolitionist movement is ignored. Frederick Douglass, mentioned three times in Morison/Commager-1950, is now referred to only once, as a "writer" of unspecified subjects. The bigot may find some comfort in the categorical statement, in Morison-1965, that the "confident expectation" of the abolitionists "that the Negro, once free, could compete on equal terms with white people" has been proved wrong. This is underlined by the suggestion that "the colored intellectual of the 1960s knows less about the plantation Negro of the 1840s than did many white masters of that era."

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And the villains of the stereotyped story now blamed on *The Birth of a Nation* are villains still. Thaddeus Stevens is not, as he was in Morison/Commager-1950 "one of the most unpleasant characters in American history"; but he is still "sour and angry," and "harsh and bitter in his hatred." Morison/Commager's animadversion on Charles Sumner, "without personal knowledge of the Negroes he believed them no exception to the dogma of equality" (1950) was too great an affront to the Negro to survive in 1965: it is replaced by "with little personal knowledge of former slaves, he believed that they only wanted the vote to prove themselves worthy of sharing the duties and privileges of citizenship." After some reflection, I cannot find in that an improvement of substance.

In adding a few paragraphs about the dark decades between 1890–1920, era of mass lynching, the Admiral cannot resist erasing six decades of protest that escalated into revolution—

> In general, the Southern Negro submitted to his own abasement and accepted the degraded status that his former masters forced upon him. His fellows in the North did nothing to help him. No leaders then arose to fire his sullen heart with courage and determination to resist.

One does not have to know how many of the humblest dwellings in the South were decorated by at least one photograph, a picture of W.E.B. DuBois, to realize how much there is of American history that Samuel Eliot Morison has left to learn. It is evoked in a phrase in Roy Wilkins' eulogy to DuBois on the day of the Great March of 1963: "his was the voice that for six decades has been calling us here." And yet I fear that few white radicals are qualified to throw a stone at the Admiral: Christopher Lasch calls his 350-page book *The New Radicalism in America 1889–1963*, without so much as mentioning the author of *Black Reconstruction*, and the time in question covers precisely DuBois' working years.

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COMMUNICATIONS

Henry Pachter

Ideology and Power in Foreign Affairs

Comments on John Schrecker and Michael Walzer, "American Intervention and the Cold War" in DISSENT, Autumn, 1965

One always preserves the fears of his youth. Those who grew up in the fifties will never forget McCarthy: when they see a Communist being attacked, they are sure it's a witch hunt. Some liberals are so obsessed by the specter of John F. Dulles that in their view conflicts of power merely reflect an irrational fear of imagined "Communists." They do not understand that witches don't exist while in certain countries Communists do have power. They are so afraid of being "cold warriors" that they look away from the real constellation of forces and substitute psychoanalysis for political analysis. In their essay on "American Intervention," Walzer and Schrecker argue that the cold war is a mere "phantom," a fantasy of ideologists and crusaders. Not the Soviet striving for hegemony in Europe has created the post-war tensions, but the hypocritical imagination of U.S. Presidents who used the "perspective" to justify their own interventionism.

If this is so, then nothing should be easier than to stop the cold war: we would just have to stop believing in it. If we will abandon Vietnam, the Russians will leave East Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, etc. . . . and the danger of war will fade as soon as we abandon "the cold war perspective." Not Soviet aggression, but our own ideology "for almost 20 years" was "partly the cause . . . of the power struggle." You see, it was only our "perspective" that made it look as though Khrushchev was sending tanks into Hungary and rockets to Cuba.

Incidentally, the term "cold war" was coined by a facetious journalist who meant to say that the diplomatic and propagandistic tug-of-war was not a "hot" war. Far from having the sinister connotation which the authors read into it, "cold war" signifies a political warfare in which the powers try to *avoid* a military show-down. This is a normal relationship between powers, yet some people object to it when it occurs between Western capitalist governments and the Soviet government. For the "cold war" does, of course, have overtones and a fearful polarization has in fact taken place: since either of two super-powers must be the ultimate gainer or loser in every shift of the international balance, the mitigating and mediating effects of third-power and small-power interposition are that much more dubious.

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Instead of facing the problem of power relations which has been created through these postwar developments, the authors try to get away from it by two ingenious devices. One is the nostalgic return to a precontemporary world where there would not be two powers but many; in this dream the authors go so far as to find de Gaulle's old-fashioned power game "attractive." Come now, do you really find "attractive" a policy which presupposes, wills, and actually promotes the proliferation of nuclear weapons and opposes itself to U.N. efforts to prohibit it? One should never admit an absurd or contemptible consequence in order to save a mistaken premise. The assumption in this case is that many powers are more likely to maintain a balance of peace than a few. Any equilibrist or mathematician will tell you that the opposite is true; history also shows that a balance of many powers can be maintained only if there is space for all to expand. But this space is now taken by the "Third World," which the authors diligently set apart to make believe that polarization need not exist. Presently we shall see how the authors dispose of this arena of conflict by simply not believing in conflict.

Intimately connected with the first is their second device: If the cold war was a mere chimera in Europe, how much less real is it in the "Third World" to which it was only "transferred." The Chinese it seems, never invaded India and Sukarno never quit the U.N.—only astigmatics like Johnson stare at such specters because they *believe* in the "cold war model." If Johnson were not a victim of his imagination, he would not need to fight over influence in the "Third World." To support their contention that "a defeat for the one side is not necessarily a victory for the other side," the authors say that a defeat is a defeat "only if we recognize it" as such: a topless bikini will not provoke sinful thoughts unless you believe in sin. Though that may be true, the rule is that topless bikinis not only provoke sinful thought but are meant to do that. Likewise, in a country that used to be in the U.S. orbit an opposition party will often embrace all "anti-imperialist" slogans which Soviet propaganda can provide and moreover, will often turn to the USSR for support. Nor did such influence abroad wait for the "cold war model" to appear: Elizabeth I had to forbid members of Parliament to talk to the Russian Ambassador, and there always was a "Russian faction" at the Kaiser's court.

It belongs to the normal game of diplomacy that powers promote subversion next door, and if the authors imagine that by not "recognizing" it they might be rid of the power game itself, they are in an advanced stage of solipsism.

I will admit that the State Department, weary of explaining to stupid Congressmen why a particular country needs help, often resorts to the easy short-cut of conjuring up "Communism." But instead of denouncing this abuse of good faith, the authors chose to fall for it. I cannot tell why. By now everybody has seen that the "Communist infiltration" theory in Santo Domingo was nothing but a jerry-built justification for an old-fashioned imperialist intervention on behalf of the ruling class. In Vietnam,

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on the other hand, the issue is not "Communism" but Chinese power. Had the authors denounced the unconscionable attempt to sell us an "anti-Communist" war where there really is a power conflict, they would have rendered a real service. But instead of saying "there should be no ideological war," they seem to say "where there is no ideological war, there is no war at all." Instead of saying "there is no Communist world conspiracy," they deny that Communist power uses ideological weapons. Each war has an ideological element, but if Communism were not lending itself as a justifying ideology, then we would be fighting the "dirty barbarous Russians," the "absolute Czar" or the "bloody Tartar." Ideologies are flexible but not entirely expendable; governments as well as nongovernmental movements need them as flags; they are the cement of coalitions; they justify what one is doing and appeal to the opposition in the enemy ranks. Though ideology rarely determines policy, it may become autonomous and force the hand of its manipulator. Obviously, this is more likely to happen in a totalitarian state than in a pluralistic society. The West is less "anti-Communist" than the East is "anti-imperialist." The U.S. would recognize Castro *if* he were able to renounce his alliance with the Soviet Union, which he must maintain for material as well as ideological reasons. The U.S. supported Tito against the Soviet Union when he was "ultra-left," and we are happy to support Rumania, which supports China against Moscow. But the Russians are unable to shake off the Chinese because they are afraid of losing the ideological fight in the Communist camp, and it should not be forgotten that the "revisionists" Tito and Khrushchev felt that for ideological reasons they could not tolerate the fall of a Communist government in Budapest.

Wherever we look around us, the real world is quite different from the one which the authors so neatly organize in their minds by ordering this ideology out and another in. Once they have banished the cold war from their heads, everything becomes marvelously simple: we only need to promote "modernization" in the "Third World."

Once we apply "massive foreign aid," the backward countries will no longer lure the big powers into a power game. The fact is, however, that development aid everywhere tends to "entangle" big powers and that *weak governments solicit* outside support. Finally, misapprehension is compounded by misrepresentation when they maintain that "the U.S. is far more willing to underwrite short-term counter-insurgency operations than long-term economic development." The entire conception of the Alliance for Progress was to establish the opposite order of priorities and the simple truth is that pragamatically the State Department found that economic development is the precondition of political stability. Appearances to the contrary, I do not doubt that the Administration would rather spend millions on development, as the authors suggest, than fight an uncertain war in Vietnam. "Dollar diplomacy" is, after all, an American invention, and this country has always preferred the comfortable way out, spending money rather than assuming the burden of

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power. The consequence has often been that it stumbled into a war instead of avoiding it.

The Korean war is a case in point. It is the classical example of an intervention which the authors approve of: "a full-scale invasion" which was answered by "counter-intervention" according to established "legal procedures." Are the authors serious? The "legal procedures" were possible only because the Soviet Ambassador had absented himself from the Security Council, and this will not happen again, especially if Peking gets into the U.N. Anyway, U.N. participation in this war was merely window-dressing: Korea was mainly an American "unilateral intervention" which the authors, according to their own criteria, ought to condemn, especially since "our guy" there did not have much better credentials than Diem in Saigon. But above all, the "full-scale intervention" would never have happened if the U.S. had remained in South Korea to begin with, i.e., if it had maintained a military presence which one might call "preventive intervention." The same is true of the U.S. presence in Europe. The authors proclaim that (with the exception of Czechoslovakia — some exception!) Communists never conquered power in a viable democracy. But the foot is in the other shoe: West Germany became viable only through U.S. intervention there. And in the last resort, the argument is circular: if the Communists were able to take over, that was proof that the government was not viable, and if they were prevented, as in Greece, then the government was viable.

I mention Greece because the Truman Doctrine belongs in the category of interventions which the authors would not condone; but the point is of some importance since this intervention was not "cold war": Stalin had given the country to the West whereas the authors brush Czechoslovakia off with the remark that it had anyway been "assigned to the Russian sphere of influence." Going through the lists of interventions which the authors allow and disallow, we find that in support of rebellions in Hungary or East Germany "there is nothing the U.S. can do," whereas in the opposite cases, where uprisings occur within the Western orbit or even are fed (as in the case of Greece) from outside, there also the U.S. "must not interfere militarily." This seems to be the authors' way of being consistent!

It's a pity they don't say anything on the Berlin airlift, for their easy schematism would break down in such borderline cases—and all really important problems concern borderline cases. There is no fast-and-hard rule which says when it is proper to intervene and when to stay at home. Nor is it possible to reduce the behavior of a government to the simplistic terms of a "cold war ideology"; neither the Soviet nor the U.S. government will undertake anything without considering its effect on the other. Even the Congo action which—strangely—the authors praise as a model of desirable "collective intervention," was viewed by the U.S. as the very thing the authors condemn: a "disguised anti-Communist rescue operation," and the proof is that the Russians refuse to pay for it. But I am not con-

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cerned with the question whether this or that intervention was justified; my point is that one cannot categorize or fix the legal requirements in advance, once for all times. Moreover, one cannot be sure that non-intervention will in all cases be in the interest of peace. What about Munich? We know now that the German generals were prepared to depose Hitler in 1936, if France and England had *intervened* against the remilitarization of the Rhine!

The authors think it possible to differentiate between "ordinary power competition and cold war intervention; the first holds open the possibility of insulating international politics . . . from local unheaval; the second tends to absorb local into international politics." The fact is that the local politicians are *seeking* international backers, while the big powers are trying to isolate local conflicts. But they rarely succeed in shaking off their partisans: every local conflict may become international; nor is that an innovation of the cold warriors. There is not one state of mind which allows statesmen to "isolate international politics" and another which drags local conflicts into the "cold war"; for the "cold war" is the sum of local conflicts, and a big power cannot disengage itself from them because, if, when or as long as it needs allies. The experience of "neutralism" so far has not been encouraging. It always led to "cold war." On the other hand, a good case can be made for the contention that alliances tend to diminish local conflicts. In the atomic age, we cannot retreat into non-partisanship; there is only a way forward toward collective security, but unfortunately this term cannot be as easily defined nor its meaning exemplified as the authors assume.

By any definition and in any practical situation, collective security means stabilization of some status quo. The authors call that aim "futile," and that it is; there always will be change, and some of that change also involves changes in the international configuration. The authors isolate one kind of change which they call "modernization" and identify with changes away from "capitalism"; they call for "radical nationalism," which I assume fits the systems of Nasser, Sukarno, Nkrumah, perhaps even Peron, on the one side, and Castro, on the other. I find none of these systems either attractive or progressive. They are more reactionary than the classical capitalistic development pattern. All that seems to be "radical" in them is the loudness of their anti-colonialist protestations, but some of them practice colonialism themselves. If this is the ideology offered to us as an "alternative to Communism and anti-Communism," I beg to pass.

Given the need of these dictators to seek glory and to subvert or conquer other countries, I don't see how the big powers can avoid either of two decisions: they may cater to the vanities of these nationalisms and thereby become involved in a power game which is not distinguishable from the "cold war"; or else they must decide to prevent "change," i.e., they must agree to guarantee each other's spheres of influence. But precisely since the authors support "radical nationalism" and hence must favor the changes which its convulsions will work, they

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must agree with Johnson's dictum that civil war and international war, or cold war and power competition, are one and the same thing.

Unfortunately, questions of foreign policy come in a package with military, economic, social and ideological elements; even countries which, like Switzerland, have no foreign policy in the power sense, count on the balance of power which other countries establish among themselves; even countries which wish to stay "neutral" are intervening in the affairs of others either by their own actions or by their inaction. But it is precisely in those countries which are most characteristically "neutralist," uncommitted and "radically nationalist" that the leadership has developed an aggressive interventionism: Nkrumah and Nasser are vying for the honor of becoming Africa's Bismarck. Yet these two were also the darlings of several American administrations: Dulles was preparing to give Nasser the Aswan Dam when the latter turned around to conclude the fatal arms deal with Molotov. To Nkrumah we are giving the Volta high dam —"massive foreign aid" if the words ever had any meaning—and yet he is the instigator of forces bent on unhinging the precarious stability of the new countries in Africa, with an ideology which is a strange mixture of Mussolini and Sorel.

If we have to opt for an ideology, I would humbly ask Schrecker and Walzer to consider democratic reformism as represented by Bosch, Betancourt, the Praja socialists of India, Senghor. I think that we should intervene on behalf of the forces behind them, and, if necessary, back them up with our own force. Or to put it more succinctly: we should have intervened in Santo Domingo not on April 28, 1965 but should have on September 5, 1963—we should have intervened not to prevent the return of Bosch but to prevent his ouster.

A Reply by Michael Walzer and John Schrecker

There are two sorts of polemics. The first aims at refuting an opponent's argument; the second aims to discredit it. The first requires a more or less careful presentation and critique of a moral or political position; the second depends on caricature and attack. Henry Pachter's polemic is of the second sort. This is not to say that he doesn't touch upon interesting and difficult questions; but they are never his primary concern. Nor does he pay any significant attention to the arguments of our article. Instead, he launches himself against a set of preconceived and doubtlessly long-standing enemies, and our sentences are hacked to fit his preconceptions. Since polemics of this sort are occasionally taken seriously, some response is obviously necessary, but we don't write with any hope of enlightenment or clarification. Our response is less dialogue than self-defense.

Our comments follow the order of Pachter's polemic.

1. The major argument of our article was that cold war ideology distorts American foreign policy in the Third World. The question of the European origins and sources of the ideology we treated with some am-

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biguity; it is a difficult subject, and not ours. We wrote only that cold war ideology was developed in the post-war years and that it was "partly the cause and partly the result of the power struggle with Stalin's Russia . . ." We meant to suggest a cautionary note: that Russian power wasn't the only or independent cause of cold war theorizing; that from the beginning the U.S. acted upon a set of assumptions about Russian power which was more than simply "realistic." Pachter notices none of this; he quotes us as saying that the American conception of the cold war "was partly the cause . . . of the power struggle with Russia," and then accuses us of absolute blindness to the reality of "Soviet aggression." We are blind, he insists, to Czechoslovakia, Berlin, Hungary, etc., and so guilty of hopeless naivete, if not something much worse. Pachter cannot grant us the complexity of our position. He is convinced in advance that anyone who questions the cold war orthodoxies *must* be blind to Soviet aggression. He didn't so much read our article, we conclude, as search in it for ideological clues; once he had found his clues, he knew what we really said or meant, whatever we actually wrote.

2. Pachter writes that we regard the cold war as a "phantom," a "fantasy," a "chimera." Sometimes he quotes us using these words; sometimes he paraphrases us. Since they don't describe our position, they never appear in our article. We described the theory of the cold war as a distorted ideological view of a real power struggle. This may be right or wrong; Pachter never discusses it. Or rather, in a fit of perfect toughmindedness (to contrast with our naivete?) he comes very near denying the significance of ideology altogether, especially in "pluralistic" societies like the U.S. —a denial which, if it were serious, would considerably surprise most students of American foreign policy.

3. Pachter is, in fact, totally committed to the cold war ideology: every word he writes is a token of the pervasive and insidious power of such reigning creeds. There are two superstates in the world, he tells us; every event in international and domestic politics must be a victory or defeat for one or the other; there are no significant third powers; there is no "give" in the system, no mediation, no mitigation of what was and is an absolute conflict. In order to escape these hard truths, writes Pachter, we use two "devices." The first is to suggest that there are no longer only two powers in the world. We do indeed make that suggestion, and Pachter never says what he thinks of it. He takes us to task for some qualified praise of de Gaulle, but says nothing about the European detente, nothing about the breakup of the alliances and, more amazingly, nothing about China. Our second "device" is to shift the discussion to the third world—which is not really as "ingenious" of us as Pachter suggests, since that was the subject of our article. Pachter is, of course, certain that the cold war is as real in the third world as it was and is in Europe. He cites as evidence two events of recent history: the Chinese attack upon India's borders; the Indonesian departure from the U.N. Just what these events have to do with the cold war (which he has defined as a struggle between Russia

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and the U.S.), he doesn't say. Nor does he even consider the possibility of local or domestic explanations for either event. Yet it was one of our central points that such explanations are often more realistic than ritual invocations of cold war theory.

4. The argument about topless bikinis is just funny. A woman who wears one aims to provoke desire, not "sinful thoughts." Pachter is always an ideologist!

5. In Pachter's discussion of Vietnam, a third power appears (surely it is secretly an agent of one of the big two?): "the issue is not communism, but Chinese power." We are attacked for failing to recognize that the war is a pure power struggle in which the Chinese are "using" communism as an ideological weapon in their expansionist drive (and the U.S. using anti-communism in its . . . what?). Pachter would apparently prefer that both sides drop their dishonest ideologies and just fight it out. He doesn't say precisely what they would then be fighting about. Power, presumably; for the theory behind Pachter's view of international politics must be that great nations seek power after power endlessly. But a close reading of his text suggests that in fact only Russians and in some subordinate fashion Chinese seek power after power. We must be blind to some link in his reasoning. In any case, Pachter ignores our argument: that there was once a civil war in Vietnam which the U.S. escalated into an international power struggle because we failed to grasp its *civil,* that is, local, significance and believed mistakenly that it was an international power struggle from its very beginning. If China is today involved, it is because we have once again pursued a policy which tends to drive unwilling but weak states into the hands of rival super-powers.

6. We fail to recognize, says Pachter, that "weak governments solicit outside support," that "local politicians seek international backers." If these statements are more than truisms, Pachter seems to be suggesting (though it contradicts his earlier description of the cold war) that power struggles are started by unstable little countries which "lure" the great powers into a dangerous competition that they would avoid if they could. Pachter's central conviction that Russians have horns is thus occasionally mitigated by his generalized scorn for the small, backward states of the third world. They are really at the root of the trouble. But this is not a tenable position. It amounts to an acceptance of the rationalizations of the great powers themselves. They always claim to have been invited wherever they intervene, though the invitations are generally composed in their own capitals. Pachter insists that great powers must accept these invitations because they "need allies." This need is not explained or defended. In what sense and for what purpose does the U.S. "need" an ally in South Vietnam?

But there is a more important point here, and one central to our argument. With the exception of governments under enormous pressure or with no local power base, we cannot think of any third world nation that has invited significant great power intervention in its internal affairs. There have indeed been concessions of influence, but rarely of such a nature as to affect the international balance.

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What then is Pachter talking about? At all the crucial points in his polemic we find everything necessary in serious argument missing: reasons, evidence, examples, coherence.

7. Pachter's discussion of Korea requires a complete distortion of our meaning, achieved by juxtaposing short phrases from different parts of a long paragraph. We distinguish two different sorts of legitimate intervention: a unilateral response to full-scale invasion (Korea); a collective response to internal atrocity and chaos. It was about the latter that we wrote that "the legal procedures for such collective intervention are only just being developed." Pachter doesn't bother to distinguish the two sorts; instead he demonstrates conclusively that the American intervention in Korea was unilateral, and insists that "according to the author's own criteria" we ought to have condemned it. Sometimes he is so wrong as to be unanswerable.

But he obviously intends to raise a more general issue here. He seems to believe that it is impossible to make any legal distinctions, indeed any conceivable distinctions, between different sorts of interventions or between intervention and some different policy. A kind of intellectual nihilism lurks behind such sentences as these: "It belongs to the normal game of diplomacy that powers promote subversion next door. . . . even countries which wish to stay 'neutral' are intervening in the affairs of others by their own actions or by their inaction." If these statements are true then the vocabulary which Pachter himself uses is meaningless. The same point must be made against Pachter's assertions that there is no use suggesting general rules about intervention and that only "borderline cases" are important. If he recognizes no general rules, how does he know which are the *borderline* cases?

8. In fact, he doesn't know. According to the rules which we tentatively put forward, Quemoy and Matsu, and Berlin are quite clearcut. Greece, however, at least with regard to the American intervention of 1947, seems to us a borderline case. But Pachter, in the most infuriating paragraph in his polemic, not only imputes an opinion about Greece to us, but contrasts it with a misquotation about Hungary, and then concludes that our "way of being consistent" is to oppose American but not Russian interventions. He accuses us of applying a double standard, which is, in fact, entirely his own invention. Assuming for the moment that he is right about our opinion on Greece, he could have stated the moral parallel: that American intervention in Greece and Russian intervention in Hungary were both wrong; or, he could have stated the factual parallel: that Stalin could not act effectively in Greece, nor the U.S. in Hungary. The odd juxtaposition which he offers instead would be utter nonsense were its political purpose not so obvious and disturbing.

9. Pachter writes: "one cannot be sure that non-intervention will in all cases be in the interest of peace. What about Munich?" We are certain that non-intervention will not in all cases be in the interests of peace. And all right, what about Munich? We have heard that question so often during the past year. Pachter manages to make its serious import unusually un-

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clear; but doubtless there is some polemical value in simply reciting it.

10. Pachter is in favor of "collective security." He doesn't say against whom, but one would be foolish to entertain doubts. He is certain, however, that the search for collective security is difficult, for "the term cannot be as easily defined nor its meaning exemplified as the authors assume." We never discuss collective security. We might as well be on the moon.

11. Pachter suggests that we are "offering" an ideology called "radical nationalism" as (quoting us) "an alternative to Communism and anti-Communism." At this point his generally odd use of quotations is superseded by pure creative writing. We say no such thing; the phrase does not appear in our text. Obviously we are *not "offering" any third world* ideology as an "alternative" to anything else. We are only pleading that all such ideologies be viewed as local products or local adaptations of international commodities, and not as *weapons in a world conspiracy.*

12. We don't believe anything we wrote can reasonably be construed as a specific endorsement of regimes like those of Nasser, Sukarno, Nkrumah, etc. But we suspect that Pachter regards as endorsement anything short of ritual denunciation.

13. Finally, Pachter invites us to join him — in supporting democratic movements and regimes throughout the world. The U.S. ought to intervene whenever necessary to create or sustain democracy—the mind boggles at the possibilities. Pachter's one example is worth discussing briefly. We should have intervened in the Dominican Republic in September, 1963, he writes, to prevent the ouster of Bosch. About this two points need to be made. First, it would not have been necessary to intervene in support of Bosch had we not previously intervened to undermine his power. Theodore Draper's recent *Commentary* piece, "The Dominican Crisis," makes it clear that Pentagon officials in Santo Domingo had some part (how big a part is not certain) in the military coup. They may have been acting against the State Department as well as against the Bosch government; nevertheless, their role was not untypical of American military missions abroad. Secondly, Bosch apparently did not ask for American intervention once the coup had begun. According to Draper, Ambassador Martin offered "to call for the U.S. carrier *Boxer* to deter the military conspirators." Bosch's response is not given, but it seems that he did not accept the offer. He is, after all, a nationalist, and may well have felt that he should be maintained in office or restored to power *by his own people.* Pachter, perhaps, has no appreciation for such a sentiment, but it seems to us entirely appropriate. There is a lesson in all this: given a movement like Bosch's, only our wholehearted political and economic support is necessary if democracy is to survive. The only purpose of military intervention would be (and was) to destroy such a movement. If, on the other hand, no democratic movement exists, it cannot conceivably be created by military intervention. Pachter's call for an American crusade is simply irrelevant to the problems of sustaining democratic government.

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BOOKS

Michael Harrington

Beyond the Statistics—The Brutality

THE SHAME OF A NATION, by Philip M. Stern. Photographs by George de Vincent. Foreword by Hubert H. Humphrey. New York: Obolensky. 182 pp. $5.95.

By now, there is a fair-sized library devoted to the definition and description of poverty in the United States. The Government itself has financed some excellent studies (Mollie Orshansky's analysis for the Social Security Administration is an outstanding example). And there are some fine collections of readings for that undergraduate audience which is now required to examine the reality of the other America of the poor.

And yet, there is clearly a need for presentations which go beyond statistics and bureaucratic categories. One television documentary—for instance, the late Ed Murrow's magnificant hour show on the misery of the migrant workers—stirs up more conscience and consciousness than a thousand graphs. And a book like *The Shame of a Nation,* which shows living, breathing poor people in sensitive words and moving photos, has the same kind of impact. And there is a real need for exactly this kind of a work.

For, incredible as it may seem, there are still the Goldwaterites who think that the discovery of poverty is simply a mathematical trick on the part of the bleeding hearts. This attitude has enough power to find its way into *Look* Magazine, normally one of the most humane of the mass publications. The chief of *Look's* Washington Bureau was apparently persuaded by the argument of two statisticians that the whole poverty problem had been inflated by counting in graduate students, happy family farmers, old people with fine houses, etc. The simple answer which can be made to him—and hopefully to some of his millions of readers—is: go and read *The Shame of a Nation* and *see* for yourself.

There is the rural reality, for instance. John Patterson is a North Arkansas cotton farmer with a house appraised at $600 and a few acres of sandy soil. He is, of course, subsidized by the Government—to the sum of $75 last year. In a nearby county, there is a 4,000 acre corporation farm. Its subsidy was $301,700. And there is the little known impoverishment of the Southwest, the bitter life of the "Spanish surnamed" and of the "anglos" who work with them. George de Vincent's pictures of the squalid

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shacks filled with children (who are already without a future at five or six) can hardly be dismissed as the work of some biased statistician.

Here, then, are the slums, urban and rural; the faces of the aging poor, and of the impoverished mothers. Here are some of the brutal facts of life about the American welfare system and the degrading amount of time and money which we spend in trying to catch the "undeserving" poor in an infraction of some bureaucratic rule —like the night-time visit to see if there is an able-bodied man in the home of an ADC mother.

But it would be a mistake to classify Stern's book as simply a gut, emotional presentation of the issue of poverty. For there is a most important theme that runs throughout, one that is fraught with political implications. We spend pennies on a welfarism which is utterly inadequate *according to our present public standards.* We also invest dollars in subsidies for the middle class and the rich, e.g. $75 for a poor farmer, $301,700 for a cotton corporation. And *The Shame of a Nation* constantly emphasizes and illustrates this perverse inversion of decent values. In this context, it provides a convincing indictment of the exceedingly narrow limits of the welfare state.

My one real regret with regard to this book is that a $5 hardcover edition will not reach the mass audience which *The Shame of a Nation* deserves. The publisher tells me there are no current plans for a cheaper paperback. Somebody should make them.

Remembrance of Things Past

Is Curly Jewish?, by Paul Jacobs. New York: Atheneum. 399 pp. $5.95.

Paul Jacobs has written an intensely personal autobiography. Throughout the book he is trying to tell the reader how he felt about whatever he was doing during his youth as an American radical—or at least what he now thinks were the reasons for what he did. His statement at the outset that this is "not really an autobiography" may be taken as a striking illustration of one of his recurring themes: the gap between our conscious intentions and the inner drives which shape and often distort them.

This book seems to me more an act of personal catharsis than one which pursues a public purpose. Yet it will be of interest to many people whose concern with Jacobs as a man is limited, and it will have public consequences.

There are a few thousand people in America who, like Jacobs, went through the Trotskyist movement, or who have been involved, from a radical or liberal standpoint, in the struggle against Communist influence in public life. And there are millions of

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radicals and non-radicals who have had to come to terms (or have avoided coming to terms) with what it means to be Jewish in America. If such readers are inclined to self-analysis, it will give them a standard of candor and insight by which to measure how consciously they themselves have acted in their public lives. But if Jacobs intended his book to be instructive to the new generation of young radicals, or to those who never participated in the kind of political life he describes, he has fallen short of his goal.

Jacobs' analysis of the psychological role of his Jewishness is a running theme throughout the book. Toward the end, it dominates the other themes to the point of excluding a statement of his current political views or attitudes. But even in the earlier sections which describe his life as a radical, he appears to feel little need to describe the political *content* of his radicalism, or to convey a real sense of the world in which it had meaning—even if not quite the meaning with which its participants invested it.

Not that Jacobs fails to mention the great public events which moved him and those who shared his ideological assumptions. But these events, as well as the ideas he had about them, appear more as references than descriptions.

Jacobs has, of course, no obligation to describe the content of the ideas which preoccupied the Trotskyists of his day (from his own account, he joined the Trotskyist movement when he was fifteen or sixteen, and severed organizational ties with it at the ripe old age of twenty-two). He has no greater obligation to tell us how or why his views changed or what they are today. But why should he then describe his book as "*a political* self-portait" and leave his readers in the dark about the content of his politics —or even what that content meant to him, except in psychological terms?

Well, that's his privilege. But he leaves those of us who are concerned with radical politics in America today with a bit of a problem.

What public consequences can we anticipate from the *way* in which he treats at least one of his subjects: his participation in the struggle between the Communists and their opponents in the labor movement and the Jewish community during the late forties and early fifties?

Jacobs tells us that he was often troubled by things he did and said, and even more by the political views of people he found himself allied with in those struggles. One can readily believe this, for it is in the nature of the Communist movement that it creates moral dilemmas for everyone who comes in contact with it—except for its know-nothing supporters and know-nothing enemies.

Nor is this a problem the passage of time has left behind us. With the revival of radical politics in America today, this problem of Communism will not leave us alone, regardless of our wishes. It has again become acute in the civil rights and peace movements. Unless they are able to define their relationships to world Communism, and to the various groups of its American exponents, they are in for more self-inflicted trouble than many of their leaders and members can imagine.

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On the positive side, Jacobs describes the inhibitions under which Trotskyists and other radicals fought Communist influence in the labor movement, and in public life in general. American Communists had no compunction about "turning in" their radical opponents to employers and government agencies (as their colleagues in Europe had no compunction about turning such opponents over to the Gestapo). But Jacobs and his friends felt differently:

> Even though I considered him (a Communist soldier) an enemy of the workers and of socialism, I wasn't a strong supporter of the American government either, and so I could not "turn him in" to what I still believed were the institutions of capitalist repression.

He also describes the frustrations of maintaining a civil libertarian position while engaging in a bitter ideological and organizational struggle with the Communists.

> The dilemma of radicals opposed to the Communist party was an agonizing one. We had none of the illusions of the liberal concerning the nature of the Communist party, but we were just as adamantly opposed to the party's suppression by the government as were the Communists themselves. Our position was made even more difficult because it was virtually impossible to explain to the great mass of liberals how we could fight the Communist party inside the unions at the same time that we fought against its suppression by the government.

One of the side effects of what we might call the institutionalization of McCarthyism has been to make such basic and necessary distinctions even more difficult to grasp for a new generation of liberals and radicals. The one way in which government harassment and persecution of Communists, real and alleged, has helped the Communist movement has been to give it a kind of immunity from open confrontation and attack by political opponents. All too many liberals and radicals, and especially young ones, refuse to distinguish between political attack and police repression; accurate political characterization and "red baiting"; rejection of cooperation with a totalitarian movement and "knuckling under to McCarthyism."

Jacobs' failure to describe his own political evolution may lead to a misunderstanding of the position of left democratic socialists in the struggle which led to the expulsion of Communist-controlled unions from the CIO. Jacobs helped prepare the charges against Harry Bridges which led to the expulsion of the West Coast Longshoremen from the CIO. Throughout that fight, it should be stressed, both the Trotskyists and socialists opposed these expulsions. The socialists supported Reuther's fight in the United Automobile Workers which led to the defeat of the Communist faction in that union in open, democratic battle—and held it up as a model to the whole labor movement. They opposed bureaucratic administrative measures to expel unions on two grounds: that this method did not permit the union membership itself to assert its democratic rights; and that it left the workers in the expelled unions to the mercies of their Communist leaderships. They charged that the top bureaucracy in the CIO was reluctant to stimulate and support rank-and-file oppositions to Communist union leaderships because it didn't

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want the ranks to get in the habit of opposing bureaucratic machines in general. So it should be clear that Jacobs in 1965 looking critically at his role in the labor movement during the post-war years is talking primarily about his own experience; he is not recording the experience of the democratic, anti-Stalinist left at the time, despite the fact that his general political outlook is in accord with it.

At times, Jacobs' short-hand treatment of political ideas can be positively harmful. He tells us a lot about what he and others did in their struggles against the Communists, with particular emphasis on what he wishes he hadn't then felt compelled to do. But why should socialists, radicals, even liberals, combat Communist influence and control of unions, civil rights organizations, peace groups, etc.? Jacobs puts it down to "anger at the way in which Communists had betrayed our ideals, and partly because it was our job to do so."

I suspect that he believed, and still believes, that in addition to his "anger" and his "job" there were good political reasons for his actions. But one danger of the auto-analytic mood is that the writer can easily slip over into belittling the social causes for which he fought in the course of trying to unearth the unconscious reasons for his actions. And Jacobs succumbs to this danger repeatedly.

Widespread Communist influence and control of the social movements of our time would constitute a disaster. One consequence of such control would be that they would be subjected to abrupt policy changes based not on changing political circumstances here, but on the latest turns in Russian or Chinese foreign policy. Jacobs describes the sport Trotskyists were able to make of the flip-flops in the Communist party line. He does not dwell very much on the cynicism and disillusionment—the twin effects of these flip-flops—which infected a whole generation of liberals and radicals who found themselves unwitting victims of these changes in policy which were imposed from the outside on the movements in which they participated.

The basic result of Communist control is that the purposes of the movements in question are distorted to meet the needs of Russian or Chinese foreign policy. Opposition to reactionary aspects of American foreign policy is transformed into support of Russian foreign policy; the struggle for civil rights and civil liberties are exploited in the interests of the world Communist movement (or movements) and the governments which control them, rather than being pursued in the interest of the constituencies of these movements and of the transformation of American society in the direction of greater equality and democracy.

But Jacobs doesn't discuss the *politics* of radical opposition to Communism in these terms. He prefers to talk about the "ex-radicals and the radicals without an ideology whose opposition to the Communists was based on their past enmity to them." This kind of description runs the danger of presenting an ideological happy hunting ground for those who, through naivete or worse, attack *any* opposition to Communism as an equivalent of or aid to McCarthyism.

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In the last sentence of *Is Curly Jewish?* Paul Jacobs seems to be promising us another book in which he will try to learn more about himself. As they say, it's a free country. I personally found the book a fascinating stimulus—and foil—to an examination of my own motives, conscious and otherwise, down through the years. Thus, I wish Jacobs well in his further explorations. But since books have political as well as personal meaning, I can't help but feel that if such exercises are to be shared at all, they are best reserved for gatherings of intimate friends in the presence of good whiskey.

GORDON K. HASKELL

Social Powerlessness in the Negro Ghetto

DARK GHETTO, by Kenneth B. Clark. New York: Harper & Row. 251 pp. $4.95.

Any new book on urban Negro problems risks being familiar, despite Kenneth Clark's assertion that there is no comprehensive study focusing exclusively on the Negro racial ghetto. Ghetto conditions such as housing decay, illegitimacy, narcotics addiction, massive unemployment, inferior schools, and political impotence have been aired and considered. Fresh insights into the ghetto predicament, while always welcome, become truly meaningful when related to fresh proposals for changing the patterns of ghetto life.

Powerlessness is the theme of Clark's book. He explains that the ghetto fosters not only economic and political powerlessness but a total psychology of powerlessness. Negroes share a sense of inferiority and frustration over the striking contrasts between the American dream and Negro achievement. Rather than attempt to break through the ghetto's multiple barriers, some Negroes escape into apathy while others take refuge in "hustles," narcotics, prostitution, and other behavior considered criminal or condemnable. Ghetto teachers and social workers often reinforce the frustration and low expectations of ghetto residents by judging them according to white middle-class standards and dismissing them as inferior or incorrigible when they don't measure up.

The book's momentum comes not so much from its analytical originality as from its emphasis on recent programs such as HARYOU or politically relevant figures like J. Raymond Jones and Adam Clayton Powell. Clark's conceptual handle — powerlessness — is well documented, but many of his observations, including complete chapters on ghetto schools and the ghetto power structure, seem to lead nowhere, at least not to comprehensive and concrete proposals for change.

Even where Clark makes specific recommendations, what he expects them to accomplish is frequently unclear. The rehabilitative programs he calls for show an appreciation of the complexity of the ghetto and the need to deal with the problems of low skills, low income, and low self-esteem,

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but he fails to analyze the impact of his proposals on the very ghetto he would change. He would, for example, inaugurate on-the-job retraining for the ghetto's jobless and employment in community service programs until the most unskilled can move on to jobs and job retraining outside the ghetto. What Clark does not explain is how his recommendations will cope with joblessness now spreading through the ghetto. His suggestion that business can or will provide jobs is particularly unillumined. He suggests on the one hand that the untapped consumer potential of Negroes constitutes an incentive to business for providing jobs for all who need them. At the same time, he indicates that he does not expect the pace of automation to subside. Yet, if Clark expects business to deal with Negro joblessness while automation continues unabated—and we know that automation often strikes first at the kinds of unskilled jobs many Negroes hold—then he has not explained why or how business will undertake this burden. His single comment that a small, skilled labor force controlled by labor unions is distasteful to business is not at all persuasive. Unless Clark's retraining programs raise skill levels of all or most jobless Negroes in record time, and this Clark does not maintain, jobs will have to be created if the economic misery of the ghetto is to be relieved.

Clark's failure to probe further the subtleties of unemployment may reflect his awareness that for Negroes the kind of job held is often more important than having a job at all. His job retraining and paid community worker proposals are an attempt to meet the need for meaningful, respectable work. But Clark fails to consider that widespread unemployment may eventually prompt governmental measures which combine large investments in the public sector with job retraining geared to an automated economy. The creation of jobs through direct government spending is not a novel idea, yet Clark has failed to examine it, even though public works programs logically would focus upon the ghetto. If, however, Clark sees Negro unemployment as something unique and not redressable by programs aimed at *all* unemployment, then he at least is obliged to make that clear.

Clark's book becomes more uneven and impressionistic in the later chapters when he considers the ghetto's power structure. He presents a rather pessimistic account of political powerlessness without analyzing the potential impact of the community action programs which he urges at an earlier point in the book. He sees such programs as leading to a confrontation of community problems such as poor garbage collection or inadequate street cleaning by ghetto residents, seemingly the beginning of grass-roots political activity over issues directly relevant to the ghetto. Still, he does not explore how indigenous people have been involved politically by the activities of such groups as the Northern Student Movement or Students for a Democratic Society. Nor does he comment upon the more obvious examples of the Harlem rent strike (which was followed by legislation legitimizing rent strikes) or Saul Alinsky's Chicago community organizing efforts. Whatever the success or failure of such efforts, they provide insights into the ghetto's potential for political development.

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It is bewildering that Clark's final chapter, "Strategy of Change," abruptly shifts to a discussion of the civil rights movement. Clark summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the movement, touching on one or two matters relevant to the ghetto—school boycotts, demonstrations. His focus, however, clearly is the civil rights movement of Martin Luther King, SNCC, and the March on Washington. While this movement may be slowly turning toward the ghetto and grappling with its problems, Clark's discussion lacks any clear attempt to relate the lessons of the movement to the unique needs of the ghetto. And while Clark alludes to the need for civil rights movements to join with other groups with a comparable interest in social change, he neither develops this idea fully nor relates it to the specific problems of the ghetto.

Clark is concerned, as he puts it, with the "truth" of the ghetto. But the ghetto's "truth" is more than a perceptive account of Negro and white attitudes or a documentation of social disintegration. The ghetto's "truth" includes a consideration of the possibilities of its positive transformaton.

SHEILA RUSH

A Critic of Literature and Politics

WRITERS AND POLITICS, by Conor Cruise O'Brien. New York: Pantheon. 259 pp. $4.95.

Conor Cruise O'Brien, at least on the international scene the radical-liberal intellectual *par excellence*, has recently published a new collection of articles and speeches, *Writers and Politics*. As a United Nations official effectively in charge of the UN's Congo operation, and later as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ghana during a period of great unrest, he has been intimately involved in activities usually unfamiliar to Western intellectuals. What makes O'Brien's example all the more salutary is that he is not merely a diplomat, not merely a political scientist, nor a mandarin in the international movements for progressive education; he is also a literary man—a distinguished critic and literary historian.

O'Brien, who originally entered the UN in the service of Ireland, is deeply concerned with Irish history and intellectual life. His book includes several long studies of Irish historical figures. In his introduction he examines the peculiar relationship between Ireland's orthodox institutions and the characteristic stance of her intellectual avant-garde. The following passage illustrates O'Brien's brilliant gift for analysis:

> If we take an intellectual to be a person who prefers to try to do his thinking for himself . . . then we see that the intellectual, in a priest-led community, must develop strengthened means of defending himself. He acquires in the process special capabilities and special limitations. . . . He is likely to set great store by irony, the versatile, durable, and easily camouflaged weapon of every ideological guer-

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> rilla; he will take an almost morbid interest in hypocrisy . . . because of the natural targets it presents to irony, and perhaps above all because of its peculiar social function in subordinating the meaning of words to the practical needs of the moment. . . . It is both the weakness and the strength of the intellectual brought up in a Catholic tradition that he finds it peculiarly hard to accept such pragmatic intimations.

O'Brien's book includes important articles on James Baldwin, George Orwell, Dwight Macdonald and *The New Yorker,* and on varieties of the contemporary political experience. The two oustanding features of the book are O'Brien's exposure of the intellectual evasion practiced by Western critics and commentators—and his own passionate commitment to radical politics. Nor is O'Brien a dupe of the perennial party line. He is not an ideologue. He prefers to work for meaningful change rather than to permit an appreciation of nuances and complexities to paralyze his will. This is not to suggest that he has no reservations about the political situations in which he is involved. In Ghana, for example, political imprisonment became an accepted facet of government policy. As a man deeply commited to liberal values, including freedom of press and speech, O'Brien could not help being dismayed by what he saw. He appealed to President Nkrumah without success. As Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ghana, he then worked persistently behind the scenes to stem the government's unwarranted intrusion into the university's affairs. The book concludes with a moving address to the academic community, in which he defends the idea of academic freedom even while recognizing the central importance of the university in the social and political framework of Ghana.

The truth which O'Brien, as a critic of society and ideas, seeks to explore leads him neither to quietism nor resolute intransigence. He can tolerate and understand the needs of peoples in underdeveloped areas who must embrace drastic measures in order to project any future at all. On the other hand, he describes the face of the late Adlai Stevenson as ". . . the ingratiating moral mask which a toughly acquisitive society wears before the world it robs."

O'Brien's book demonstrates, then, that political advocacy is not tantamount to doctrinaire denial of complexities. The banality of liberalism, as the intellectual from Asia or Africa has long recognized, resides in its quietism with respect to putting its own house in order, and in the smugness with which liberal literati manage to separate the spiritual and moral from the immediately political. For too long, the liberal's compulsive addiction to fashionable nuance has resulted in the attenuation of those militant elements which make liberalism worthy of endorsement.

In a few pieces, O'Brien moves from topical criticism into literary history. He discusses R. W. B. Lewis' critical study *The Picaresque Saint,* which treats a distinguished group of modern novelists. He accuses Lewis of a crucial failure to discharge the duties implicit in his subject. O'Brien may somewhat overstate his case, but his point is in general well taken. He quotes Lewis' suggestion that " 'the form or soul of the modern epoch . . . is the shape of individual experience during a period when political history

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affects all experience.'" He charges that Lewis subsequently fails to examine sufficiently the writers' relation to the general political experience. O'Brien concludes that "the critic, like the turtle, is a specialist in fertile ambiguity: it is useful for survival." This conclusion unfairly suggests a deliberate evasion or distortion on Lewis' part. The implication also blurs the important point, that the habitual, virtually unconscious orientation prevents anyone from thinking the unthinkable as efficiently as any overt restriction. That the Western critic resembles his Soviet counterpart more closely than he would like to suppose, "... by the way in which he acquiesces in the orthodoxy which prevails in his society," is far from a gratuitous indictment. O'Brien adds that Western criticism, which systematically ignores unmistakeable political implications in the material it treats, indicates "... a dangerously close intellectual atmosphere."

If this book reaches people in the literary community, it may stimulate a reexamination of political and literary orthodoxies. Of course, literature is not always, nor even predominantly, involved with politics, and the critic who spuriously indulges his appetite for political advocacy at the expense of literary relevance and taste will be doing no service to his profession. What O'Brien laments is the deterioration of public discourse in Western societies, largely due to the myopia which seems to afflict men of letters when they confront ugly political details. It might be naively optimistic to expect that this acknowledgement could provoke a widespread conversion to political activism, but it may help us to arrive at a new and challenging literary criticism.

ROBERT BOYERS

A REPORT ON THE L.I.D. (continued from page 116)

Probably the single most dramatic breakthrough for the League was the opening in October of its Leadership Training Institute in Harlem. Hopefully, the Institute will become a permanent educational center in which young civil rights activists can receive training in the intellectual and organizational skills for leadership. Courses in Negro history, urban problems and community organizing techniques are now under way, drawing upon LID experts in a variety of fields. Robert Curvin, former head of Newark CORE and a member of CORE's NAC, is director of the project and has been working with civil rights organizations, block associations, and other community groups. The Institute is a unique attempt to train the new kind of activist required in the current stage of the civil rights revolution.

The rich tradition of the League in past decades rested very largely on its muckraking pamphlets, which were disseminated by the hundreds of thousands. We have not, in a year, reclimbed those heights, but we have got our publications program moving again. My pamphlet *The Economics of Equality,* has sold out (15,000 copies) and has been excerpted for several anthologies. *To Build a New World: A Brief History of American Labor,* by Thomas R. Brooks, was distributed to over 17,000 high school students. It is expected to become a

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standard item in trade union education programs, as well as a useful means of orienting college students toward the labor movement. At the end of the year, the League produced as a pamphlet Michael Harrington's *The Politics of Poverty,* which originally appeared in the Fall 1965 *Dissent.* This is one concrete example of how the close working relationship that has just been established between LID and *Dissent* can bring benefits. 20,000 copies of this pamphlet will be distributed nationally to individuals and organizations active in the anti-poverty movement.

In addition to such pamphlets, the League initiated *Looking Forward,* a series of occasional papers. So far, papers by Bayard Rustin, Herbert Gans and Theodore Draper have been enormously successful, enjoying distribution by the tens of thousands.

The new relationship with *Dissent* will make possible a considerable expansion of this publications program. At least four major pamphlets will appear in 1966, plus more occasional papers, some of which may first appear in the magazine. Another area of cooperation will be the organization of public meetings. These, too, were an important part of the League's tradition and have recently been resumed by the New York Chapter.

Another League project, conceived last year, has become even more relevant with the escalation of the war in Vietnam and with the debate over the growing military budget's effects on domestic social spending. With the sponsorship of an impressive list of economists and "movement people," the League proposes to initiate a Conference on National Economic Planning. Scheduled for the fall of 1966, the Conference would bring European experts together with trade unionists, civil rights activists, and intellectuals to discuss techniques of democratic allocation of resources to meet the unmet social needs of the nation.

I have left for the end the area in which the League has been working most intensely, the student movement. There is not space to describe the circumstances which led to the separation of the League from its former student department, Students for a Democratic Society. The ideological and political differences that emerged between the two organizations are part of ongoing controversy among American radicals. These differences cannot be ascribed solely to the "generational gap" or subsumed under "New Left" v. "Old Left." They revolve largely around concepts of democracy and attitudes toward Communism.

What is important here is that the League, more than any other adult organization, has sought to maintain the links between the new student movement and the older generation of liberals and radicals, while stimulating honest debate of the issues. The split with SDS, far from signifying the end of the LID's work in the student movement, frees us from petty organizational squabbles and makes possible the pursuit of work which is more substantive. There is perhaps no more urgent task for democratic radicals in this period.

(For further details on SDS etc., see the article in the current *Dissent* by Paul Feldman—Ed.)

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Noah Greenberg: 1919-1966

The world knew him as a gifted musician, but to those of us who had grown up with him in the socialist youth movement, he was, above all, a figure from those vibrant years when everything seemed possible. Buoyant, large and zestful, he radiated a vast energy, the very heat and noise of life.

Even during his most politically-active years, music was his passion. He was one of those fortunate enough to have an apartment of his own, and on Saturday nights we would pile into his place on East 14th Street, submitting ourselves to his musical teaching, listening to the baroque and medieval pieces he had discovered, and succumbing to his enthusiasm as he sang in accompaniment to the records, his voice, hands and body alive with the pleasure of sound. In those days we never supposed there could be any conflict between politics and culture, engagement and taste; we wanted the socialist revolution and *avant garde* modernism, Trotsky and Joyce, Marx and Stravinsky, everything that seemed bold and truthful.

A bit later Noah shipped out as a seaman and became intensely active in a maritime union. He was soon involved in a fierce struggle against an entrenched union bureaucracy, led by a man who had risen to power through an alliance with the Communists, had learned from them all he could about suppressing critics and dissidents, and, to consolidate his rule, had turned first upon the Communists and then upon the authentic union militants. Against this entrenched machine Noah and his few friends had no chance, but they fought well, with courage and good faith.

Even after Noah organized the Pro Musica Antiqua, he kept a strong interest in politics. The last time I spoke to him he grew vivid with his characteristic excitement, a kind of kinetic fervor, as he expressed disagreement with some article I had written, and then went on to describe a visit to the Soviet Union, where he had discussed politics with young people and formed his impressions about the cultural plight of the Russian Jews. For his old friends, scattered by life and various in their ideas, there was pleasure in following his work: the same spirit flamed through it that had warmed our youth.

When Noah Greenberg died, he was at the peak of his achievement. Others honor him, rightly, for his work as a musician, but for at least some of his friends he seems like a force stolen away, a figure embodying the strength of memory. He is gone, at 46.

I. H.

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